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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three studies that collectively examine the genesis 
and dynamics of collaborative cross-sector partnerships between nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations. The overarching question that frames the papers is how cross-sector 
partnerships organize across sectoral interfaces to advance social innovation. This thesis 
makes three contributions: 1) the standpoint of the beneficiaries needs to be explicitly 
discussed when exploring social innovation in cross-sector partnerships; 2) neither 
success nor failure are absolute but rather cross-sector partners deliberately and 
iteratively adjust their roles to sustain momentum towards success or rebound from 
temporary failure in pursuit of social innovation; and 3) despite largely non-overlapping 
sectoral frames, social innovation is possible when partners learn how to negotiate and 
fuse their value frames.  
In the first paper, we develop a critical theory of social innovation in cross-sector 
partnerships by recasting value creation from the standpoint of the beneficiary. We 
review and contrast the principles, relations and relational processes underpinning the 
Marxist, pragmatist and Frankfurt schools of thought to unpack the role the beneficiary 
may (or may not play) in value creation. Such critical theorizing enriches the conceptual 
foundation of the Resource Based View by reinstating the beneficiary as an essential 
contributor to value creation through voice-receiving, voice-making and/or voice-taking. 
This paper concludes that beneficiaries are essential to social innovation in cross-sector 
partnerships: they create and sustain generative tensions within each value creation cycle.  
In the second study, we explore the relational processes that underpin social 
innovation within cross-sector partnerships. Using four longitudinal narratives in 
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healthcare, we explain how partners navigate the duality of success and failure: deliberate 
role (re)calibrations help the partners sustain the momentum for success and overcome 
temporary failure or crossover from failure to success. Three factors moderate the 
relationship between role recalibrations and the momentum for success or failure: 
relational attachment, partner complacency, and partner disillusionment. 
The third and last study uses the same four longitudinal narratives to explore how 
cross-sector partners come to recognize and reconcile their divergent value creation 
frames in order to co-construct social innovation. We argue and find that partners initially 
contrast their sector-embedded diagnostic frames and then work together to deliberately 
develop partnership-specific prognostic frames. The study develops a four-stage 
grounded model of frame negotiation, elasticity, plasticity and fusion which unpacks the 
relational process of value creation in cross sector partnerships.  
Taken together, the three studies advance the cross-sector partnership project by 
fleshing out the (largely neglected) role of relational processes in social innovation. 
 
Keywords: social innovation, cross-sector partnerships, value creation, voice, relational 
processes, framing processes, critical management studies, RBV, healthcare   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A wide range of urgent social challenges, including climate change, sustainability, 
the growing gap between rich and poor, diversity, the social and economic impacts of 
globalization, and the current worldwide economic downturn are part of the everyday 
lexicon of Western society. And increasingly, corporations and businesses of all kinds are 
not only expected to be good corporate citizens but also to be actively engaged in solving 
some of these and other retractable social challenges such as poverty, disease and lack of 
education. Corporations in turn are looking to nonprofit organizations to assist them in 
meeting societal expectations.  
Yet, how these cross-sector partnerships, between for-profit and nonprofit 
organizations, work together to advance social innovation is not well understood. We 
know little of the genesis and dynamics of cross-sector partnerships; and even less of the 
role that the intended recipients or beneficiaries of these partnerships play in the process 
of social innovation. With three distinct actors, each with divergent value creation logics, 
power structure (or lack thereof) and identities, coming together for social innovation, the 
overarching question that frames the papers in this dissertation is how cross-sector 
partnerships organize across sectoral interfaces to advance social innovation. 
SOCIAL INNOVATION 
While there is not consensus on a universal definition (Goldenberg et. al., 2009) 
there is agreement that social innovation can bring about transformative change at the 
societal level if it is implemented successfully. Broadly, the goal of social innovation is to 
address the social challenges the world faces through innovative means. Social 
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innovation rests on two premises. First, it requires some degree of strategic repositioning, 
that is, it entails the creation of benefits or reductions of costs for society ―through efforts 
to address social needs and problems – in ways that go beyond the private gains and 
general benefits of market activity‖ (Phills et al., 2008: 39). Second, it requires novel 
combinations of ideas, resources, and capabilities; the process of creating social value is 
deliberate, effortful and unusually demanding (Magee, 2003; Pearce and Doh, 2005; 
Phills et al., 2008).  
While social value creation encompasses (but not exclusively) ―the pursuit of 
societal betterment through the removal of barriers that hinder social inclusion, the 
assistance of those temporarily weakened or lacking a voice, and the mitigation of 
undesirable side effects of economic activity‖ (Austin et al., 2006: 264); the term also 
suggests that not all value can be monetized. Although western society regularly 
calculates the value of someone‘s life or health in economic terms, social value 
challenges the notion that individual well-being, sense of belonging, hope, self-esteem, 
self-sufficiency, and self actualization or justice, fairness, environmental preservation, 
improved health, and better education can be reduced to a monetary amount. While there 
may be economic impacts of these social aspects of life, they are not defined by 
economics but rather through relationships between individuals and within communities.   
Nor is social value simply an unintended by-product of market dynamics, which 
is what Peteraf and Barney suggest when they say that: ―The economic value created by 
an enterprise in the course of providing a good or service is the difference between the 
perceived benefits gained by the purchaser of the good and the economic cost to the 
enterprise‖ (2003: 314). We argue that social value is distinct from financial or economic 
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value and that trade-offs and/or generative tensions between social and economic value 
exist. 
CROSS-SECTOR COLLABORATIVE PARTNERSHIPS 
The question of how business and nonprofit organizations come together to 
generate social value has received substantial theoretical and practical attention in recent 
years (Hess, Rogovsky and Dunfee, 2002; Selsky and Parker, 2005). Many regard social 
value creation as the raison d’être of cross sector partnerships (Alvord et al., 2004; 
Teegen et al., 2004). Creating social value requires novel combinations of partners‘ 
experience and capabilities. The received wisdom is that cross sector partners are often 
held apart by deeply embedded frames (Yaziji & Doh, 2009) and identity chasms 
(Brickson, 2007) – this often triggers clashes in their prior logics and expertise (Bryson et 
al., 2006) and surfaces inherent fragilities and incompatibilities which often predispose 
cross sector partnerships to distrust, conflict and premature failure (Macdonald & Chrisp, 
2005). A handful of applied studies vividly illustrate partners‘ will to ‗come together‘ 
(Austin, 2000; Rondinelli & London, 2003), but the underlying question of how partners 
surface, negotiate and fuse their value frame remains so far underexplored. 
In addition, organizational identities (Brickson, 2007), missions (Fiol & 
O‘Connor, 2002), structure (King, 2007), and patterns of activity (Plowman et al., 2007) 
constrain partners‘ willingness to engage in increasingly intense partnerships (Austin, 
2000; Rondinelli & London, 2003), their ability to adapt to evolving contingencies and 
opportunities (Seitanidi, 2008), and to overcome role conflict (Fiol et al., 2009). Inter-
organizational relational capabilities (i.e. the capacity to purposefully create, extend and 
modify organizational routines and resource base through engagement and relationships 
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with other organizations, Dyer & Kale, 2007), fostered by prior ties, trust, overarching 
goals and control mechanisms can help partners move along the collaboration continuum 
(Austin, 2000). When the strategic value of partnerships is high and the for-profit and 
nonprofit partners have a high level of engagement, interact frequently, and grapple with 
complex issues (i.e. in integrative social alliances; Yaziji & Doh, 2009), cross-sector 
partnerships are more resourceful and resilient than go-it alone social innovation efforts 
(Rondinelli & London, 2003). Yet the process by which partners jointly create social 
value is often non-linear (i.e. iterative between progress towards the goals and setbacks or 
circuitous), and fraught with fragilities, difficulties and disappointments (Teegen et al., 
2004). Only some partners manage to create social change in a constant, evolving, and 
cumulative manner (Weick & Quinn, 1999). Many others crumble due to ―mis-es‖ – 
misunderstandings, misallocations of costs and benefits, mismatches of power, 
mismatched partners, misfortunes of time and mistrust (Berger et al., 2004).  
THE THREE PAPERS 
The first paper critically examines how cross-sector partnerships initiate radical 
pro-social yet economically sustainable changes. This paper reframes the tensions 
between economic and social value creation from the standpoint of the primary 
beneficiaries of cross-sector partnership initiatives – groups with urgent and legitimate 
social claims. Although social innovation beneficiaries are often denied knowledge/ 
power/voice, this critical theory model explains how they can influence social and 
economic value creation: by engaging in voice-giving, voice-making and voice-taking, 
they create generative tensions which help attain and sustain meaningful social change. 
The two qualitative studies examine the relational processes (i.e. engagement and 
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exchanges of personal energy and influence in interactions between actors) that underpin 
social innovation within strategic cross-sector partnerships (paper 2) and the multilevel 
coordination mechanisms that help bring together clashing value creation logics and 
conflicting identities that can stall social innovation (paper 3).  
Context 
Our grounded inquiry focuses on the healthcare domain, one of the most 
promising contexts for studying social innovation (Christensen, Baumann, Ruggles, & 
Sadtler, 2006; Christensen, Grossman, & Hwang, 2009; Hwang & Christensen, 2008). 
We construct and contrast four in-depth, longitudinal narratives of cross-sector 
partnerships in Canadian healthcare using interviews of senior executives of both the 
nonprofit health organization and the for-profit business partner; and internal as well as 
public documents relating to the focal partnership. Each partnership sought to reshape the 
corporate-NGO interface and was considered strategic by both partners. All our for-profit 
partners were large publicly traded companies -- two medical device firms, an e-health 
solution provider, and an energy conservation solution provider focused on the healthcare 
industry. Our nonprofit partners in each dyad were either a separate division within a 
multi-hospital health centre or its affiliated hospital-based research institute.  
Structure of Dissertation 
Chapter 1 serves as the general introduction for this thesis. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
compose the major body of the dissertation. Each of the three chapters is an independent 
paper that is presented in publication style, with its own introduction, theory, methods, 
conclusion and bibliography. Following these chapters, I wrap up the dissertation with a 
general conclusion chapter, Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 2 
TOWARDS A CRITICAL THEORY OF VALUE CREATION 
IN CROSS-SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS
1
 
WHY WE NEED A CRITICAL THEORY OF VALUE CREATION 
The role of the beneficiary - broadly defined as a stakeholder who receives part of 
the value organizations create (Lepak, Smith, & Taylor, 2007) - is under-developed 
within mainstream theorizing about value creation and the resource-based view (RBV).
1
 
Although beneficiaries contribute both directly and indirectly to value creation in 
organizations, their contributions are often ignored and typically under-leveraged (Coff, 
1999). As a counterpoint to the unapologetically under-socialized RBV, we develop a 
critical theory of value creation which reclaims the beneficiary as a missing theoretical 
link and whose role influences for whom, for what and to what effect organizations in 
general (Freeman, Martin, & Parmar, 2007) and cross-sector partnerships in particular 
(Austin et al., 2006), create value. 
We take a beneficiary standpoint (Adler & Jermier, 2005) to revisit the historical 
roots of conceptualizing value to argue for a deliberate balance between social and 
economic interests (Smith, 1759/2000: 235) and draw explicit attention to how social 
processes in general (Margolis & Walsh, 2003) and relational processes more specifically 
(Di Domenico, Tracey, & Haugh, 2009; Le Ber & Branzei, 2010) may enable or hinder 
value creation. We first fill out the gap in mainstream theorizing of value creation within 
RBV by mapping out the distinct foundational premises of value creation within three 
                                                 
1 A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication (Le Ber, M. J., & Branzei, O. Forthcoming. Towards a 
critical theory of value creation in cross-sector partnerships. Organization, 17(5): 1-31. 
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critical theories – specifically, we articulate the principles, relations and relational 
processes that characterize value creation within each of these critical theories. 
We have focused on the Marxist, pragmatist and Frankfurt schools of thought 
because these strands have explored largely non-overlapping facets of value creation – 
asking respectively for whom, for what and to what effect beneficiaries may (or may not) 
create value. We argue for generative tensions at the interstices between these three 
theories to propose a creative hybrid that, we hope, helps ―advance the critical project [by 
putting forward] a less orthodox, more eclectic approach that favors rich diversity over 
rigorous contingencies‖ (Adler, Forbes, & Willmott, 2007: 155-156). Our beneficiary-
centric approach to value creation both challenges and amends prior firm-level or 
resource level theorizing within the RBV (Helfat et al., 2007) to propose a critical theory 
of value creation. 
The Resource-Based View (RBV) 
RBV initially provided a firm-centric account of value creation, arguing that firms 
with superior resources (i.e. valuable, rare, inimitable and organized to exploit) create and 
appropriate or capture more value than their competitors (Barney, 1991; 2007; Lepak et 
al., 2007). Subsequent iterations took a resource-centric account, examining how specific 
resources such as employees‘ labour or capabilities may contribute directly (Coff, 1999) 
or indirectly (Branzei & Thornhill, 2006) to organizational value creation and 
appropriation. Implicit throughout the RBV is the notion that combinations or 
configurations of resources may determine whether, when or what value is created or 
captured by organizations – often more so than resources per se (Lavie, 2006; Teece, 
2007). Explicit attention to micro-processes, foundational within the RBV since its 
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Penrosian roots (Rugman & Verbeke, 2002), has seen a resurgence of theoretical (Abell, 
Felin, & Foss, 2008; Felin & Hesterly, 2007) and empirical (Salvato, 2003) interest.  
Attempts to explain the micro-processes by which resources emerge and evolve 
has shown the glass half full to RBV theorists – helping to articulate how issues of fit and 
misfit amongst resources explain value creation and especially value appropriation, i.e. 
yielding above- or below-average levels of organizational performance (Helfat et al., 
2007). Yet the glass is also half empty. The RBV not only lacks a clear account of how 
social premises and social constraints influence value creation and appropriation (Sheth 
& Uslay, 2007), but also remains relatively silent about who contributes what to value 
creation (Adler et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2007; Garnett, 1999). Theorizing about value 
creation from the standpoint of the beneficiary helps bridge critical and mainstream 
conceptualizations of value and value processes. This not only moves us towards a more 
overtly socialized resource based view (Westwood & Clegg, 2003), but also 
problematizes and enriches the foundational principles, relations and relational processes 
of value creation within and across critical theories. 
Value Creation in Cross-Sector Partnerships 
This oversight is particularly challenging when theorizing about value creation 
within cross-sector partnerships, which set out to create value for the benefit of a third 
party, the beneficiary (Austin, 2000; Selsky & Parker, 2005). Cross sector partnerships 
are voluntary working arrangements between for-profit and not-for-profit organizations
2
 
which involve the deliberate exchange, sharing, or co-development of products, 
technologies, or services that address an unmet need for a specific segment of society 
(Yaziji & Doh, 2009) – i.e. the beneficiary.  
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The beneficiary. The beneficiary, broadly understood as the intended ―target‖ of 
value creation (Lepak et al., 2007), typically refers to a marginalized, disenfranchised or 
vulnerable segment of society at social risk (Phills, Deiglmeier, & Miller, 2008) that a 
cross-sector partnership explicitly addresses in its mission, products/services and 
accountability statements. Beneficiaries of value creation in general and for cross-sector 
partnerships in particular can be either individuals (e.g. Pearce & Doh, 2005) or 
collectives (e.g. Tracey, Phillips, & Haugh, 2005).
3
  
In cross-sector partnerships, beneficiaries can accrue social and/or economic 
value. We are agnostic on which, whether and how much value is captured by the cross-
sector partnership as long as at least some of the value created can be captured and 
appropriated by the target beneficiary. Social value creation is broadly regarded as the 
raison d’être of cross-sector partnerships (Alvord, Brown, & Letts, 2004; Mair & Martí, 
2006; Teegen, Doh, & Vachani, 2004): partners join forces to pursue ―societal betterment 
through the removal of barriers that hinder social inclusion, the assistance of those 
temporarily weakened or lacking a voice, and the mitigation of undesirable side effects of 
economic activity‖ (Austin et al., 2006: 264). By mission and design, the incremental 
social value created by a cross-sector partnership is channelled towards the target 
beneficiaries (Austin, 2000). Cross-sector partnerships may also create (although they 
typically do not appropriate) financial gains. Beneficiaries may access some of these 
financial gains depending on their (perceived) role in the value creation process. The 
partnership or the partners may capture a portion of the economic rents (Barney 1991) – 
either as profits or as reinvestments. The balance accrues to other stakeholders, e.g. 
higher wages for employees. 
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We conceptualize the beneficiary as a unitary social actor with the potential to 
make a contribution to value creation in cross-sector partnerships. Cross-sector 
partnerships can address multiple beneficiaries; for example, when target audiences 
diverge either in their needs or in how their needs are being served by the cross-sector 
partnership. Stakeholder theory explores how organizations in general (Freeman et al., 
2007) and cross-sector partnerships in particular (Stafford, Polonsky, & Hartman, 2000) 
accommodate multiple beneficiaries. Stakeholder theory also explores the point of view 
of other stakeholders (Frooman, 1999). This theory-building exercise contrasts and cross-
pollinates mainstream versus critical conceptualizations of the role that a specific 
beneficiary may (or may not) play in value creation.  
Mainstream versus critical conceptualizations of value creation in cross-sector 
partnerships. Our argument contrasts RBV and critical theory conceptualizations of 
value creation in cross-sector partnerships. Table 2.1 highlights literature on cross-sector 
partnerships and juxtaposes studies relying on RBV concepts (capabilities, advantage) 
versus critical concepts (power asymmetries, dependency, and marginalization) as 
building blocks in arguing about whether, when or how cross-sector partnerships create 
value. The RBV theorizes optimal value creation for the focal organization. Applied to 
cross-sector partnerships, how the cross sector partnership can be deliberately designed 
and implemented to create and capture value (King, 2007) and/or carefully managed to 
prevent value erosion (Googins & Rochlin, 2000; Rondinelli & London, 2003; Le Ber & 
Branzei, 2010; Seitanidi & Ryan, 2007) has been studied. Value creation helps build 
capabilities and foster innovation. Cross-sector partnerships are not ends in themselves 
but rather instruments to partners‘ goals including competitive advantage and growth. 
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TABLE 2.1 
 
Value Creation in Cross-Sector Partnerships 
 
Core Assumptions For Whom? For What? To What Effect? 
RBV Concepts 
Value is ―created 
primarily when business 
meets society‘s needs by 
producing goods and 
services in an efficient 
manner while avoiding 
unnecessary negative 
externalities‖ (Schwartz 
& Carroll, 2008: 168) 
 
Cross-level (Lepak 
et al., 2007) 
Partners (Austin, 
2000; 2006) 
 
Harnessing 
complementarities  
(Rondinelli & London, 
2003); 
Linkage capabilities 
(Stafford et al., 2000);  
Relational knowing 
(Bouwen & Taillieu, 
2004); 
Integration through 
engagement (Austin, 
2000; Dowling, Powell, 
& Glendinning, 2004)  
Organizational identity 
(Brickson, 2007) 
 
 
Competitive 
advantage (Barney, 
2007; Barney & 
Hesterly, 2005); 
Firm growth (Penrose, 
1959; Rugman & 
Verbecke, 2004); 
Improved relations 
between the firm and 
the society (Waddock, 
2004) 
Critical Theory concepts 
Asymmetric levels of 
engagement (Austin, 
2000); 
Uneven or misaligned 
interests, contributions or 
resource commitments 
(Yaziji & Doh, 2009); 
Power imbalances 
(Selsky & Parker, 2005; 
Frooman, 1999) 
 
Inter-firm (Hendry, 
2005, 2006); 
Inter-sector (Yaziji 
& Doh, 2009); 
Multi-party 
dynamics (King, 
2007; Hart & 
Sharma, 2004) 
 
True vs. hidden purpose 
of partnership 
(Macdonald & Chrisp, 
2005); 
‗Mis-es‘, i.e. 
misunderstandings, 
misallocations of costs 
and benefits, 
mismatches of power, 
mismatched partners, 
misfortunes of time and 
mistrust (Berger et al, 
2004) 
 
Social change in the 
face of complexity 
(Plowman et al., 
2007);  
Managing generative 
tensions (Hardy et al., 
2006)  
 
Beneficiaries are also seen as a means to organizational ends: by optimally addressing 
beneficiary needs, organizations achieve a tighter alignment between internal and 
external priorities or constituencies (Helfat et al., 2007). 
In contrast, studies using critical concepts acknowledge that cross-sector 
partnerships are fraught with fragilities and incompatibilities which often predispose 
partners to distrust, conflict and premature failure (Berger, Cunningham, & Drumwright, 
2004; Long & Arnold, 1995; Macdonald & Chrisp, 2005). They explore causes and 
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effects of power asymmetries and ‗mis-es‘ (misunderstandings, misallocations, and 
misfortunes, Berger et al., 2004). These theorists view cross-sector partnerships as 
important in and of themselves irrespective of the costs or gains accruing to the partners 
or their beneficiaries, as arenas for negotiating class differences, for constructing 
practical meaning (Follett, 1941), or redefining social priorities through radical social 
change initiatives (Plowman et al., 2007). 
We recast value creation from the standpoint of the beneficiary to counterbalance 
the focus of RBV on firm-centric resources, processes and outcomes. By marrying 
mainstream with critical views of value creation in cross-sector partnerships we begin to 
problematize for whom, for what, and to what effect value is created. 
THEORY 
A beneficiary-centric view of value creation sensitizes us to foundational 
differences in how critical theories have conceptualized value creation. To compare and 
contrast the roles the beneficiary may (or may not) play across different critical theories, 
we use a shared unit of theorizing value creation in cross-sector partnerships, borrowed 
from the RBV: the value cycle.  
The Value Cycle 
A value cycle is a set of exchanges between at least two parties (i.e. the cross-
sector partnership and the beneficiary in our case) whereby the parties first create some 
additional value jointly and then unilaterally capture some of this value. The value 
captured by each party is a prerequisite for participation in future exchanges (Makadok, 
2001; Peteraf & Bergen, 2003) – but it is not always, nor even necessarily commensurate 
with the effort and/or resources contributed by each party (Lepak et al., 2007). Each 
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value cycle aggregates value creation across social exchanges; in some cases a value 
cycle may be further disaggregated into standalone exchanges. However, it often takes 
multiple exchanges to generate and accrue value.    
Value cycles are idiosyncratic to each cross-sector partnership: they depend on 
how partners define value (Le Ber & Branzei, forthcoming) and what partners expect to 
gain from the exchange (Di Domenico et al., 2009). They also vary across beneficiaries 
depending on the expected benefit. In some cases, value may be created and captured 
instantly (e.g. a vaccine takes a short time to administer); in other cases, value creation 
and capture can take much longer (e.g. building a value chain for reliably administering a 
vaccination program may take years).  
The Beneficiary Voice 
The concept of voice runs across critical theories (Alvesson & Deetz, 2006; 
Maguire, 2001). Voice proxies and affects power relations (Way, 1997). Not only we do 
not ―give voice to those in less powerful positions‖ (Noffke, 1998: 10-11), but silencing 
mechanisms such as censorship, suppression, intimidation, marginalization, trivialization, 
discounting and gate keeping (Barrett, 2001) are applied systematically in organizations 
to mute contributions from specific groups. Some participants gain voice – they make 
sense of their everyday experiences, expose hidden relations and deep conflicts, and re-
engage in (less oppressive) social relations. Finding voice helps disrupt ingrained power 
relationships (Brydon-Miller, 1997); exercising voice becomes ―an act of power that 
forces the other to carry the burden of speaking or acting as if any relationship is to be 
maintained‖ (Chataway, 1997: 758). 
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We introduce the concept of beneficiary voice to explain how marginalized, 
disenfranchised or vulnerable segments of society choose to engage in cross-sector 
partnerships which focus on addressing their needs. Our working assumption is that 
beneficiaries act agentically; they can and often do contribute to value creation processes. 
Yet we are mindful that beneficiaries often remain marginalized during value creation 
processes and thus many of their potential contributions may fail to materialize. Our 
concept of beneficiary voice is power-ambivalent: in some cases, power asymmetries 
may favour the partnership (e.g. Hardy, Lawrence, & Phillips, 2006); in other cases, they 
may favour the beneficiary (e.g. Frooman, 1999). However, specific types of beneficiary 
voices carry specific assumptions concerning the relative power of the beneficiary vis-à-
vis the partnership. 
Table 2.2 summarizes the value creation premises of five critical theories. 
Marxists caution that an exclusive focus on economic value creation can undermine 
social good and stifle social progress through the (unreflective) reification of class 
structure, dominant discourse, and power asymmetries. Environmentalists similarly 
contrast the priorities of managerial elites with the (often foregone) contributions of 
human and non-human stakeholders. They criticize greenwashing and bluewashing, 
expose the downsides of corporate practices which are causing environmental strain and 
damage (Jermier et al., 2006) and bemoan the hijacking of social needs by corporate 
capitalists to promote private gains (Laufer, 2003; Welford, 1997; 1998). Feminists also 
criticize the constraints placed on women and other marginalized segments of the society 
(e.g. barriers to access, lesser recognition of their contributions), suggesting that these 
constraints unnecessarily and unfairly constrain value creation (Calás & Smircich, 2006).  
  
 
TABLE 2.2 
 
Critical Theories of Value Creation  
Core Assumptions For Whom? For What? To What Effect? 
Standpoint 
―All phases of a research study – how we identify 
research issues, theorize research questions, 
gather and analyze data, draw conclusions, and 
use the knowledge produced – are conditioned to 
some extent by the researcher‘s subjective and 
objective place in the […] social order‖ (Adler et 
al., 2007: 145-146) 
 
Takes point of view of those least 
advantaged which requires 
―reflexive inquiry about the values 
underwriting our work‖ (Adler and 
Jermier, 2005: 942); Those who are 
exploited, systematically oppressed 
and dominated (Adler et al., 2007) 
 
―…create knowledge that raises 
consciousness about 
exploitation and helps 
movement toward 
emancipation‖ (Adler and 
Jermier, 2005: 943) 
 
A more just and democratic 
public policy debate (Adler and 
Jermier, 2005) 
Marxism 
Class conflict both limits labourers‘ contribution 
to value creation and caps their ability to 
appropriate this value. ―Work is not designed to 
express human needs and values, but to maximize 
profit and/or to safeguard the privileges and 
control of managerial elites‖ (Adler et al., 2007: 
134) 
 
Labourers, non-owners of 
productive resources, property-less, 
working class, proletariat create 
value for the managerial elites 
(Adler et al., 2007; Tucker, 1978) 
 
Forces of production become 
obsolete and cooperation 
becomes more important in 
order to further develop new 
forces of production (Adler et 
al., 2007).  
 
A radical social-structure 
change (social revolution) 
places productive capacities of 
society into collective 
ownership (Tucker, 1978) 
Feminism 
―All feminist theorizing is about social change. It 
is premised on the assumption that gender is 
fundamental in the structuring of society with 
women being historically disadvantaged and it 
seeks to end this condition‖ (Calás et al., 2009) 
 
Non-dominant persons, usually 
women but could be racial, ethnic 
and sexual minorities (Calás & 
Smircich, 1999) 
 
Eliminating barriers to access in 
public life for women; 
promoting workforce equity and 
equality; validation of women‘s 
contribution to society (Calás et 
al., 2009) 
 
Social change that reduces 
domination/ subordination/ 
gendered relations (Calás & 
Smircich, 2006) 
Environmentalism 
Critiques the misleading representation of 
corporations‘ environmental performance; the 
hijacking of the environmentalist movement; the 
environmentalist rhetoric, and the lack of green 
substance (Welford, 1997) 
 
Laggards in environmental 
practices and corporations engaged 
in ―Greenwashing‖ (Adler et al., 
2007; Laufer, 2003; Lyon & 
Maxwell, 2004) 
 
Green narrative (Starkey and 
Crane, 2003); Critiques of 
partisan rhetoric (Fineman, 
2000; Levy & Egan, 2003; Levy 
& Newell, 2005) 
 
Sustainable development 
(Castro, 2004) 
Pragmatism 
Social realities are negotiated and contested 
(Blumer, 1969); Rejection of self-other dualism 
(Dewey, 1935/1963) 
 
Everyday interactions; individual 
practice, knowledge and 
experiential learning 
 
Community and participatory 
democracy in organizations 
(Follett, 1941) 
 
Change in corporate power and 
social structure (Adler et al., 
2007) 
1
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TABLE 2.2 (continued) 
Core Assumptions For Whom? For What? To What Effect? 
Enlightment/ Frankfurt School 
―Assumes the feasibility and desirability of 
greater autonomy for individuals, who, in the 
tradition of Enlightenment, are able to master 
their own destinies through collaboration with 
peers‖ (Adler et al., 2007: 138) 
 
Marginalized and disadvantaged 
groups of people (Adler et al., 
2007) 
  
 
Undistorted communication 
among stakeholders (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2007); Integration of 
ethical concerns and economic 
bargaining (Habermas, 1998) 
 
Radical social-structural change: 
―The aim is to (re)establish a 
political order where economic 
rationality is circumscribed by 
democratic institutions and 
procedures‖ (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2007: 1097) 
1
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Pragmatists introduce the notion of participatory democracy to restore more 
balanced contributions to value creation. They view community participation on par with 
corporate power (Adler et al., 2007). They also place equal expectations of participation 
in all social relationships; Follett calls for ―related thinking‖ (1941: 212), joint 
responsibility for each other‘s outcome (1941: 214), and a principle of integration, 
whereby ―you and I both get what we want, the whole situation moves forward, and the 
process often has community value‖ (1941: 215). Taken together, Follett argues for self-
interested contributions – but only ―in the service of the highest unity with which we are 
capable of identifying ourselves‖ (1941: 218). 
Enlightenment scholars, and especially those from the Frankfurt school, see the 
disenfranchised as masters of their own destinies and encourage them to play an 
autonomous role in value creation (Adler et al., 2007). Frankfurt school theorists go 
beyond undistorted communication among all stakeholders (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007) to 
advocate for a championing and self-redefining role of the marginalized in driving radical 
social change.  
Types of Voice 
The concept of beneficiary voice, deeply rooted in the critical theory tradition, 
foreshadows the role that beneficiaries may (or may not) play in value creation within 
different critical theory strands. In Marxist and related feminist and environmentalist 
thought, voice-receiving perpetuates power asymmetries and dependencies (Phillips, 
2003: 1100). For pragmatists, voice-making equalizes and empowers (Dewey, 1935/1963; 
Follett 1941). Beneficiaries have the responsibility to communicate openly and explicitly 
to facilitate understanding and get what they really want (Follett, 1941: 221-222). For 
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enlightenment theorists, voice-taking strengthens individual autonomy and civic liberties 
(Alvesson, Bridgman, & Willmott, 2009) and enables emancipation from domination or 
marginalization (Willmott, 1997). It helps break with the historical continuum to enable 
radical transformation (Marcuse, 1970). It also confers legitimacy: ―What can be justified 
as a social claim in the eyes of a social interest group may be different from the moral 
ideas of managers, suppliers, customers or other interest groups‖ (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2007: 1099; see also Tomlinson, 2005).  
Voice-receiving. In Marxist and related feminist and environmentalist schools of 
thought, the elite class recognizes the dominated as a key contributor to value creation, 
i.e. ―for Marx, it is the socially necessary labor time required to produce a commodity 
that determines this exchange value‖ (Adler et al., 2007: 133). The marginalized, 
disenfranchised or vulnerable are either silent or systematically silenced (Maguire, 2001). 
Any concerns they voice -- short of a revolution that uproots the dominant class -- are 
channelled and interpreted, and occasionally granted, by the elites. However, only claims 
in line with the dominant interests are heard and headed. Not only are the dominated 
heard only partially but their claims can be misframed, misunderstood, or misconstrued in 
ways that deepen and reify their dependence by the dominant actors. Even those seeking 
to address the needs of the marginalized still control whether, when and how these get to 
exercise voice (Calás, Smircich, & Bourne, 2009; Karnani, 2008). Our label of voice-
receiving emphasizes the (often one-sided) constraints placed on the beneficiary. Should 
the beneficiary exercise voice, its ability to contribute to value creation and to appropriate 
the gains would increase (Coff, 1999). The elite class balances the possibility of greater 
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contributions to value creation as a result of the beneficiary receiving voice against the 
likelihood of disrupting the status quo. 
Voice-making. Pragmatists envision beneficiaries as equal participants in value 
creation through an ongoing dialogue that can both surface and resolve non-overlapping, 
even conflicting, interests. ―The hope is to provide forums so that different segments of 
society and different human interests can be part of a better, more moral historical 
dialogue, so that each may equally contribute to the choices in reproducing a future for 
all‖ (Alvesson & Deetz, 2006: 259). Voice-making brings divergent interests together by 
openly acknowledging that mutuality and complementarity of interests can develop 
through (painstaking) engagement (Follett, 1941).  
Not only are voice-making beneficiaries actively and pragmatically engaged in 
value creation, but their claims often co-evolve as the other participants update their own 
goals and contributions. Voice-making requires deep and dynamic engagement by the 
beneficiary – it is not a foregone conclusion but an achievement which requires ―hard 
thinking, inventiveness and ingenuity‖ (Follett, 1941: 212. Voice-making processes are 
often emotionally charged (Fiol & O‘Connor, 2002) and involve constant renegotiations 
of identities and roles (Fiol, Pratt, & O‘Connor, 2009). When successful, the equal 
engagement of the beneficiaries re-shapes the dialogue (Zietsma & Winn, 2008) by 
testing, triangulating and dynamically incorporating new sources and processes of value 
creation (Plowman et al., 2007).  
Reflexivity and meaning are important parts of voice-making. Beneficiaries are 
welcome to scrutinize the bases of value creation and the compatibility between social 
and economic goals. However, the pragmatic beneficiary can only trigger a change in 
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value creation when other participants‘ actions are compatible with their claims, i.e. when 
everyone‘s self-interest subscribes to a common goal. Furthermore, beneficiaries share in 
the responsibility of finding an agreeable way forward – even when the process of value 
creation may crumble under tensions and adversity (Berger et al., 2004).  
Voice-taking. The Frankfurt School of critical theory emphasizes social change 
though activism, specifically through peer connections that reaffirm individual mastery 
over their destiny and promote mutual support and collective power (Adler et al., 2007). 
Enlightened individuals take voice through collective action. Voice-taking is a marked 
counterpoint to the status quo. It is often a reaction to inadequate or insufficient attention 
by the dominant actors to legitimate and urgent beneficiary claims. Unlike pragmatists, 
enlightened beneficiaries do not seek attention. Rather, attention is a means to the greater 
end of seeing their claims resolved; they seek specific (re)alignments between their 
contributions and rewards and those of other participants to value creation. Thus, voice-
taking beneficiaries explicitly (re)define who ought to participate in value creation, what 
value should be pursued and to what effect – often (radical) social change. 
 Clearly, such (re)definition is not always sufficient to effect social change. In 
some instances, voice-taking can backfire by exposing the marginalized to discriminatory 
treatment, by ‗tipping off‘ their hand in negotiations, or by scaring off potential partners, 
who may be unable or unwilling to assume the risks associated with significant changes 
in the nature, scope or process of value creation. Indeed, voice-taking succeeds at times 
(Alvord et al, 2004; Hardy et al., 2006) but often fails (Banerjee, 2007; Habermas, 1998). 
The failure is not inherently problematic, and may indeed offer some forward momentum 
by clearly exposing the limitations of the status-quo (Tomlinson, 2005), by bringing 
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legitimate and urgent social needs to the fore (Stafford, Polonsky, & Hartman, 2000), and 
by outlining both the trade-offs and the potential synergies between economic and social 
value creation (Hudson, 2009). 
 Irrespective of its success or failure, voice-taking is often not just critical of the 
past, but more importantly, is forward-looking. It exposes current models of business 
thinking and practice to new frames or logics of value creation (Di Domenico et al., 
2009) and proposes new value combinations (Le Ber & Branzei, forthcoming). However, 
voice-taking does not pre-empt the risk that collective action can be stalled, side-tracked, 
or high-jacked or exploited by powerful actors. 
Several critical theories explore discrepancies between the role that the 
marginalized, disadvantaged or vulnerable could and perhaps should play in value 
creation in order to meet their own needs and goals and the role they are able or allowed 
to play. Next, we contrast the distinct perspectives on value creation within the Marxist 
perspectives and the related feminist and environmentalist strands, pragmatism and the 
Frankfurt School. We play up differences in foundational principles, relations and 
relational processes to suggest how the type of beneficiary voice patterns value creation 
in cross-sector partnerships. 
PRINCIPLES, RELATIONS AND RELATIONAL PROCESSES OF VALUE 
CREATION 
Critical theories articulate the role the marginalized could play in value creation 
(principles), the conditions that may enable or hinder their contribution to value creation 
(relations) and the interactions that reify power asymmetries or dependencies (relational 
processes). In Table 2.3, we map out the principles, relations and relational processes 
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foundational to Marxist (and related applications of these in feminist and 
environmentalist strands), pragmatist and Frankfurt School perspectives. We first explain 
how the type of beneficiary voice signifies each perspective; then we explore how 
transitions in voices help contrast, blend or shift critical perspectives to provide a more 
nuanced and more wholesome view of value creation in cross-sector partnerships.  
To illustrate our arguments, we developed three examples of cross-sector 
partnerships in healthcare by combining archival sources, including partnership and 
partner-specific reports, beneficiary accounts, and third party representations (see 
Appendix). We focused on healthcare partnerships because they represent a hot bed for 
theoretical and empirical understanding of value creation (Christensen et al., 2006; 
Christensen, Grossman, & Hwang, 2009) and because they necessarily scrutinize and 
document the evolution of beneficiary needs, voice and contributions to value creation. 
We relied on well-known examples – Merck‘s introduction of Mectizan to fight river 
blindness, DNDi-sanofi‘s campaign against malaria and AngloGold‘s HIV/AIDS 
program in South Africa.  
For each example, we compiled rich descriptions which provided a multifaceted 
understanding of how the cross-sector partnership emerged and evolved over time. We 
kept expanding the set of archival resources to provide evidence or counterevidence for 
the principles, relations and relational processes outlined in Table 2.3. We then analysed 
each example to identify (often multiple) types of voices and explore overlaps or 
transitions between different types of voice. Our text narratives and supporting tables 
summarize and detail the key insights from our analyses.  
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TABLE 2.3 
 
Principles, Relations and Relational Processes of Value Creation 
 
Voice Critical Theories Principles Relations Relational Processes 
Voice-
receiving 
 
Marxism  
Feminism 
Environmentalism 
Constraint Relations of 
Production 
(Mis)attribution – the 
partners ignore, control, 
constrain, inappropriately 
define and/or under-
leverage the role the target 
beneficiary could play in 
value creation. 
Voice-
making 
 
Pragmatism Consensus Relations of 
Integration 
(Misdirected)attention – 
the partners question, 
change, and/or expand the 
roles the beneficiary could 
play in value creation 
based on dialogue 
(adversarial and/or 
collaborative) with the 
target beneficiary.  
Voice-taking 
 
Enlightenment 
Frankfurt School 
Contingency Relations of 
Definition 
(Mis)alignment – the 
recombination and/or 
reconfiguration of 
partners‘ contributions is 
contingent on the role the 
target beneficiary chooses 
to play. 
 
Voice-receiving: Principle of Constraint, Relations of Productions, Processes of 
Attribution 
Despite many differences in their focus and applications,
4
 the Marxist and related 
feminist and environmentalist schools of thought share the assumption that contributions 
of the marginalized, disenfranchised or vulnerable to value creation are unduly 
constrained by one asymmetrically powerful class or faction, i.e. the elites in Marxism, 
the dominant gender in feminism, and the corporate interest in environmentalism. This 
foundational principle of constraint has different applications in each perspective, but the 
end result is similar: value creation is repressed by dominant actors, who (often unfairly) 
take advantage by capturing and appropriating a disproportionate amount of the value 
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created at the expense of the marginalized, disenfranchised or vulnerable. Although the 
dominated contribute essentially to value creation, the power asymmetries constrain not 
only their ability to increase their contributions (by withholding compensation, 
subsequent value cycles are short-changed), but often their motivation to do so (i.e. by 
systematically silencing them). For example, under-pricing natural resources not only 
leads to their overuse, but also undermines their contribution to future cycles of value 
creation (Hart, 1995). Similarly, gender barriers deny women their current and future 
contributions to value creation (Calás et al., 2009; Maguire, 2001).  
Value creation is short-sighted (and often short-lived) due to relations of 
production, whereby the dominant actors adjust value cycles to capture the desired gains, 
without close regard to who contributes what to value creation in the first place. The 
marginalized, disenfranchised or vulnerable can bargain for a greater share of the 
economic gains by making their initial contribution more salient. They may draw 
attention to the value of their (potential or foregone) contributions, either favourably, by 
building capabilities, or unfavourably, by withholding capabilities (Coff, 1999). 
However, such bargaining is suboptimal for value creation because it remains subject to 
power asymmetries: dominant actors typically focus on maximizing their returns, not on 
maximizing value creation.  
Although each value cycle creates some opportunities for bargaining and iterative 
correction (Coff, 1999) – these are hindered by recurrent and persistent (mis)attributions 
about who contributes what to value creation. These (mis)attributions are perpetuated by 
the dominant class – despite evidence to the contrary. Relational processes that make 
salient the contribution of the beneficiary and/or their claims for compensation can help 
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correct these (mis)attributions – but corrections typically fall within the interest of the 
dominated, consistent with the principle of constraint. When the dominant accept greater 
contributions from the dominated in exchange for better compensation (but without full 
or just compensation), value creation improves in the next cycle; however, the 
improvement remains suboptimal and thus sustains asymmetric contributions and 
compensation, ultimately reifying the dependence of the dominated on the dominant.  
Table 2.4 recounts the early efforts of Merck & Co. to fight onchocerciasis (better 
known as river blindness) with the introduction, production, and distribution of Mectizan 
to illustrate how these foundational elements of value creation – principle of constraint, 
the relations of productions, and the relational processes of (mis)attribution – influence 
for whom the cross-sector partnership creates value. Merck initially assumed that the 
target beneficiaries – the poor going blind in Africa, Middle East and Latin America – 
could neither pay anything for the drugs nor contribute in any other way to value 
creation. Merck recognized health benefits for the beneficiary – voice-receiving thus 
reinforced the marginalization and vulnerability of the poor going blind but ignored their 
potential influence for the development, testing and distribution of the drug. This short-
changed Merck‘s ability to create value early on – for the poor waiting for the drug and 
for Merck‘s staff scientists conducting the research.  
These initial (mis)attributions were iteratively corrected. Merck through its 
nonprofit partners, particularly the World Health Organization (WHO), gradually 
expanded the roles the beneficiaries could play to include participation in clinical trial, 
adoption and distribution programs. Merck‘s and WHO‘s efforts to broaden the roles of 
the beneficiaries in value creation resulted in (significant and unprecedented)
  
 
TABLE 2.4 
Example of Value Creation in Cross-Sector Partnerships: River Blindness Treatment  
For Profit: Merck & Co.; Non Profit: World Health Organization (WHO); World Bank; UNICEF 
 
 1978 1980 1982 1982-1987 1987 1987-1988 1988 1989- 
K
ey
 E
ve
n
ts
 
Ivermectin, a 
veterinary 
drug, thought 
to treat river 
blindness/ 
onchocerciasis. 
Voice-
receiving 
 
Merck moves 
forward with 
human clinical 
trials. 
Voice-making 
 
 
Most individuals with 
river blindness live in 
remote areas  
Voice-receiving 
WHO scientists 
question the potential 
effectiveness and 
safety of Mectizan.  
WHO and Merck 
discuss the most 
appropriate way to 
conduct clinical 
trials. 
Voice-making 
Mectizan 
formulated to be 
taken once a year in 
tablet form under 
minimal 
supervision. 
Merck pursues 
regulatory approval 
– granted in 1987.  
Voice-receiving 
Merck announces 
that it would supply 
Mectizan to anyone 
who needed it as 
long as necessary at 
no charge.  
Voice-receiving 
Merck searches for 
parties to distribute 
Mectizan -US AID, 
African health 
ministries, and 
foundations. 
Voice-making 
WHO recruits and 
trains community 
workers in 16 
African countries 
how to dispense the 
drugs, look for side 
effects and keep 
records. WHO 
supplies the drugs 
from Merck to the 
village volunteers 
who do the rest.  
Voice-taking 
Merck creates 
independent 
Mectizan Expert 
Committee to 
ensure 
appropriate 
distribution of 
and tracking of 
adverse 
reactions to the 
drug 
Funded by 
Merck. 
Voice-making 
WHO invites 
Merck to join the 
―Global Alliance to 
Eliminate 
Lymphatic 
Filariasis‖ 
(elephantiasis); 
Merck donates 
Mectizan, to be 
used in combination 
with another 
preventive drug, 
albendazole 
donated by 
GlaxoSmithKline. 
Voice-taking 
G
en
er
a
ti
ve
 T
en
si
o
n
s 
Attribution: Those afflicted with the 
disease can not afford to purchase 
the drug. Governments or 
foundations will pay for and 
distribute drug if proven effective. 
Head of Merck research labs 
approves initial funding for research 
in human use of drug. 
Attribution: Distribution to afflicted 
individuals needs to be simple; risk of 
noncompliance if drug administration is too 
complicated or logistically difficult. Clinical 
trials require modern medical facilities to 
ensure proper medical oversight of study and 
collection of data. 
Attribution: If they give away the drug 
someone (else) will have to distribute it to 
those individuals with disease. 
Attribution: Merck‘s contributions will 
be complemented by a growing role of 
the beneficiaries. 
 
Attention: Dr. Aziz, a tropical 
disease expert, a native of 
Bangladesh, and a former WHO 
scientist, who had lived in Sierra 
Leone and had firsthand knowledge 
of the disease, is appointed to 
oversee the clinical trials. 
Attention: Clinical trials begin at the 
University of Dakar, Senegal. Merck 
supplies drug and grants-in-aid; WHO 
provides scientists and research facilities; 
1983-1984 Phase 2 clinical trials Senegal, 
Mali, Ghana, Liberia; 1986 Phase 3 in 
Ghana and Liberia. 
Alignment: WHO has access to a global 
network of government health officials and 
scientists who could help run clinical trials. 
Alignment: WHO has access to 
governments and companies and can 
coordinate collaborations to effectively 
fight disease in developing countries. 
V
a
lu
e 
C
re
a
ti
o
n
 
Building 
knowledge on 
parasitology. 
Maintaining 
culture of 
innovation. 
Reinforcing 
Merck‘s mission 
to alleviate 
human suffering. 
Establishing optimum dosage and drug‘s 
safety; establishing drug effectiveness for at-
risk populations. 
Goodwill for Merck – gesture to less 
developed countries and to WHO;  
Burnish company‘s already stellar 
reputation. Existing culture of self- 
sufficiency among villagers reinforced. 
Pharma executives more open minded 
about innovative collaborations. 
40,000 cases of blindness prevented 
annually.  62 million acres of 
previously abandoned arable land 
recovered (World Bank). Estimated 
7.5million years of productive adult 
labor available by 2010. 
2
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breakthroughs. After Mectizan was approved for human use in 1987, the appropriate 
form/dosage was introduced, and suitable pricing and logistics were established, more 
than 1.5 million people were treated within three years (1988-1990). By 2007, 60 million 
people annually were being treated, and the WHO estimates that 40,000 more cases of 
blindness are prevented each year.  
The Merck/WHO partnership also shifted to voice-making and then voice-taking 
(a journey we return to in the next section to explain generative tension). For example, 
Merck engaged with WHO scientists on questions about drug safety and effectiveness, 
and then participatively reworked the protocol, location, and timing of clinical trials 
(Table 2.4). Furthermore, beneficiaries‘ confidence that the treatment would work so they 
could restore their traditional livelihoods and preserve their culture of self-sufficiency 
and traditions broadened the scope of value creation to include reclaiming previously 
abandoned lands. The World Bank approximates that 62 million acres of previously 
abandoned arable land were recovered by addressing the health risk, and 7.5 million 
years of productive adult labor were restored to river-bank communities. 
Voice-making: Principle of Consent, Relations of Integration, Processes of Attention 
Voice-making beneficiaries can have their claims expressed, heard, and satisfied 
(without compromise), through equal participation in a shared course and discourse. 
Pragmatists emphasize social co-determination, whereby multiple parties come together 
as equal conversation partners to co-create a shared future. Social realities are negotiated 
in everyday encounters by promoting self-interest as well as identity with a greater goal 
(Follett, 1941); self-other dualisms are rejected (Dewey, 1935/1963) and parties feel 
responsibility for each other‘s outcomes. The principle of consent is foundational for 
30 
 
 
 
pragmatists. Change is consensual, not antagonistic, and socially constructed through 
open and explicit conversation (Follett, 1941). 
The agenda for change is affirmative, rooted in a shared hope that institutions can 
be reformed through morally driven discourse (Deetz 1992; 1999). Consent is (re)built 
through relations of integration. Integration is seen as a collaborative and socially 
constructed achievement (Follett, 1941). ―It is not power, status, prestige, ideology, 
manipulation, the rule of experts, fear, insecurity, misunderstanding or any other form of 
mischief that furnishes a base for evolving ideas; instead, decision-making is based on the 
strength of well-grounded arguments provided in an open forum‖ (Alvesson & Deetz, 
2006: 263). Relations of integration not only acknowledge who plays what role in value 
creation, but also jointly decide for what (shared) good value is being created in the first 
place (Lyytinen & Hirshcheim 1988; Power, Laughlin, & Cooper, 2003; Deetz, 2007). 
Consent and integration are not easily achieved. Our concept of voice-making 
reinforces the effortful achievement of consent through consistent participation. ―One of 
the fundamental differences between consent and participation is that consent is not part 
of the process; it comes at the end of or after the process. Participation is not only part of 
the process; it should begin with the beginning of the process‖ (Follett, 1941: 223), 
before differences grow and crystallize.  
When participants have to negotiate their interests in conflict-ridden situations, 
when identities clash (Hardy et al., 2006) and goals diverge (Di Domenico et al., 2009), 
reaching consent through integration requires directing attention towards shared values 
(Le Ber & Branzei, forthcoming). However, the cross-sector partnership can (mis)direct 
attention towards some beneficiary needs or goals at the expense of others, in ways that 
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create tension or suspicion, or may even endanger or harm the interest of the target 
beneficiary (e.g. Karnani, 2008). Some partnerships harbour heated conflict (Fiol & 
O‘Connor, 2002) and most require constant (re)forming to stay tuned to the beneficiary 
(Le Ber & Branzei, 2010). Mis-communication and mis-understandings are not 
uncommon in cross-sector partnerships (Berger et al., 2004; Selsky & Parker, 2005). 
Relational processes help re-direct attention towards goals shared by the partnership and 
the beneficiaries – or may (mis)direct attention towards divergent claims, ending in an 
impasse.  
Table 2.5 presents the changing role of the beneficiary in the partnership of Drugs 
for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi) and sanofi-aventis. The partnership tackled 
malaria, the leading parasitic cause of morbidity and mortality worldwide. It focused on 
sub-Saharan Africa, which accounts for 90% of all malaria deaths and where a child dies 
every 30 seconds. Across Africa, the economic cost of malaria is estimated at US$12 
billion every year; in high prevalence areas, malaria slows down economic growth by 
1.3% a year. Even before the inception of the collaboration, the partnership paid close 
attention to the needs of these target beneficiaries. In 2002, Médecins Sans Frontiéres 
(MSF, also known as Doctors without Borders; a 1999 Nobel Peace Prize recipient for its 
humanitarian work but also an outspoken activist organization regarding the plights of the 
populations it serves) plus five public sector research organizations – Kenya Medical 
Research Institute, Indian Council of Medical Research, Malaysian Ministry of Health, 
Oswaldo Cruz Foundation in Brazil and France‘s Institut Pasteur joined forces to develop 
more locally-suitable combinations of existing malaria drugs. WHO stepped in as a 
permanent observer to the initiative. The partnership formalized this collaboration, 
  
 
TABLE 2.5 
Example of Value Creation in Cross-Sector Partnerships: Malaria Treatment 
For Profit: sanofi-aventis; Non Profit: Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi) 
 
 2003 2004 2004 2007 2007 
K
ey
 E
ve
n
ts
 
DNDi is founded as a patients‘ 
needs-driven drug R&D organization 
for neglected diseases. They create 
and manage R&D networks to 
develop new treatments; raise 
awareness through advocacy on 
R&D of drugs for neglected 
diseases; strengthen existing 
research capacity in countries where 
neglected diseases are endemic. 
Voice-taking 
Agreement is signed 
between DNDi and sanofi-
aventis 
No patents taken to 
encourage local 
manufacturing  of generic 
drug formulation 
Pricing policies are 
developed that give access. 
Voice-making 
The drug is adapted to all age 
groups (using 3 presentations 
for children and one for 
adults), following WHO 
advice. Drug is manufactured 
by sanofi-aventis in a purpose 
built plant in Morocco. 
Voice-taking 
ASAQ (new fixed-dose combination 
of Artesunate (AS) and Amodiaquine 
(AQ) is available throughout sub-
Saharan Africa to cure malaria. 
Available at a ―no profit–no loss‖ 
price of less than 50¢ US for a child 
under 5 years old and less than $1.00 
for older children and adults, it is 
affordable for public health 
organizations of endemic countries, 
NGOs and UN institutions. 
Voice-receiving 
The Fact Implementation 
Advisory Group is 
convened by DNDi as an 
independent panel of 
experts to provide 
independent advice and 
guidance about rational 
use, equitable access and 
implementation more 
generally.   
Voice-making 
G
en
er
a
ti
ve
 T
en
si
o
n
s 
Attention: Includes local research 
partners from the countries where 
neglected diseases are endemic.  
Attention: Local partners 
add value to defining the 
needs of the target 
beneficiary and engaging 
them in the initiative. 
Attention: Those affected by 
the disease can add value and 
guide value creation in the 
development and 
manufacturing of the drug. 
Attribution: Those affected by the 
disease can access and afford the drug 
– pricing and distribution involve the 
target beneficiary. 
Attention: Consensus is 
necessary and beneficial 
for the value creation 
process.  
 Alignment: Three Decision Criteria: 
Quality in galenical (organic) development, manufacturing and storage;  
Accessibility, non-patented drug at a affordable price; and 
Simplicity, once-a-day regime easy to manage for the prescriber and the patient. 
Alignment: The beneficiary needs 
inform and drive others‘ role in the 
value creation process, including 
pricing and distribution decisions. 
Alignment: Broad 
consultation promotes 
further alignment 
between value creation 
roles. 
V
a
lu
e 
C
re
a
ti
o
n
 At the start, major issues of contention were the requests by DNDi for:  
A royalty-free license to develop drugs arising from the research for commercialization in all disease-endemic countries;  
Freedom to manufacture the drugs in any country; 
Freedom from the requirement to patent the research outcomes for commercialization in any of the disease-endemic countries (Patents can add 
several million dollars to the cost of a drug.) UCSF retains the right to patent for other uses but not in a manner that will restrict DNDi‘s use of 
the research.7 
By October 2008 – over 
3million treatments of 
ASAQ had been 
distributed. 
3
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refocusing on the development of FACT -- Fixed dose Artesunate-based Combination 
Therapies -- as recommended by the WHO in 2001. 
Voice-making beneficiaries helped (re)direct the partnership‘s attention towards 
the most relevant aspects of the drug development, manufacturing and distribution 
process. By mid 2007, ASAQ -- a new fixed-dose combination of Artesunate (AS) and 
amodiaquine (AQ) -- was available throughout sub-Saharan Africa at a ―no profit–no 
loss‖ price of less than 50¢ US for a child under 5 years old and less than $1.00 for older 
children and adults. The drug fit the needs of the target beneficiary and was accessible 
and affordable for local public health organizations, NGOs and UN institutions. By 
October 2008, the partnership had delivered over 3 million treatments of ASAQ. To 
reinforce its commitment to voice-making beneficiaries, the partnership convened the 
FACT Implementation Advisory Group, an independent panel of experts who provide 
independent advice about rational drug use, equitable access and implementation.   
Voice-taking: Principle of Contingency, Relations of Definition, Processes of 
Alignment 
The Frankfurt school views the marginalized, disenfranchised and vulnerable as 
both products and producers of socio-political processes. It emphasizes emancipation – 
despite the acknowledgement that ―everyday is characterized by the uneven distribution 
of power and by attempts to dismiss or even oppress other voices to promote one‘s own 
interests‖ (Scherer, 2009: 42). The Frankfurt school promotes the inclusion of the other – 
but it is inclusion without integration (Habermas, 1998: xxxvi). Focused on deliberative 
democracy, the Frankfurt School singles out the (unresolved) conflictual interactions 
among competing social groups as the driver of social change (Honneth, 1996). 
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Emancipation harnesses ―the deep structures of subjective experience, i.e. lived 
experience of disrespect, exclusion and denigration‖ (Scherer: 2009: 46) into levers for 
radical change. Value creation is contingent on subjective experience. This principle of 
contingency is not only a relevant starting point but also the outcome of a maturation 
process by which individuals reclaim their autonomy and validate their morality.  
Relations of definition (Beck, 1996; Goldblatt, 1996) systematically challenge the 
specific rules, institutions and capacities that structure a specific cultural context. 
Conceptually equivalent to Marx‘ relations of production which help explain who plays 
what role in value creation and Follett‘ relations of integration which help decide what 
value ought to be created to meet shared goals, the relations of definition take issue with 
the effects of value creation. Relations of definitions ask four different clusters of 
questions: ―(1) Who is to define and determine the harmfulness of products, the danger, 
the risks? Where does the responsibility lie: with those who generate the risks, those who 
benefit from them, those who are potentially affected by them, or with public agencies?; 
(2) What kind of knowledge or non-knowledge about the causes, dimensions, actors, etc. 
is involved? To whom have evidence and ‗proof‘ to be submitted?; (3) What is to count 
as sufficient proof in a world where knowledge about environmental risks is necessarily 
contested and probabilistic?; and (4) Who is to decide on compensation for the afflicted 
and on what constitutes appropriate forms of future damage-limitation control and 
regulation?‖ (Beck, 2000: 224). Beneficiaries take voice by asking – and proposing 
alternative answers – for these questions. 
Relational processes of (mis)alignment enable reconfigurations of value creation 
roles to acknowledge, accommodate, and support the role the beneficiary chooses to play. 
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Alignment requires concerted effort to reconfigure others‘ roles to accommodate the 
subjective goals and means of the beneficiary. Alignment does not imply that all parties 
place equal weight on the resulting gains; in fact, each party likely derives distinct 
benefits. It simply requires some compromise such that multiple parties can see (some of) 
their objectives met. Enlightened beneficiaries do not seek recognition of their roles – 
they believe in the desirability and feasibility of their contribution. Neither do they seek 
consensus with other participants – they accept opposite positions and interests, but seek 
to redefine them. They do, however, recognize contingencies and deliberately act to 
redefine them according to their own goals. 
Table 2.6 shows how beneficiaries redefined value creation in a cross-sector 
partnership between five South African Unions, two activist organizations (South African 
Treatment Action Campaign and MSF/Doctors without Borders) and AngloGold, a 
South-African gold mining firm, to address the social and economic risks associated with 
HIV/AIDS. AngloGold‘s program was driven by South African unions and activists who 
had earlier targeted pharmaceutical companies to deal with the HIV/AIDS risk by 
securing not only cheaper-priced drugs but also a broad exception to the evolving global 
regime of intellectual property rights. Although some concessions in price reduction 
followed (largely due to the introduction of generic drugs, Table 2.6), and although the 
social change was stalled by then South African President Thabo Mbeki who challenged 
the relationship between HIV and AIDS, the unions and activists did not give up; they 
saw in AngloGold a champion for their cause.  
With 45,000 South African employees, and an estimated HIV/AIDS prevalence of 
25 to 30%, AngloGold was sympathetic to the social and economic risks, and sought to 
  
 
TABLE 2.6 
Example of Value Creation in Cross-Sector Partnerships: HIV/AIDS Treatment 
For Profit: AngloGold  
Non Profit: South African Labor Unions, South African Treatment Action Campaign and Doctors without Borders 
 
 Before  March 2000 April 2000 November 2001 July 2002 
K
ey
 E
ve
n
ts
 
Activists and South African unions target 
pharmaceutical companies for not only 
cheaper-priced drugs but a broad 
exception to the evolving global regime of 
intellectual property rights.  
Voice-taking 
South African President Thabo Mbeki 
notifies the world that he is 
establishing his own panel of experts 
to establish the link between HIV and 
AIDS in South Africa.  
Voice-receiving 
AngloGold and all its affiliated 
union groups begin to jointly 
develop an agreement on the HIV 
programs at AngloGold  
Voice-making 
AngloGold and all its affiliated union groups 
sign an agreement. On the same day as the 
agreement is signed Chair and CEO of 
AngloGold, Bobby Godsell, announces 
AngloGold‘s commitment to provide HAART 
for any of its workers and their spouse/life 
partner. 
Voice-taking 
G
en
er
a
ti
ve
 T
en
si
o
n
s 
Attribution: After the introduction of 
HAART (highly active antiretroviral 
therapy) in the US in the late 1990s, the 
pharma industry fiercely protects their 
intellectual property rights, this despite 
the unprecedented pace of the epidemic in 
the developing world, particularly in 
Africa. 
Attribution: Despite the growing 
incidence of HIV and AIDS in South 
Africa and the lobby of the South 
African Labor Unions, President 
Thabo Mbeki acknowledges no 
expertise in the field.8 
Attention: HIV and AIDS have a 
major impact on employees and 
the company, but this impact can 
be managed. About 15 percent to 
35 percent of AngloGold's 
workers (45,000 employees) are 
HIV-infected.9 
Attention: ―HIV and AIDS performance 
statistics are reported to the Southern Africa 
Division executive on a monthly basis and to the 
Safety, Health and Sustainable Development 
Committee of the Board every quarter. The 
issues are also considered during the company‘s 
risk management process.‖10 
Alignment: In March 2000, the pharma industry responds with ―Accelerating 
Access‖ which reduces the cost of treatment to $1000 to $1500 annually per patient 
(10% of US pricing) but restricts access through national governments that uphold 
intellectual property rights. 
Alignment: Educates workers about HIV transmission and encourages them to use 
the company's voluntary HIV testing and counselling facilities. Monitors infection 
levels at the company and persuades those who test positive for HIV to use the 
company's wellness centers. 
V
a
lu
e 
C
re
a
ti
o
n
 The overall company prevalence rate of HIV and AIDS around 30% (which varies 
in different communities). The main contributors to the economic cost of the 
disease are increased levels of absenteeism and reduced productivity while at work. 
The provision of anti-retroviral therapy (ART), along with comprehensive prevention 
and treatment campaigns, has meant that mortality rates have declined, while 
absenteeism remained stable.11 ―On a cost per employee level, a net annual benefit of 
R4,000 to R12,000 per person enrolled on the ART programme is achieved through 
reduced absenteeism and savings in health care. At a company level, the benefits of 
the investment are less than initially anticipated. They are, however, in line with those 
of the management of chronic diseases, such as hypertension, coronary artery disease 
and occupational lung diseases, in the workplace.‖12 
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mitigate the costs associated with HIV/AIDS absenteeism, decreased productivity, 
training and recruitment as well as the increases in insurance premiums. AngloGold‘s 
2008 report quantified the total economic impact of the disease at around 7% to 8% of 
payroll, with the main contributors to the economic cost of the disease including: 
increased levels of absenteeism and reduced productivity while at work, increased benefit 
payments and medical expenses (excluding that of the anti-retroviral therapy [ART] 
programme, which comprises just 6% of the overall economic cost of HIV & AIDS to 
AngloGold Ashanti).
5
 Total expenditure on the company‘s HIV & AIDS treatment 
programme in South Africa (excluding mine-based costs) amounted to approximately 
R21.36 million by December 2008, mostly for the Voluntary Counselling and Testing 
programme [VCT], wellness programmes, and the provision of ART.
6
 These expenses 
helped stabilize the HIV & AIDS prevalence level among employees at the South African 
operations (which according to Anglo-Gold peaked at 30% in 2004, declining marginally 
to 29% in 2008) and helped extend the productive lives for HIV-positive employees.  
Unions were also concerned about HIV-stigmatization or discrimination in the 
workplace, job security and illness care for its members. AngloGold and its affiliated 
union groups worked on a joint HIV programs at AngloGold in November 2001, and 
signed an agreement in July 2002. By 2008, a comprehensive prevention-treatment 
program was in place, with a cost-saving of R4000 to R12,000 per person enrolled on the 
ART programme. 
GENERATIVE TENSIONS 
Key events in the life and death of cross-sector partnerships (Seitanidi, 2008), and 
certainly the momentum towards success or failure (Le Ber & Branzei, 2010) often hinge 
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on (temporary) breaches in the principles and/or relations underpinning value creation 
(Seitanidi, 2008). However, critical theorizing on value creation in general, and bridges 
between critical theories of value creation more specifically, remain theoretically under-
specified. In part for good reason: principles of constraint, consensus and contingency are 
logically incompatible. Relations of production, integration and definition also cast 
radically different expectations of the beneficiaries. They are embedded in social 
exchanges (Di Domenico et al., 2009) and cultural contexts (Scherer, 2009) and thus are 
prone to inertia.  
Relational processes are inherently flexible and, we suggest, may create 
opportunities for reassessing the role of different parties in value creation (Di Domenico 
et al., 2009). The crux of our argument is that relational processes guiding value creation 
‗within‘ differently critical theories invite closer exploration of who contributes what and 
to what effect. By correcting (mis)attributions, (re)directing attention, and (re)aligning 
contributions, cross sector partnerships can unleash value creation, one value cycle at a 
time. We explore three distinct generative tensions – attribution-attention, attention-
alignment, and alignment-attribution – and propose six questions. Table 2.7 and Figure 
2.1 summarize these tensions.   
Attribution-Attention 
Within Marxist and related feminist and environmentalist schools of thought, the 
role of the beneficiary broadens or narrows through corrections of (mis)attributions. 
These corrections reinforce the principle of constraint and reify relations of production. 
Within the precepts of pragmatist theory, the role of the beneficiary evolves through 
  
 
TABLE 2.7 
 
Types of Beneficiary Voice and Generative Tensions 
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Voice-receiving role: challenging attributions 
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directly influence value 
creation. 
 Attention-alignment tension: clarify for what value will be 
created in the next value cycle. 
Voice-making role: directing attention to open and 
explicit consensus building between the beneficiary 
and other parties for value creation. 
Voice-taking role: calling for alignment between 
the beneficiary’s and other parties’ roles in value 
creation. 
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  Rethinking to what effect 
value is being created. 
Taking the lead in 
reconfiguring the value 
creation and informing or 
adjusting others‘ role in 
order to orchestrate positive 
social change. 
Alignment-attribution tension: clarify to what effect value 
will be created in the next value cycle. 
Voice-taking role: calling for alignment between 
the beneficiary’s and other parties’ roles in value 
creation. 
Voice-receiving role: challenging attributions 
about the scope of the beneficiary role in value 
creation. 
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FIGURE 2.1 
 
Towards a Critical Theory of Value Creation:  
 
Generative Tensions from the Beneficiary Standpoint 
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shifts in attention, which again reinstate the principle of consensus and support relations 
of integration. These two critical perspectives are ill-prepared to justify (relatively) 
sudden changes in the underlying principles of value creation, i.e. from principle of 
constraint to principle of consensus (or vice-versa). They are also poorly equipped to 
explain replacements of the relations of production with relations of understanding (or 
vice-versa) – without the backdrop of social unrest or societal changes. Yet such 
(reversible) changes were noted in studies of cross-sector partnerships (Le Ber & 
Branzei, 2010; Seitanidi, 2008). 
Overlays in relational processes can explain temporary or incremental shifts 
between voice-receiving and voice-making beneficiaries (or vice-versa). Combining 
attribution and attention temporarily deepens relational awareness, motivating 
beneficiaries to monitor and bargain for their contributions to value creation (Coff, 1999); 
this reminds the cross-sector partnership for whom value is being created and may 
foreshadow a broader or narrower role of the beneficiary in the next value cycle. For 
example, in Merck‘s case (Table 2.4), the decision to explore human applications of 
Ivermectin in 1978-1980, hinged on a narrow role for the target beneficiary – those 
afflicted by the disease who could not afford the drug. Merck did not consider that some 
beneficiaries might afford the drug once they regained productive capacity; nor did 
Merck anticipate that others would reclaim fertile land and restore previously deserted 
river-bank communities. Activities that gave attention and attributed abilities to 
beneficiaries broadened the beneficiary‘s role and unleashed additional value creation 
potential for the cross-sector partnership. The role of beneficiary was narrowed in 1987 
once Merck returned to one-sided attributions, and expanded again a year later when 
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beneficiaries took on village volunteer roles to enable the distribution of Mectizan (Table 
2.4). Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 show the effects of attribution-attention tensions for the 
other partnerships. 
Attention-Alignment 
Pragmatists and Frankfurt School scholars disagree on what value is being created 
for. Pragmatists‘ reciprocated consensus and relations of integration see value as a shared 
gain. Frankfurt School‘s emphasize subjectively-driven (and typically discordant) social 
change. Overlays between attention and alignment emphasize individual agency and 
responsibility – this heightens expectations of what the beneficiaries contribute to value 
creation. Voice-making beneficiaries may step beyond their consensual role to redefine 
relationships, as local researchers and manufacturers did for DNDi-sanofi in 2004 (Table 
2.5) or the activist unions did with AngloGold in 2002 (Table 2.6). Voice-taking 
beneficiaries may subscribe to the efforts of the cross-sector partnerships and work 
collaboratively; shouldering joint responsibility for the outcome, as research institutes did 
once DNDi-Sanofi had foregone the right to patent and priced the malaria drug for broad 
accessibility (Table 2.5).  
Alignment-Attribution 
Frankfurt school theorists and Marxists (and feminists and environmentalists) 
disagree on the purpose of value creation. For the former, social change is predicated on 
reconfiguring roles and redefining relations. For the latter, social change is the last resort 
for overturning unfair relations of production. Voice-taking beneficiaries direct value 
creation towards social change while voice-receiving beneficiaries are often seen as 
relatively powerless. However, the push and pull of relational processes of alignment and 
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attribution can at least temporarily swap one for the other. In our AngloGold example, 
voice-taking activists sought to redefine how organizations approached HIV/AIDS, but 
suddenly switched to voice-receiving when political set-backs stalled broader societal 
changes. Once the political climate improved, they took voice to shape AngloGold‘s 
programs (Table 2.6). 
DISCUSSION 
This theory-building exercise takes a step towards a critical theory of value 
creation by developing an eclectic and multi-vocal understanding of value creation in 
cross-sector partnerships from the standpoint of the beneficiary. The resulting theoretical 
hybrid merges different critical views on value creation to explain why cross-sector 
partnerships beneficiaries play broader or narrower, and often swiftly changing, roles in 
value creation. Merging the tool-kit of mainstream value theorists (i.e. value cycle) with 
critical perspectives (i.e. beneficiary voice) also equips the emerging field of cross-sector 
partnerships to straddle value logics (Le Ber & Branzei, forthcoming) and power 
asymmetries (Berger et al., 2004). 
Mainstream theorizing acknowledges voice, but only as a by-product rather than 
an engine of value creation. For example, Coff (1999) explains how employees can 
increase their bargaining power, i.e. by acting in a unified manner; by securing access to 
key information; by signalling their high cost of replacement; and/or the relative loss in 
value creation if the employees move to another firm. Branzei and Thornhill (2006) show 
how employees can increase the value of other resources. The RBV has also focused on 
the role of rivals (Lockett, Thompson, & Morgenstern, 2009) and alliance partners 
(Lavie, 2006) in value creation. However, mainstream theorizing on value creation still 
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remains quiet on the role of the beneficiary (King, 2007) and more generally the role of 
peripheral or marginalized stakeholders who may benefit from cross-sector partnership 
(Calás et al., 2009; Plowman et al., 2007).  
Taking the standpoint of the beneficiary enriches and extends mainstream 
theorizing on value creation in cross-sector partnerships. A critical theory of value 
creation complements the handful of studies which have asked how and how effectively 
beneficiaries (re)engage in value creation (Coff, 1999; Peredo & Chrisman, 2006; 
Plowman et al., 2007). It also adds to the theoretical toolkit of RBV theorists by enabling 
them to anticipate and incorporate the multi-vocal beneficiary as a key (if still neglected) 
contributor to value creation.  
Future Directions 
Our contribution focuses on cross-sector partnerships (Yaziji & Doh, 2009), but 
warrants future extensions to organizational forms that marry doing well with doing good 
(Alter, 2006; Boyd et al., 2009). Future research may also explore how the notion of 
beneficiary voice may carry across extreme circumstances (e.g. deep poverty, Karnani, 
2008; Seelos & Mair, 2007; reintegration of disenfranchised community members, 
Plowman et al., 2007; coping with adversity and economic marginalization, Peredo & 
Chrisman, 2006). 
Practical Implications 
This study brings the voice of beneficiaries to the fore of value creation processes 
in cross-sector partnerships. We explain that voice matters, both because it systematically 
patterns value creation and because it informs and enables changes in the role of the 
beneficiary. We show how overlaps in attribution-attention, attention-alignment, and 
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alignment-attribution can help practitioners rethink and enhance value creation in cross-
sector partnership by harnessing sudden changes in beneficiary voice. These generative 
tensions may also help some partnerships ‗get unstuck‘ from suboptimal value creation 
cycles, or assist others in their pursuit of new value combinations.  
CONCLUSION 
Changing the standpoint of theorizing to bring in the voice of the beneficiary can 
complement firm- and resource-centric views of value creation, by stimulating critical 
reflection on for whom, for what and to what effect value is being created. Not only has 
RBV so far remained largely silent on the social processes of value creation (for 
exceptions, see Coff, 1999), and social value creation more broadly (Di Domenico et al., 
2009), but it also lacks the theoretical tool-kit to explore value creation from alternative 
standpoints.  
Our theorizing introduces different types of beneficiary voice to invoke, harness, 
and bridge the foundational principles, relations and relational processes of value creation 
across three distinct critical theory perspectives – Marxism and related feminism and 
environmentalism; pragmatism, and Frankfurt School. Our core argument is 
straightforward: appreciation for each type of beneficiary voice increases the potential for 
value creation in cross-sector partnerships. Its implications, we hope, are farther reaching. 
For some, rethinking value creation from the standpoint of the (underprivileged) 
beneficiary may be long overdue (Maguire, 2001). For others, it comes just in time, as 
mainstream management studies are explicitly engaging the agenda of social change 
(Aguilera et al., 2007; Bies et al., 2007; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Plowman et 
al., 2007). For many others this theory-building exercise may offer an early invitation to 
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engage critical theorizing in order to both challenge and rekindle the potential of 
mainstream management studies to theorize radical social change.  
We end by recalling Adam Smith‘s lament about the corruption in our moral 
sentiments brought forth by the ―disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich 
and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to neglect, persons of poor and mean 
condition‖ (1759/2000: 84). Our beneficiary-centric critical theory of value creation in 
cross-sector partnership takes a first step towards re-embedding moral sentiment in our 
conceptualization, and appreciation, of value. 
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NOTES 
1
 The Resource Based View explicitly addresses value creation and capture; we consider it a mainstream 
theory because it ―has also reached a pre-eminent position among theories in the field of strategy‖ (Lockett, 
Thompson, & Morgenstern, 2009: 9).  
2
 The ―for-profit‖ arm of a cross-sector partnership includes organizations that pursue opportunities for 
financial gain, often by creating or developing a market for products or services (McLaughlin, 2006). The 
―not-for-profit‖ category encompasses any non-governmental organization that focuses on delivering a 
social good or services – with or without financial gain (Mawlawi, 1993). Governments can partner with 
either or both to create or enhance public value (Moore, 2000; Selsky & Parker, 2005).  
3
 In some cases, the beneficiary is equated with society at large. While the ripple effect may be at the 
societal level, the target beneficiaries for most cross-sector partnerships are specific individuals or 
segments of society. Stakeholders are defined as those who affect and are affected by its decisions 
(Freeman, 1984) or more narrowly as those who place something at risk in their relationship with the firm 
or are necessary for the firm to survive (Schwartz & Carroll, 2008). Beneficiaries may or may not qualify 
under these definitions. Beneficiaries are defined by their unmet needs that the firm can do something 
about. Merck was motivated to eliminate river blindness because they could. 
4
 Our argument focuses only on the streams of feminism and environmentalism which share the Marxian 
premise of oppression and exploitation of a dominated group by the dominant group. The dominant differ 
across the three strands: in Marxism, the managerial elite/owner dominance over the labourer is challenged 
(Adler et al., 2007), in feminism the gendered dominance and subordination in social arrangements is 
critiqued (Calás & Smircich, 2006), and in environmentalism, humanity‘s right to degrade the environment 
is questioned (Jermier et al., 2006). Marxism, feminism and environmentalism differ in the interventions 
that may restore justice. While Marxism advocates seizing power through a social revolution, feminism 
advocates human development; structural/legal interventions; separatist institutions; and establishing 
organizations with feminine values (Calás & Smircich, 2006). Environmentalists urge informal and formal 
―green politics‖ activism as well as regulatory lobbying. 
 
5
http://www.anglogoldashanti.co.za/subwebs/InformationForInvestors/Reports08/ReportToSociety08/f/hiv
_aids.pdf, last accessed April 16, 2010. 
 
6
The estimated total cost of providing ART in South Africa is around R1,200 per employee per month, and 
includes a drug cost of some R400 per employee per month. 
 
7
Pragmatic and Principled: DNDi's Approach to IP Management, 
http://www.protoneurope.org/ExamplesofGoodPractice/Files/ipHandbook-Ch_17_19_Banerji-
Pecoul_DNDi.pdf/attachment_download/file, last accessed April 16, 2010. 
 
8
South African President Thabo Mbeki has been portrayed by some media as the little guy standing up to big pharma 
which may suggest that he is a powerless beneficiary. The beneficiaries were those individuals with HIV and AIDS. 
Mbeki was neither the beneficiary nor the representative of the beneficiary. He was in a position of power in 
comparison to the beneficiaries. 
 
9
http://www.thebody.com/content/world/art20655.html, last accessed April 16, 2010. 
 
10
http://www.anglogoldashanti.co.za/subwebs/InformationForInvestors/Reports08/ReportToSociety08/f/hiv
_aids.pdf, p. 10, last accessed April 16, 2010. 
 
11
http://www.anglogoldashanti.com/subwebs/Informationforinvestors/Reports08/AnnualReport08/g/corpor
ate_citizen.htm, last accessed April 16, 2010. 
 
12
http://www.anglogoldashanti.co.za/subwebs/InformationForInvestors/Reports08/ReportToSociety08/f/hiv
_aids.pdf, p. 10, last accessed April 16, 2010.  
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APPENDIX 
 
References for the Illustrative Cases 
 
Case 1 - River Blindness Treatment 
1. Bollier, D., Weiss, S., & Hanson, K. O. 1991. Merck & Co., Inc.: Addressing third 
world needs. Case #s 9-991-021, 9- 991-022, 9-991-023 & 9-991-024, Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business School Publishing. 
2. Merck website: (http://www.merck.com/corporate-responsibility/access/access-
developing-emerging/mectizan-donation-riverblindness/) 
3. The Economist. 2007. In the land of the blind. August 30.  
4. Useem, M. 1998. Roy Vagelos attacks river blindness. In M. Useem (Ed.), The 
leadership moment: Nine true stories of triumph and disaster and their lessons for us 
all: 10-42. New York: Three Rivers Press.   
 
Case 2 - Malaria Treatment 
1. DNDi website: (http://www.actwithasaq.org/en/asaq3.htm)  
2. sanofi-aventis website: (http://en.sanofi-aventis.com/sustainability/patient/access-
medicines/malaria/actions/actions.asp)  
3. UNICEF website: (http://www.unicef.org/health/index_malaria.html) 
4. Banerji, J. & Pecoul, B. 2007. Pragmatic and principled: DNDi‘s approach to IP 
management. In A. Krattiger, R. T. Mahoney, L. Nelsen, J. A. Thomson, A. B. Bennett, 
K. Satyanarayana, G.D. Graff, C. Fernandez, & S. P. Kowalski (Eds.), Intellectual 
property management in health and agricultural innovation: A handbook of best 
practices: 1775-1782. Oxford: MIHR. 
 
Case 3 - HIV/AIDS Treatment 
1. Barrett, D. 2003. AngloGold – Corporate responsibility for HIV/AIDS. Case #s     9-
303-101, 9-303-102, 9-303-103 & 9-303-104. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School 
Publishing. 
2. Spar, D. & Bartlett, N. 2002. Phase two: The pharmaceutical industry responds to 
AIDS. Case # 9-703-046 and TN #5-703-046. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School 
Publishing. 
3. Spar, D. & Bartlett, N. 2003. Life, death, and property rights: The pharmaceutical 
industry faces AIDS in Africa. Case # 9-702-049 and TN #5-703-047. Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business School Publishing. 
4. Rosen, S., Simon, J., Vincent, J. R., MacLeod, W., Fox, M., & Thea, D. M. 2003. AIDS 
is your business. Harvard Business Review, 81(2): 80-87.  
5. U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2002. AngloGold Signs Pact to Fight 
AIDS. Available from: http://www.thebody.com/content/world/art20655.html  
6. AngloGold Ashanti website 
(http://www.anglogoldashanti.co.za/subwebs/InformationForInvestors/Reports08/Report
ToSociety08/f/hiv_aids.pdf 
http://www.anglogoldashanti.com/subwebs/Informationforinvestors/Reports08/AnnualRe
port08/g/corporate_citizen.htm) 
49 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abell, P., Felin, T., & Foss, N. J. 2008. Building microfoundations for the routines, 
capabilities, and performance links. Managerial and Decision Economics, 29(6): 
489–502. 
Adler, P. S., Forbes, L. C., & Willmott, H. 2007. 3 Critical management studies‘, The 
Academy of Management Annals, 1(1): 119-179.  
Adler, P. S., & Jermier, J. 2005. Developing a field with more soul: Standpoint theory 
and public policy research for management scholars. Academy of Management 
Journal, 48(6): 941-944. 
Aguilera, R. V., Rupp, D. E., Williams, C. A., & Ganapathi, J. 2007. Putting the S back 
in corporate social responsibility: A multilevel theory of social change in 
organizations. Academy of Management Review, 32(3): 836-863. 
Alter, S. K. 2006. Social enterprise models and their mission and money relationships. In 
A. Nicholls (Ed.), Social entrepreneurship: New models of sustainable social 
change: 205-232. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Alvesson, M., Bridgman, T., & Willmott, H. (Eds.). 2009. The Oxford handbook of 
critical management studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Alvesson, M., & Deetz, S. 2006. Critical theory and postmodernism approaches to 
organizational studies. In S. R. Clegg, C. Hardy, T. B. Lawrence & W. R. Nord 
(Eds.), The Sage handbook of organization studies (2nd ed): 255-283. London: 
Sage. 
Alvord, S. H., Brown, L. D., & Letts, C. W. 2004. Social entrepreneurship and societal 
transformation. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 40(3): 260-282.  
Austin, J. E. 2000. The collaboration challenge: How nonprofits and businesses 
succeed through strategic alliances. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
Austin, J., Gutierrez, R., Ogliastri, E., & Reficco, E. 2006. Effective management of 
social enterprises: Lessons from businesses and civil society organizations in 
Iberoamerica. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. 
Banerjee, B. 2007. Corporate social responsibility: The good the bad and the ugly. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management, 17(1): 99-120. 
Barney, J. B. 2007. Gaining and sustaining competitive advantage (3rd ed.). Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall.  
Barney, J. B., & Hesterly, W. S. 2005. Evaluating a firm‘s internal capabilities. In J. B. 
Barney & W. S. Hesterly (Eds.), Strategic management and competitive advantage: 
Concepts and cases: 74-112. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Barrett, P. A. 2001. The early mothering project: What happened when the words ‗action 
research‘ came to life for a group of midwives. In P. Reason & H. Bradbury (Eds.), 
50 
 
 
Handbook of action research: Participative inquiry and practice: 294-300. London: 
Sage. 
Beck, U. 1996. World risk society as cosmopolitan society? Ecological questions in a 
framework of manufactured uncertainties. Theory, Culture & Society, 13(4): 1-32. 
Beck, U. 2000. Risk society revisited: Theory, politics and research programmes. In B. 
Adam, U. Beck & J. Van Loon (Eds.), The risk society and beyond: Critical issues 
for social theory: 211-229. London: Sage. 
Berger, I. E., Cunningham, P. H., & Drumwright, M. E. 2004. Social alliances: 
Company/nonprofit collaboration. California Management Review, 47(1): 58-90. 
Bies, R. J., Bartunek, J. M., Fort, T. L., & Zald, M. N. 2007. Corporations as social 
agents: Individual, interpersonal, institutional, and environmental dynamics. 
Academy of Management Review, 32(3): 788-793. 
Blumer, H. 1969. Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press.  
Bouwen, R., & Taillieu, T. 2004. Multi-party collaboration as social learning for 
interdependence: Developing relational knowing for sustainable natural resource 
management. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 14(3): 137-153. 
Boyd, B., Henning, N., Reyna, E., Wang, D. E., & Welch, M. D. 2009. Hybrid 
organizations: New business models for environmental leadership. Sheffield: 
Greenleaf Publishing. 
Branzei, O., & Thornhill, S. 2006. From ordinary resources to extraordinary 
performance: Environmental moderators of competitive advantage. Strategic 
Organization, 4(1): 11-41. 
Brickson, S. L. 2007. Organizational identity orientation: The genesis of the role of the 
firm and distinct forms of social value. Academy of Management Review, 32(3): 
864-888.  
Brydon-Miller, M. 1997. Participatory action research: Psychology and social change. 
Journal of Social Issues, 53(4): 657-666. 
Calás, M. B., & Smircich, L. 1999. Past postmodernism? Reflections and tentative 
directions. Academy of Management Review, 24(4): 649-671. 
Calás, M. B., & Smircich, L. 2006. From the ‗woman‘s point of view‘ ten years later: 
Towards a feminist organizational studies. In S. R. Clegg, C. Hardy, T. B. Lawrence 
& W. R. Nord (Eds.), The Sage handbook of organization studies (2nd ed.): 284-
346. London: Sage.  
Calás, M. B., Smircich, L., & Bourne, K. A. 2009. Extending the boundaries: Reframing 
―entrepreneurship as social change‖ through feminist perspectives. Academy of 
Management Review, 34(3): 552-569. 
Castro, C. J. 2004. Sustainable development: Mainstream and critical perspectives. 
Organization & Environment, 17(2): 195-225. 
51 
 
 
Chataway, C. 1997. An examination of the constraints on mutual inquiry in a 
participatory action research project. Journal of Social Issues, 53(4): 747-766. 
Christensen, C. M., Baumann, H., Ruggles, R., & Sadtler, T. M. 2006. Disruptive 
innovation for social change. Harvard Business Review, 84(12): 96-101. 
Christensen, C. M., Grossman, J. H., & Hwang, J. 2009. The innovator’s prescription: A 
disruptive solution for health care. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Coff, R. W. 1999. When competitive advantage doesn‘t lead to performance: The 
resource-based view and stakeholder bargaining power. Organization Science, 10(2): 
119-133. 
Deetz, S. 1992. Democracy in the age of corporate colonization: Developments in 
communication and politics of everyday life. Albany: State University of New York 
Press. 
Deetz, S. 1999. Multiple stakeholders and social responsibility in the international 
business context: A critical perspective. In P. Salem (Ed.), Organization 
communication and change: Challenges in the next century: 289-319. Cresskill, 
NJ: Hampton Press.  
Deetz, S. 2007. Corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, and 
communication. In S. May, G. Cheney & J. Roper (Eds.), The debate over corporate 
social responsibility: 267-278. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dewey, J. 1935/1963. Liberalism and social action. New York: Capricorn Books. 
Di Domenico, M., Tracey, P., & Haugh, H. 2009. The dialectic of social exchange: 
Theorizing corporate-social enterprise collaboration. Organization Studies, 30(8): 
887-907. 
Dowling, B., Powell, M., & Glendinning, C. 2004. Conceptualising successful 
partnerships. Health and Social Care in the Community, 12(4): 309-317. 
Felin, T., & Hesterly, W. S. 2007. The knowledge-based view, nested heterogeneity, and 
new value creation: Philosophical considerations on the locus of knowledge. 
Academy of Management Review, 32(1): 195-218.  
Fineman, S. 2000. Enforcing the environment: Regulatory realities. Business Strategy 
and the Environment, 9(1): 62-72. 
Fiol, C. M., & O‘Connor, E. J. 2002. When hot and cold collide in radical change 
processes: Lessons from community development. Organization Science, 13(5): 532-
546.  
Fiol, C. M., Pratt, M. G., & O‘Connor, E. J. 2009. Managing intractable identity 
conflicts. Academy of Management Review, 34(1): 32-55.  
Follett, M. P. 1941. Dynamic administration: The collected papers of Mary Parker 
Follett (edited by H. C. Metcalf & L. F. Urwick). New York: Harper & Bros. 
Freeman, R. E. 1984. Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston, MA: 
Pitman.  
52 
 
 
Freeman, R. E., Martin, K., & Parmar, B. 2007. Stakeholder capitalism. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 74(4): 303-314.  
Frooman, J. 1999. Stakeholder influence strategies. Academy of Management Review, 
24(2): 191-205. 
Garnett, R. F. 1999. Postmodernism and theories of value: New grounds for 
intuitionalist/Marxist dialogue? Journal of Economic Issues, 33(4): 817-834. 
Goldblatt, D. 1996. Social theory and the environment. Cambridge: Polity. 
Googins, B. K., & Rochlin, S. A. 2000. Creating the partnership society: Understanding 
the rhetoric and reality of cross-sectoral partnerships. Business & Society Review, 
105(1): 127-144. 
Habermas, J. 1998. The inclusion of the other: Studies in political theory. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Hardy, C., Lawrence, T. B., & Phillips, N. 2006. Swimming with sharks: Creating 
strategic change through multi-sector collaboration. International Journal of 
Strategic Change Management, 1(1-2): 96-112. 
Hart, S. L. 1995. A natural resource-based view of the firm. Academy of Management 
Review, 20(4): 986-1014. 
Hart, S. L., & Sharma, S. 2004. Engaging fringe stakeholders for competitive 
imagination. Academy of Management Executive, 18(1): 7-18. 
Helfat, C. E., Finkelstein, S., Mitchell, W., Peteraf, M. A., Singh, H., Teece, D. J., & 
Winter, S. G. 2007. Dynamic capabilities: Understanding strategic change in 
organizations. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Hendry, J. R. 2005. Stakeholder influence strategies: An empirical exploration. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 61(1): 79-99. 
Hendry, J. R. 2006. Taking aim at business: What factors lead environmental Non-
governmental organizations to target particular firms? Business & Society, 45(1): 47-
86. 
Honneth, A. 1996. The struggle for recognition: The moral grammar of social conflict. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Hudson, R. 2009. Life on the edge: Navigating the competitive tensions between the 
‗social‘ and the ‗economic‘ in the social economy and in its relations to the 
mainstream. Journal of Economic Geography, 9(4): 493-510.  
Jermier, J. M., Forbes, L. C., Benn, S., & Orsato, R. J. 2006. The new corporate 
environmentalism and green politics. In S. R. Clegg, C. Hardy, T. B. Lawrence & W. 
R. Nord (Eds.), The Sage handbook of organization studies: 618-650. London: Sage. 
Karnani, A. 2008. Help, don‘t romanticize, the poor. Business Strategy Review, 19(2): 
48-53. 
King, A. 2007. Cooperation between corporations and environmental groups: A 
transaction cost perspective. Academy of Management Review, 32(3): 889-900. 
53 
 
 
Laufer, W. S. 2003 Social accountability and corporate greenwashing. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 43(3): 253-261. 
Lavie, D. 2006. The competitive advantage of interconnected firms: An extension of the 
Resource-Based View. Academy of Management Review, 31(3): 638-658. 
Le Ber, M. J., & Branzei, O. 2010. (Re)Forming strategic cross-sector partnerships: 
Relational processes of social innovation. Business & Society, 49(1): 140-172. 
Le Ber, M. J., & Branzei, O. (forthcoming). Value frame fusion in cross-sector 
interactions. Journal of Business Ethics.  
Lepak, D. P., Smith, K. G., & Taylor, M. S. 2007. Value creation and value capture: A 
multilevel perspective. Academy of Management Review, 32(1): 180-194. 
Levy, D. L., & Egan, D. 2003. A neo-Gramscian approach to corporate political strategy: 
Conflict and accommodation in the climate change negotiations. Journal of 
Management Studies, 40(4): 803-830. 
Levy, D. L., & Newell, P. J. (Eds.). 2005. The business of global environmental 
governance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Lockett, A., Thompson, S., & Morgenstern, U. 2009. The development of the resource-
based view of the firm: A critical appraisal. International Journal of Management 
Review, 11(1): 9-28. 
Long, F. J., & Arnold, M. B. 1995. The power of environmental partnerships. Fort 
Worth, TX: Dryden Press.  
Lyon, T. P., & Maxwell, J. W. 2004. Corporate environmentalism and public policy. 
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
Lyytinen, K., & Hirschheim, R. 1988. Information systems as rational discourse: An 
application of Habermas‘s theory of communicative action. Scandinavian Journal of 
Management, 4(1-2): 19-30. 
Macdonald, S., & Chrisp, T. 2005. Acknowledging the purpose of partnership. Journal 
of Business Ethics, 59(4): 307-317. 
Maguire, P. 2001. Uneven ground: Feminism and action research. In P. Reason & H. 
Bradbury (Eds.). Handbook of action research: 59-69. London: Sage. 
Mair, J., & Martí, I. 2006. Social entrepreneurship research: A source of explanation, 
prediction, and delight. Journal of World Business, 41(1): 36-44. 
Makadok, R. 2001. Toward a synthesis of resource-base view and dynamic capability 
views of rent creation. Strategic Management Journal, 22(5): 387-401. 
Marcuse, H. 1970. The end of utopia. In H. Marcuse (Ed.), Five lectures: 
Psychoanalysis, politics and utopia: 62-69. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Margolis, J. D., & Walsh, J. P. 2003. Misery loves companies: Rethinking social 
initiatives by business. Administrative Science Quarterly, 48(2): 268-305. 
Mawlawi, F. 1993. New conflicts, new challenges: The evolving role for non-
governmental actors. Journal of International Affairs, 46(2): 391-413. 
54 
 
 
McLaughlin, T. A. 2006. Nonprofit strategic positioning. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
Moore, M. H. 2000. Managing for value: Organizational strategy in for-profit, nonprofit, 
and governmental organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 29(s1): 
183-204. 
Noffke, S. E. 1999. What‘s a nice theory like yours doing in a practice like this? And 
other impertinent questions about practitioner research. Change: Transformations in 
Education, 2(1): 25-35. 
Orlitzky, M., Schmidt, F. L., & Rynes, S. L. 2003. Corporate social and financial 
performance: A meta-analysis. Organization Studies, 24(3): 403-41. 
Pearce, J. A., & Doh, J. P. 2005. The high impact of collaborative social initiatives. Sloan 
Management Review, 46(2): 30-39. 
Penrose, E. 1959. The theory of the growth of the firm (3
rd
 ed.). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
Peredo, A. M., & Chrisman, J. J. 2006. Toward a theory of community-based enterprise. 
Academy of Management Review, 31(2): 309-328. 
Peteraf, M. E., & Bergen, M. E. 2003. Scanning dynamic competitive landscapes: A 
market-based and resource-based framework. Strategic Management Journal. 
24(10): 1027-1041. 
Phillips, R. 2003. Stakeholder theory and organizational ethics. San Francisco: Berrett-
Koehler. 
Phills, J. A., Deiglmeier, K., & Miller, D. T. 2008. Rediscovering social innovation. 
Stanford Social Innovation Review, 6(4): 34-43. 
Plowman, D. A., Baker, L. T., Beck, T. E., Kulkarni, M., Solansky, S. T., & Travis, D. V. 
2007. Radical change accidentally: The emergence and amplification of small change. 
Academy of Management Journal, 50(3): 515-543.  
Power, M., Laughlin, R., & Cooper, D. J. 2003. Accounting and critical theory. In M. 
Alvesson & H. Willmott (Eds.), Studying management critically: 113-135. London: 
Sage.  
Rondinelli, D. A., & London, T. 2003. How corporations and environmental groups 
cooperate: Assessing cross-sector alliances and collaborations. Academy of 
Management Executive, 17(1): 61-76. 
Rugman, A. M., & Verbeke, A. 2002. Edith Penrose‘s contribution to the resource-based 
view of strategic management. Strategic Management Journal, 23(8): 769-780. 
Salvato, C. 2003. The role of micro-strategies in the engineering of firm evolution.   
Journal of Management Studies, 40(1): 83-108. 
Scherer, A. G. 2009. Critical theory and its contribution to critical management studies. 
In M. Alvesson, T. Bridgman & H. Willmott (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of critical 
management studies: 29-51. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
55 
 
 
Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. 2007. Toward a political conception of corporate 
responsibility:  Business and society seen from a Habermasian perspective. Academy 
of Management Review, 32(4): 1096-1120. 
Schwartz, M. S., & Carroll, A. B. 2008. Integrating and unifying competing and 
complementary frameworks: The search for a common core in the business and 
society field. Business & Society, 47(2): 148-186. 
Seelos, C., & Mair, J. 2007. Profitable business models and market creation in the context 
of deep poverty: A strategic view. Academy of Management Perspectives, 21 (4): 49-
63. 
Seitanidi, M. M. 2008. Adaptive responsibilities: Non linear interactions in cross-sector 
social partnerships. Emergence: Complexity and Organizations, 10(3): 51-64. 
Seitanidi, M. M., & Ryan, A. 2007. Forms of corporate community involvement: From 
partnerships to philanthropy. A critical review. International Journal of Nonprofit 
and Voluntary Sector Marketing, 12(3): 247-266. 
Selsky, J. W., & Parker, B. 2005. Cross-sector partnerships to address social issues: 
challenges to theory and practice. Journal of Management, 31(6): 849-873. 
Sheth, J., & Uslay C. 2007. Implications of the revised definition of marketing: From 
exchange to value creation. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 26(2): 302-307. 
Smith, A. 1759/2000. The theory of moral sentiments. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. 
Stafford, E. R., Polonsky, M. J., & Hartman, C. L. 2000. Environmental NGO-business 
collaboration and strategic bridging: A case analysis of the Greenpeace-Foron 
alliance. Business Strategy and the Environment, 9(2): 122-135. 
Starkey, K., & Crane, A. 2003. Toward green narrative: Management and the 
evolutionary epic. Academy of Management Review, 28(2): 220-237. 
Teece, D. J. 2007. Explicating dynamic capabilities: The nature and microfoundations of 
(sustainable) enterprise performance. Strategic Management Journal, 28(13): 1319–
1350. 
Teegen, H., Doh, J. P., & Vachani, S. 2004. The importance of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOS) in global governance and value creation: An international 
business research agenda. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(6): 463-
483. 
Tomlinson, F. 2005. Idealistic and pragmatic versions of the discourse of partnerships. 
Organization Studies, 26(8): 1169-1188. 
Tracey, P., Phillips, N., & Haugh, H. 2005. Beyond philanthropy: Community enterprise 
as a basis for corporate citizenship. Journal of Business Ethics, 58(4): 327-344. 
Tucker, R. C. (Ed.). 1978. The Marx-Engels reader (2
nd
 ed.). New York: Norton. 
Waddock, S. 2004. Creating corporate accountability: Foundational principles to make 
corporate citizenship real. Journal of Business Ethics, 50(4):  313-327. 
Way, N. 1997. Using feminist research methods to understand the friendships of 
adolescent boys. Journal of Social Issues, 53(4): 703-723. 
56 
 
 
Welford, R. J. (Ed.). 1997. Corporate environmental management 2: Culture and 
organization. London, UK: Earthscan. 
Welford, R. J. 1998. Corporate environmental management, technology and sustainable 
development: Postmodern perspectives and the need for a critical research agenda. 
Business Strategy and the Environment, 7(1): 1-12. 
Westwood, R., & Clegg, S. 2003. Debating organization: Point-counterpoint in 
organization studies. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. 
Willmott, H. 1997. Management and organization studies as science? Organization, 4: 
309-344.  
Yaziji, M., & Doh, J. 2009. NGOs and corporations: Conflict and collaboration. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Zietsma, C., & Winn, M. I. 2008. Building chains and directing flows. Business & 
Society, 47(1): 68-101. 
  
57 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 (RE)FORMING STRATEGIC CROSS-SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS: 
RELATIONAL PROCESSES OF SOCIAL INNOVATION
2
 
Cross-sector partnerships between nonprofit and for-profit organizations are 
uniquely positioned to create and capture social value (King, 2007; Plowman et al., 
2007). Known also as social alliances, intersectoral partnerships or strategic partnerships 
(Yaziji & Doh, 2009), cross-sector partnerships ―emerge at the intersection of the 
business (corporate) and nonprofit (NGO) sectors‖ (Selsky & Parker, 2005: 851). They 
strategically leverage the core competencies of both partners to address market failure 
(Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-Skillern, 2006) or social opportunity (Crane & Matten, 2007) 
and thus engender social innovation (Hess, Rogovsky, & Dunfee, 2002; Waddock, 1989).  
By social innovation we mean the pursuit of ―a novel solution to a social problem 
that is more effective, efficient, sustainable, or just than existing solutions and for which 
the value created accrues primarily to society as a whole rather than private individuals‖ 
(Phills, Deiglmeier, & Miller, 2008: 39). Outcomes of social innovation can range from 
improving the life conditions of disenfranchised individuals to meeting unmet basic 
needs for society as a whole (Austin, Gutiérrez, Ogliastri, & Reficco, 2006; Brickson, 
2007); the ultimate goals include justice, fairness, environmental preservation, improved 
health, arts and culture, and better education (Phills et al., 2008). 
Many regard social value creation as the raison d’être of cross-sector partnerships 
(Alvord, Brown, & Letts, 2004; Teegen, Doh, & Vachani, 2004) and suggest that 
relational processes enable or hinder social innovation (Seitanidi & Crane, 2009). Prior 
                                                 
2 A version of this chapter has been published (Le Ber, M. J., & Branzei, O. 2010. (Re)forming strategic cross-sector 
partnerships: Relational processes of social innovation. Business & Society, 49(1): 140-172.) 
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studies suggest that cross-sector partnerships involve a staged progression along a 
collaboration continuum; that is, from philanthropic and transactional to integrative 
relationships (Austin, 2000; Seitanidi & Ryan, 2007), each stage rife with specific 
contingencies and constraints (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006). A handful of descriptive 
and prescriptive studies further argue that partners deliberately design and implement 
cross-sector partnerships to increase their likelihood of success (Googins & Rochlin, 
2000; Rondinelli & London, 2003), while others caution about inherent fragilities and 
incompatibilities which often predispose cross-sector partnerships to distrust, conflict and 
premature failure (Berger, Cunningham, & Drumwright, 2004; Macdonald & Chrisp, 
2005; Rondinelli & London, 2003).  
We begin to unpack the relational processes of social innovation in cross-sector 
partnerships by juxtaposing the emergent bodies of research and practice-based insights 
on adversarial cross-sector interactions (Frooman, 1999; Hendry, 2005, 2006), 
collaborative relationships (Hardy, Lawrence, & Phillips, 2006; King, 2007; Stafford, 
Polonsky, & Hartman, 2000) and turnaround sequences (Fiol & O‘Connor, 2002; Fiol, 
Pratt, & O‘Connor, 2009). We ask how nonprofit and for-profit organizations deliberately 
adjust their roles to sustain momentum towards success or rebound from temporary 
failure in pursuit of social value creation. This research question joins, complements and 
extends current debates concerning the distinct roles (Hansmann, 1980), identities 
(Brickson, 2007; Fiol et al., 2009), and institutional embeddedness of nonprofit versus 
for-profit partners (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990) by exploring how relational processes 
may help them overcome and leverage key differences.  
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Our working assumption is that partners form strategic cross-sector partnerships 
to learn how to create social value; they ―must rely on strategic criteria that can both 
effectively utilize the firm‘s existing competencies in intra-sector … alliances and 
develop the new skills needed to make cross-sector … alliances succeed‖ (Rondinelli & 
London, 2003: 63). The odds of success and survival of cross-sector partnerships improve 
when partners accept adaptive responsibilities and co-design mechanisms for delivering 
effective solutions to social problems (Seitanidi, 2008). As collaborations grow 
progressively more intensive (Rondinelli & London, 2003) or engaged (Austin, 2000), 
early successes hinge on partners‘ ability to select ―the right partner‖, their willingness to 
develop acceptable procedures for cooperating, and their ability to judge ―relational 
risks‖ (i.e. the ability of partners to predict with confidence what the potential outcomes 
of the alliance will be based on past experience; Hardy et al., 2006). Higher levels of 
engagement promise significant collaboration gains ―… both in specific benefits accruing 
to the respective partners and in the social value-added by the alliance, [but] the effort 
and investment … to obtain those are greater‖ (Austin, 2000: 72). Managing 
interdependencies requires partners to grapple with complexity and juggle ―different 
kinds of knowledge and competencies [as] multiple actors or stakeholder parties co-
construct a social learning process‖ (Bouwen & Taillieu, 2004: 137).  
This study contributes a deeper understanding of the relational processes 
underpinning  social value creation in strategic cross-sector partnership (Selsky & Parker, 
2005; Teegen et al., 2004) by examining how partners‘ interactions sustain success or 
precipitate failure. Our research question – understanding how nonprofit and for-profit 
partners (re)form their strategic partnerships by actively managing their differences and 
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interdependencies – complements prior research from a nonprofit angle (Frooman, 1999), 
a corporate perspective (Pearce & Doh, 2005), and a dyadic lens (Hendry, 2006; King, 
2007). 
We explore how relational processes may accelerate success, undermine early 
wins or help reverse temporary set-backs when a nonprofit and a for-profit partner join 
forces for social innovation. We are particularly interested in the relevance of relational 
engagement (Austin, 2000; Rondinelli & London, 2003) and relational compromise 
(Yaziji & Doh, 2009) as partners bridge their distinctive values and objectives (LaFrance 
& Lehmann, 2005; Rangan, Samii, & Van Wassenhove, 2006) by negotiating new 
responses, new values and new logics (Austrom & Lad, 1989). Our inquiry seeks to 
bridge practice-based insights on the staged evolution of cross-sector partnerships 
(Austin, 2000; Hess et al., 2002; Pearce & Doh, 2005) with relational perspectives on the 
processes of social value creation in adversarial and collaborative relationships 
(Brickson, 2007; Fiol & O‘Connor, 2002).  
Our grounded inquiry focuses on the healthcare domain, one of the most 
promising contexts for studying social innovation (Christensen, Baumann, Ruggles, & 
Sadtler, 2006; Christensen, Grossman, & Hwang, 2009; Hwang & Christensen, 2008). 
We construct and contrast four in-depth, longitudinal narratives of cross-sector 
partnerships in Canadian healthcare. Each partnership sought to reshape the corporate-
nonprofit interface and was considered strategic by both partners. All our for-profit 
partners were large publicly traded companies -- two medical device firms, an e-health 
solution provider, and an energy conservation solution provider focused on the healthcare 
industry. Our nonprofit partners in each dyad were either a hospital or a hospital-based 
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research institute. Hospitals represent more than one third of the revenue and over 40% in 
terms of gross domestic product (GDP) of the overall nonprofit sector in Canada 
(Statistics Canada, 2006). All Canadian hospitals are self-governed nonprofit 
organizations
1
; they are publicly funded and administered and cannot be purchased or 
owned by for-profit organizations. Although they receive more than 50 % of their 
revenues in grants from government, they compete directly with other nonprofit 
organizations for charitable donations as well significant volunteer resources for the 
difference (Statistics Canada, 2006). They cannot distribute any profits generated to 
directors, staff, or members (Brody, 1996; Hansmann, 1980). They thus meet the United 
Nations‘ international standards for nonprofit institutions (Statistics Canada, 2006). 
Relational Processes of Social Innovation 
We focus on the relational processes of social innovation during the formation 
and reformation of strategic cross-sector partnerships (King, 2007; Pearce & Doh, 2005; 
Yaziji & Doh, 2009). Social innovation rests on two premises. First, it requires some 
degree of strategic repositioning, that is, it entails the creation of benefits or reductions of 
costs for society ―through efforts to address social needs and problems – in ways that go 
beyond the private gains and general benefits of market activity‖ (Phills et al., 2008: 39). 
Second, it requires novel combinations of ideas, resources, and capabilities; the process 
of creating social value is deliberate, effortful and unusually demanding (Magee, 2003; 
Pearce & Doh, 2005; Phills et al., 2008).  
However, organizational identities (Brickson, 2007), missions (Fiol & O‘Connor, 
2002), structure (King, 2007), and patterns of activity (Plowman et al., 2007) constrain 
partners‘ willingness to engage in increasingly intense partnerships (Austin, 2000; 
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Rondinelli & London, 2003), their ability to adapt to evolving contingencies and 
opportunities (Seitanidi, 2008), and to overcome role conflict (Fiol et al., 2009). Inter-
organizational relational capabilities, fostered by prior ties, trust, overarching goals and 
control mechanisms can help partners move along the collaboration continuum (Austin, 
2000). When the strategic value of partnerships is high and the for-profit and nonprofit 
partners have a high level of engagement, interact frequently, and grapple with complex 
issues (i.e. in integrative social alliances; Yaziji & Doh, 2009), cross-sector partnerships 
are more resourceful and resilient than go-it alone social innovation efforts (Rondinelli & 
London, 2003). Yet the process by which partners jointly create social value is often non-
linear (and fraught with fragilities, difficulties and disappointments (Teegen et al., 2004). 
Only some partners manage to create social change in a constant, evolving, and 
cumulative manner (Weick & Quinn, 1999). Many others crumble due to ―mis-es‖ – 
misunderstandings, misallocations of costs and benefits, mismatches of power, 
mismatched partners, misfortunes of time and mistrust (Berger et al., 2004).  
A growing body of applied studies has developed prescriptive and normative 
suggestions about what yields new collaborations (Hendry, 2006), what sets successful 
partnerships apart from the unsuccessful ones (Rondinelli & London, 2003; Bouwen & 
Taillieu, 2004), and how partners can overcome temporary bottlenecks and set-backs 
(Westley, Zimmerman, & Patton, 2006). Co-evolution, adaptability, flexibility are 
commonly prescribed cures, yet we know comparatively little about how nonprofit and 
for-profit organizations can (re)align their contributions and gains. The vast literature on 
strategic alliances affords additional caution. Because heterogeneity encumbers 
knowledge transfers (Das & Teng, 2001) and divergent identities and control mechanisms 
63 
 
 
make mundane interactions more challenging (Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999), the 
contrasting institutional logics of for-profit and nonprofit organizations make a 
partnership between them more vulnerable to tension and conflict.  
In the past decade, research has surfaced a noteworthy asymmetry between 
strategic alliances and cross-sector partnerships. Strategic alliance partners can anticipate 
and manage success by building relational capabilities that substitute for prior ties or 
common experience (Dyer & Singh, 1998). They can prevent failure by selecting similar, 
homogeneous partners, and implementing control mechanisms that mitigate transaction 
costs (Das & Teng, 2001). Cross-sector partnerships follow non-linear progression paths; 
marked by constant adjustments and recombinations (Ring & van de Ven, 1994), and 
punctuated by transient successes and temporary failures (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002). 
Different capability bases, relational risk, intensity, engagement, interdependence, power 
balance and mutual expectations can draw partners closer together or push them further 
apart. Some transition from adversarial relations to mutuality by nurturing common 
missions and goals but many derail for the same reasons. 
So how can (some) partners co-prosper while they share critical resources to bring 
forth social innovations (Hardy et al., 2006)? Our core premise, borne out by our 
qualitative investigation, is that (re)alignment is ubiquitous and iterative – partners 
continuously manage relational processes that help them appraise the progress towards 
their own goals and the shared purpose of the partnership. Prior literature has highlighted 
the role of emotions (i.e. intensity, Rondinelli & London, 2003; engagement, Austin, 
2000; and cognitions, Fiol & O‘Connor, 2002) and social connections (i.e. champions, 
Egri & Herman, 2000; feedback loops, Zietsma, Winn, Branzei, & Vertinsky, 2002; 
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amplifying actions, Plowman et al., 2007; and social learning, Bouwen & Taillieu, 2004). 
We track these relational processes by developing longitudinal narratives of interactions 
between corporations and non-profit organizations (hospitals and research institutes) 
crafting social innovation in the Canadian healthcare sector. 
METHODS 
To build rich descriptions and deep understanding of the phenomenon under 
investigation we adopted a case study design (Weick, 2007).
2
 This allowed us to track the 
phenomenon at the partner and dyad levels of analysis (Yin, 2003). We started by 
sampling ―polar types‖ of dyads that helped us tease out contrasting patterns in the data 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). We then extended the analyses within each dyad by 
conducting in-depth interviews with the senior executives of each partner. We tracked the 
initial goals of their partnerships and developed longitudinal narratives documenting how 
their roles evolved as their relationships progressed (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Figure 3.1 
introduces our four dyads and their strategic objectives. To protect the anonymity of the 
participants, we identify the four studied dyads by their shared goal: Energy Conservation 
(EC), Telecommunication (TC), Diagnostic Imaging (DI) and Minimally Invasive 
Surgery (MIS). 
We sampled four cross-sector partnerships engaged in different types of social 
innovation, following Christensen and colleagues‘ (2006) typology of sustaining versus 
catalytic social innovation. Sustaining innovations ―provide better quality or additional 
functionality for an organization‘s most demanding customers‖ (Christensen et al., 2006: 
96); they can be incremental improvements or breakthrough products or services that 
leapfrog the existing technologies. In contrast, catalytic innovations challenge industry  
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FIGURE 3.1 
Research Design – Sampling on Type of Social Innovation and Activity Focus 
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Telecommunication (TC) 
For Profit Est. 1880, 17.9B CAD, publicly 
traded, 44,292 employees 
Non Profit  (Health Centre) Est. 1875, 770M 
CAD, 10,515  employees & students 
 
“I’d like to believe that some of those are 
good, corporate purchases and good 
corporate thrusts for the betterment of 
Canadians…. So what does that do for (my 
corporation)? If you believe that that’s a 
good thing to do for Canadians, right across 
the country, and it is a large area in which 
health care, a large industry that needs 
sizeable transformation and you can help any 
individual hospital get over the financial 
hurdle by acquiring it and bringing it down 
to a cost point and a cost that is palatable on 
a hospital by hospital basis, then you need 
some hospitals that are willing to work with 
you to prove that it can work and be able to 
go out and talk to other hospitals and 
demonstrate to other hospitals.” (FP) 
Energy Conservation (EC) 
For Profit  Est. 1885, 34.6B US, publicly 
traded, 122,000 employees  
Non Profit  (Health Centre) Est. 1875, 770M 
CAD, 10,515  employees & students 
 
“Energy has been the leading value proposition 
because it’s one where you actually do get to go 
and talk to the CEO…So that’s why our energy 
solutions business, with our value proposition 
we tend to get very engaged with the executive 
team.” (FP) 
 
FP was a huge advocate of energy conservation 
and worked hard at being able to “convert” 
other organizations through the development of 
a business model or value proposition that 
placed all financial risk of changing behaviour 
on themselves. (NP) 
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Diagnostic Imaging (DI) 
For Profit  Est. 1892, 15B US, publicly 
traded, 10,000 employees 
Non Profit  (Health Centre) Est. 1875, 770M 
CAD, 10,515  employees & students 
 
“… to fundamentally change the value 
proposition of our customers … a wonderful 
proving ground for the whole concept that we 
have around early health.” (FP) 
[We wanted] to see if we could come up with 
a shared vision … to provide the very, very 
best of imaging enabled technology to serve 
our patients … because we were very eager 
to be at the cutting edge of technology … we 
wanted to look at a partner who had a 
reputation in being at the cutting edge.” (NP) 
Minimally Invasive Surgery (MIS) 
For Profit  Est. 1969, 1.05B CAD, publicly 
traded, 3000 employees 
Non Profit  (Research Institute) Est. 1983, 50M 
CAD, 850 employees 
 
The intent was to produce a much simpler 
surgical system that would be more available to 
hospitals through a much lower price point than 
what was on the market and through a different 
business model of reusable instruments. Not 
only more environmentally friendly, it would be 
less expensive to operate on a case by case 
basis. It would be “good enough” for many 
surgeries. 
 
“[Our] ultimate objective … to have a 
prototype that is sellable to a GE kind of 
company.” (FP) 
 
“develop technology for … patient care” (NP) 
  
Sustaining Innovation Catalytic Innovation 
  
Type of Social Innovation (Christensen et al., 2006) 
 
incumbents by offering ―good-enough‖ solutions to inadequately addressed social 
problems.
3
 Their primary objective is systemic social change. Catalytic innovations 
disrupt the status quo (Anthony, Johnson, Sinfield, & Altman, 2008) through changes in 
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functionality of technologies, different business models or systemic reform (Christensen 
et al., 2009). Catalytic innovators generate resources (donations, grants, volunteer 
manpower or intellectual capital) in novel ways, which are initially unattractive to most 
incumbents. Their social innovations appear unprofitable or unattractive by the current 
measures of success, and thus are often ignored, even disparaged, by incumbents. 
Both sustaining and catalytic innovations can be subdivided into incremental and 
radical innovations (Tushman & Smith, 2004), and we theoretically sampled one 
partnership representative of each category. Christensen and colleagues (2009) argue that 
the incidence of radical innovation is higher in clinical innovations (i.e. direct healthcare 
interventions), which build on core capabilities to generate or sustain competitive 
differentiation, while the incidence of incremental innovation is higher in non-clinical 
innovations (i.e. support healthcare services). We relied on the strategic intentions at the 
time of partnership formation to identify two cross-sector partnerships pursuing 
sustaining innovation (one clinical, one non-clinical), and two seeking disruptive 
innovations (one clinical, one non-clinical). With one caveat: our assessments of 
sustaining/catalytic and respectively radical/incremental relied on partners‘ initial 
intentions; the extent of disruption was contingent of how effectively the partners learned 
to work together. 
Sampling Frame 
Comparative case study research relies on theoretical sampling to extract a very 
detailed understanding of a phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989). The four dyads selected 
received significant media and analyst coverage since their early stages of formation. We 
used archival data to reconstruct the early steps of partnership formation; these included 
67 
 
 
published and unpublished case studies; annual reports of the partners, sustainability 
reports, media releases, media clippings, Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), company 
power point presentations, and various promotional company materials. Table 3.1 
summarizes the data sources used for each dyad and provides an overview of the initial 
goals shared by the partners and a timeline of key events in the evolution of each 
partnership. 
Data Collection 
We combined rich archival data collected over time (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), 
with in-depth interviews with key informants representing both partners within each 
dyad. We interviewed the most senior executives who had the knowledge, motivation and 
authority to discuss cross-sector partnerships involving their organization. Longitudinal 
data can be collected both prospectively (working forward in time) and/or retrospectively 
(working backward in time) (Scott & Alwin, 1998). We relied on retrospective accounts 
because we were interested in understanding how partners diagnose, manage and 
interpret the duality of success and failure.  
Data Analysis 
Our analysis was guided by Eisenhardt‘s (1989) and Yin‘s (2003) outline for 
comparative case study analysis. Data collection overlapped with the analysis; the data 
and the literature were consulted in an iterative process. We first created longitudinal 
narratives for each partnership by combining archival research, interviews, and follow-
ups. The data were then analyzed at the dyad level to uncover shared meanings or 
divergent views of collaborative processes.  
  
 
TABLE 3.1 
Description of Strategic Cross-Sector Partnerships 
 
Dyad Data Shared Purpose  Timeline 
E
n
er
g
y
 C
o
n
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
 (
E
C
) 
Interviews (2007) 
Vice President, Energy 
Solutions (FP) 
Strategic Planning and 
Marketing Leader (FP) 
Sales Director (FP) 
Vice President, Planning, 
Hospital (NP) 
 
Archival Materials  
(2006-2008) 
Unpublished case study; 
Annual reports (FP, NP); 
Sustainability reports (FP); 
Media releases 
 
The EC dyad constituted a new relationship between a 
publicly-traded corporation and a nonprofit Health 
Center to address efficiencies in the delivery of non-
clinical services. The partnership initiated a radical 
commitment to energy and environmental stewardship, 
which consisted of installation and maintenance of new 
HVAC (heating, ventilation and air-conditioning) 
equipment with a guaranteed payback period and 
defined energy savings.  
 
 
1998: FP approached CEO and executive team at NP with an Energy 
Performance Contract. 
Spring 1999: NP Board approved the 3 year Energy Performance Contract   
2-3 years: Healthy scepticism on the part of the staff of the NP partner of the 
FP value proposition; Setting up the protocols and the methodology for 
measuring  
Spring 2002:  successful conclusion of the energy performance contract 
moving to next level of partnership from the pure sale of an item to a 
relationship (NP) 
2007: highest level of partnership described as an intelligence relationship 
(NP); Ecostewardship role with FP visible in the organization (NP)  
 
T
el
ec
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
s 
(T
C
) Interviews (2007) 
Regional Vice President (FP) 
Vice President, Information 
Management, Hospital (NP) 
 
Archival Materials  
(2006-2008) 
Annual reports (FP, NP) 
Sustainability reports (FP) 
Media releases 
The TC dyad brought together a large, publicly-traded 
corporate partner and a nonprofit Health Center. It 
envisioned a shift from a prior supplier contract of 
telecommunications equipment and services to a 
multiyear learning partnership. The partnership 
benefits accrued to the organizations involved the 
reinvestment of the TC corporation‘s savings in 
marketing and sales into joint projects for the co-
development of innovative telecommunication 
solutions.  
Longstanding philanthropic involvement in the community  
Strong effort to go after the [NP] business that [FP] had lost to competitors. 
2001 to 2004: The hospital contracted three major lines of service to [FP] for 
three years  
2004 to 2009: Successful completion of contract and entered into a second, 
five year, contract: ―But then we began to bring additional value to the 
table and from not only what our insights and our involvement in other 
health care institutions, but our work at the level of government and in our 
understanding of the industry and so we were bringing solutions to the 
hospital to consider.‖ (FP) 
  
   
6
7
 
6
8
 
69 
 
 
TABLE 3.1 (continued) 
Dyad Data Shared Purpose Timeline 
D
ia
g
n
o
st
ic
 I
m
a
g
in
g
 (
D
I)
 
Interviews (2007) 
National General Manager 
(FP) 
 CEO  & President, Hospital 
(NP) 
 
Archival Materials  
(2006-2008) 
Annual reports (FP, NP) 
Sustainability reports (FP) 
Media releases 
Published case study 
The DI dyad was a partnership between the same 
Health Centre involved in the two previous dyads and a 
different corporate partner. The partnership built on a 
prior vendor-supplier relationship to co-develop a beta-
testing site; its focus was on optimization of workflow.  
 
 
Mid 1980s: Key informant joins FP; the two organizations are already 
involved; relationship evolved over time 
Early 1990s: new CEO heading the NP – entered into a CT research 
relationship which far exceeded their expectations in terms of software 
developed and disseminated worldwide; profitable for both partners 
Late 1990s: Opening of research affiliate; NP selected $150,000 to $200,000 
of used equipment from the FP warehouse to put basic imaging 
infrastructure in place 
2000s: FP awarded tender to equip the [investment]; and an official 
partnership agreement signed in addition  
2002 to 2005: collaboration on which projects had physician and hospital 
interest and validity  
2005: NP CEO retires  
2006: new CEO joins the NP; no new primary contact person appointed. 
2007: partnership agreement concluded 
M
in
im
a
ll
y
 I
n
v
a
si
v
e 
S
u
rg
er
y
 (
M
IS
) 
Interviews (2007) 
National Director, Medical 
Systems (FP) 
Director, Research Institute 
(NP) 
Archival Materials  
(2006-2008) 
Annual reports (FP, NP) 
Media releases & clippings 
Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU)  
The MIS dyad forged a new relationship between the 
MIS corporation and a Research Institute. Historically, 
the MIS corporation had only performed contract 
engineering. This was the MIS corporation‘s first 
attempt to collaborate on the development of 
technology with each party bringing its background 
intellectual property to bear on the project.  
 
 
Fall 2002: Informal initial contact between FP and NP representatives 
followed by one week of on-site observations of surgery by the FP 
Spring 2003: 2 yr. MOU to work together; role negotiation – contractor vs. 
advisor 
Jan 2004: Key Surgeon leaves hospital  
Spring 2004: relationship stalls but re-emerges due to a personal contact 
between corporate executive and a third party representing NP; invitation 
to a (somewhat acrimonious) meeting of partners 
Spring 2005: NP representative brings investor on board, saying that he had 
been authorized to proceed; several months of protracted negotiations 
during which ―… a lot of effort [went] into costing what he wanted‖ (FP) 
Summer 2005: The investor tried to make something happen: ―came to our 
place at least six times and he tried to make a deal‖ (FP); MOU lapses 
Fall 2005: Corporate informant contacted the admin at research institute; ―the 
whole thing just exploded‖ (FP) 
6
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FINDINGS 
For two of the four studied dyads (Telecommunications and Minimally Invasive 
Surgery), the cross-sector partnership was the very first collaboration between them; the 
partners had no prior contracts, or relationships (adversarial or collaborative). The 
decision to go it together was rooted in a shared purpose for social value creation (see 
Table 3.1). For the other two dyads (Digital Imaging and Energy Conservation), the 
cross-sector partnership grew out of a prior transactional relationship (i.e. a vendor-
supplier contract). Both the choice of partner and the choice of the type and intensity of 
engagement were deliberate.  
In each dyad, the nonprofit (NP) and for-profit (FP) partners sought the ‗right‘ 
strategic partner. Whether the partnerships had been preceded by a transactional 
exchange or not, partners articulated a strategic motivation and negotiated shared vision 
for co-creating social value. For example, in the Digital Imaging (DI) dyad: 
There are some customers who think that a partnership is a better way to do 
something.  It‘s not.  Not necessarily. It‘s just a different way to do things, right. 
And you have to know what it is that you want and what it is that you expect out 
of that partnership. You have to have a good reason for getting into it…. You‘ve 
got to be able to say, at least in my way of thinking, there are three or four things 
that we need to accomplish strategically. (FP, DI) 
 
The whole idea here was to see if we could come up with a shared vision from the 
point of view of [FP] and ourselves coming to the conclusion that we wanted to 
provide the very, very best of imaging enabled technology to serve our 
patients.…We were very eager to be at the cutting edge of technology because … 
we were probably exposing the patients to more radiation than necessary. So, we 
wanted to look at a partner who had a reputation in being at the cutting edge and 
we had the same vision, shared vision. (NP, DI) 
 
For the Energy Conservation (EC) dyad, the for-profit partner took the initiative to forge 
a collaboration that would be clearly distinguishable from the prior vendor relation, 
which was seen as transactional, not integrative (Austin, 2000): 
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It started with us being successful on bid day and I don‘t think there are any of us 
recall as to whether it was because our technology was better, whether our price 
was right. We were a vendor…. Post that… we approached them to talk to them 
about our energy value proposition. So I think that‘s how the relationship started. 
But I think in terms of the partnership, unlike [NP], a lot of the clients that we 
have sold in health care have been, energy has been the leading value proposition 
because it‘s one where you actually do get to go and talk to the CEO. (FP, EC) 
 
We started out by talking about what could they offer and what could we 
offer…We decided to go for a partnership so that we could use the very best of 
what they had to offer and we would be a model site for them. (NP, EC)  
 
Definitions of Success and Failure 
We contrasted key informants‘ definitions of success and failure within each dyad 
and across the two types of organizations: for-profit corporation (FP) or nonprofit 
organization (NP). On the surface, all conceptualizations of success and failure focused 
on the achievement of initial expectations, that is, ―…you achieve what you set out to 
achieve at the very, very beginning‖ (NP, DI); ―ultimate success (is where) each partner 
gets what they expected to get‖ (NP, Minimally Invasive Surgery (MIS)); and ―both 
people have to win, right?‖ (NP, Telecommunications (TC)). Failure was not seen as the 
opposite of success but rather a counterpoint -- ―if you can‘t find things that are 
differentiated from everyone else … it‘s just been a conversation‖ (FP, DI).  
The lines between success and failure were often blurred: ―You know, I, 
sometimes I‘m not sure if I can really talk about it because there‘s times where a failed 
partnership in time turns around to become a valuable partnership in the end‖ (FP, TC). 
Perhaps more importantly, (temporary) accounts of success or failure triggered both 
unilateral and mutual role (re)calibrations. Prior practice-based literature emphasizes the 
importance of real-time adaptation of partners‘ roles and responsibilities (Rondinelli & 
London, 2003; Seitanidi, 2008). Our findings extend and complement earlier arguments 
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by showing that partners engage in ongoing, iterative processes to redefine their role as 
the partnership unfolds. Notably, role redefinition is seen as distinct from the overarching 
shared purpose of the partnership which shows remarkable resilience (see Table 3.2). 
There is a gradual progression towards meeting that shared purpose.  
Role (Re)Calibration 
Prior studies emphasize the importance of (re)aligning partners‘ expectations 
(Rondinelli & London, 2003) as the partnership becomes more integrative. Our findings 
show that expectations form and reform cumulating forward towards the shared purpose 
of the relationship. Rather than an activity-based alignment, our data speaks to alignment 
via relational processes. Figure 3.2 models how nonprofit and for-profit partners learn to 
take on new roles in response to (at times hidden or emergent) needs of their counterpart. 
These relational processes help partners remain closely connected with the shared 
purpose of the alliance: 
We brought them technology. We‘ve brought them innovative solutions.  We‘ve 
listened to them. We‘ve used them so that we can adjust our own offerings so that 
hopefully we can add more value to them and to other clients in health care. 
We‘ve brought them services so we support their staff in terms of maintaining, 
you know, these technologies that are implemented. We‘ve supported them with 
their efforts to promote energy conservation to their own internal organization. 
(FP, EC) 
 
We both realized there were two parties in terms of part of the problem so we 
reconciled the shared impact of that and accordingly made an adjustment and, you 
know, that‘s what, to me, a partnership is about. The next level of partnership to 
me is moving to the value add and where you actually remove yourself from the 
pure sale of an item to a relationship … but the highest level of partnership to me 
is when you get into those things that are more, I guess you‘d say it‘s your 
intelligence relationships and sharing your views of what customer service should 
be or how the company can move in another direction. (NP, EC) 
 
  
 
TABLE 3.2 
 
Momentum towards Success/Failure: Role (Re)calibration 
 
Dyad Partner’s Goal Momentum towards Success Momentum towards Failure 
Event Role (re)calibration Event Role (re)calibration 
D
ia
g
n
o
st
ic
 I
m
a
g
in
g
 F
o
r-
P
ro
fi
t 
 “Early health”  
 
―…Our belief in how to 
make ourselves more 
successful is to 
fundamentally change the 
value proposition of our 
customers. And that is 
really, to make them more 
successful.‖ 
Successful joint Six Sigma 
project  
―[Previous successful project] 
gave us a really good 
foundation from a 
relationship perspective; it 
allowed us to learn how to 
work together on different 
stuff.... The best partnerships 
grow out of some shared 
experience, right? You learn 
how to be partners together.‖ 
Discussion of how to grow 
the partnership 
―We had a number of 
retreats with [CEO and his 
senior team and the 
corporate senior team] just 
to talk about partnership 
opportunities and how we 
develop closer 
relationships.‖ 
 
NP changes the senior 
management team 
―Unfortunately the body 
count there has been pretty 
high.… I don‘t think [the 
new CEO] knows us as a 
company, nor do the new 
people in there.‖  
 
FP ready to start over and 
build from the ground up 
―Right now, [the relationship] 
just doesn‘t seem to be on their 
radar…. But I think, when it 
does, and they want to get back 
at it, it‘s really going to be 
starting from scratch again 
from an educational perspective 
of building up.‖ 
N
o
n
p
ro
fi
t 
Provide the cutting edge 
imaging enabled technology  
―To provide the very, very 
best of imaging enabled 
technology to serve our 
patients.‖ 
 
 
Process changes 
recommended by FP 
―They did bring some value 
to changing some processes‖. 
NP sets realistic timelines  
 
―One has to be very, very 
patient that you are realistic 
in terms of the time lines for 
achieving the … objectives 
that you set out. It takes, 
you know, we‘re not talking 
about months here. You talk 
about years.‖ 
Non delivery on promises. 
 
―The compromise here is in 
terms of the time frame for 
achieving all of the 
objectives.‖ 
NP engages FP in role 
recalibration 
―You can get peeved off at 
your partner for doing 
something silly but unless you 
openly talk about it and say, 
you know, what you did is not 
right, and it‘s not helping this 
partnership. So, you know, 
there are bumps in the road.‖ 
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TABLE 3.2 (continued) 
Dyad Partner’s Goal 
Momentum towards Success Momentum towards Failure 
Event Role (re)calibration Event Role (re)calibration 
E
n
er
g
y
 C
o
n
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
 
F
o
r-
P
ro
fi
t 
A responsible upgrade to 
NP’s facilities 
―An innovative solution to 
help them address their 
needs in terms of upgrading 
their facilities through what 
I call a fiscally and 
environmentally responsible 
program.‖ 
 
 
NP CEO’s public statement 
regarding the role of FPs 
―[CEO of NP], post his 
retirement, has helped us, 
he‘s introduced us to other 
CEOs, other executives in 
health care…. He talked 
about how hospitals, the 
public sector needs to look to 
the private sector, needs to 
look to these partnerships to 
improve their overall 
efficiency.‖ 
FP CEO personally 
engages with NP  
―[The NP partner] is a 
major client seen by our 
president as a true partner, 
as a business partner as 
well. That‘s why our 
president visited [CEO] and 
the hospital.‖ 
Monopoly by FP of related 
work for NP 
(FP addressing NP): ―we 
appreciate the opportunity 
to work with you on that…. 
You‘re not concerned that 
you‘re going to give us this 
much more work [when] 
we‘ve already got a 
guarantee of work to begin 
with?‖  
NP adjustment to changing 
needs of the FP and increases 
own requests of FP 
―[NP response] was 
‗the more work I have with you 
… the bigger the stick I have to 
make sure that you have an 
interest in … helping me with 
what I want.‘  It helps to build 
value both ways.‖ 
N
o
n
p
ro
fi
t 
An innovative, upgrade 
without a capital infusion 
―We‘re renewing our 
hospital. We‘re doing it 
through a very fiscally and 
environmentally responsible 
type of program.‖ 
Request by FP to refer other 
hospitals to them  
―They‘re great listeners. 
They‘ve worked very well 
with the staff. And the 
integrity is there and the 
reason I say that is that since, 
then, they‘ve asked me to 
help open some doors in 
hospitals and the way that 
they behave is very, very 
businesslike.… They have a 
huge amount of respect for 
people.‖ 
FP invited to become a 
visible partner within the 
NP as NP takes on an 
ecostewardship role 
―And so, you know, they 
became an active player and 
much more visible in the 
organization and then in 
other ways, because they 
know we have a strong 
ecostewardship role, they 
are one of the first ones if 
we‘re going to have these 
open houses, they provide 
hand outs to people, you 
know, the light bulbs, the 
enterprises.‖ 
High bid from FP partner 
results in an award to their 
competitor 
―Well, I know it happened 
in one case where [FP] 
automatically assumed they 
were going to get the 
contract and they weren‘t as 
aggressive on the pricing…. 
Well, they learned the hard 
way that, you know, in that 
particular case, because it 
was competitive bidding, 
they had to have the best 
price.‖  
Re-evaluation of the value of 
the partnership  
―You could see how the 
relationship could, you know, 
go sideways after a period. By 
the time I have to test to do 
some sort of a third party 
analysis of the value of the 
relationship because, you 
know, at a certain point, you 
always have to test the market 
to make sure you‘re getting the 
best price…. It‘s never the 
price of just the product.  It‘s 
the whole picture.  It‘s the 
whole life cycle of the 
product.‖ 
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TABLE 3.2 (continued) 
Dyad Partner’s Goal 
Momentum towards Success Momentum towards Failure 
Event Role (re)calibration Event Role (re)calibration 
T
el
ec
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
s 
F
o
r-
P
ro
fi
t 
Process and business 
transformation in 
healthcare 
telecommunications 
 
―How do you optimize the 
business and how you 
transform the business?‖  
Signed partnership agreement 
for a specified time period 
 
 
 
―We then entered into a five 
year contract and the services 
continued to get built out 
because we did deliver on 
what we said we were going 
to deliver for those three 
years.‖ 
Partners sit down on a 
regular basis as well as ad 
hoc to discuss FP 
capabilities and NP interest 
 
―We have the luxury … to 
sit down on a regular and on 
an ad hoc basis to just talk 
about the things that are 
going on and say we have 
this capability.‖ 
 
NP partner took business to 
competitor due to personal 
bias, ending the partnership 
 
 
―A few years ago … we 
delivered a terrific solution 
for them and surprisingly 
enough, our partner actually 
undid the relationship 
because of a personal bias 
that [the CIO of the 
hospital] had and took it to 
our competitor.‖ 
 
 
NP new partnership failed and 
so returned to FP – forgive & 
forget  
  
 
―It all depends on whether you 
have the ability to forgive and 
press on. If you can forgive and 
forget and move forward I 
think then you tend to be 
rewarded.‖ 
N
o
n
p
ro
fi
t 
Innovative solutions to 
telecommunications 
problems at the NP 
 
 
―Bringing additional value 
to the table and from not 
only what our insights and 
our involvement in other 
health care institutions, but 
our work at the level of 
government and our 
understanding of the 
industry‖ (FP) 
 
Personal commitment of FP 
General Manager to deal 
with any service or quality 
problems  
 
―[FP] said, `we know you 
haven‘t been happy in the 
past. Obviously the hospitals 
went away from us`. … She 
made a personal commitment 
that if there was ever any 
problem, she would make 
sure it was sorted out.‖ 
 
Working and solving 
problems together  
 
 
 
―A year later we actually cut 
a deal with them because it 
takes time to say, ―okay, 
well what do you mean by 
that and how does this work 
for the hospital?‖   
 
Existing vendor 
relationships too expensive 
for NP 
 
 
―It‘s my experience, just 
says that we can‘t afford not 
to have some partnership 
relationships. It‘s just too 
expensive to stay in that 
vendor world…‖ 
18 months of clarifications 
before signing the agreement 
 
 
 
―Because you can‘t just say 
well, that‘s really nice, I really 
like that.  It‘s how is this going 
to work?  What are we going to 
do?  How does that translate? 
… So it was probably a year to 
18 months before we actually 
signed something with them 
from the first time we met 
them.‖ 
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TABLE 3.2 (continued) 
 
Dyad Partner’s Goal 
Momentum towards Success Momentum towards Failure 
Event Role (re)calibration Event Role (re)calibration 
M
in
im
a
ll
y
 I
n
v
a
si
v
e 
S
u
rg
er
y
 
F
o
r-
P
ro
fi
t 
Design and build a 
minimally invasive surgical 
system together 
 
―I was expecting that we 
would work together to 
actually build a [surgical] 
system.‖ 
NP representative shows up 
with an investor to proceed 
with the project 
 
―About a year later [NP 
representative] shows up with 
an investor saying that he had 
been authorized by the 
research institute to proceed.‖ 
 
FP reengages with months 
of protracted negotiations  
 
 
―A lot of effort went into 
costing and what [was] 
wanted…. [The investor] 
came to our place at least 
six times and he tried to 
make a deal.‖ 
 
 
Perception of unequal effort 
by the partners 
 
 
―The final straw for me was 
we‘re about to … do a lot of 
heavy duty work on putting 
together a spec and costing 
and [NP representative] 
rolls up at the end of the 
driveway in his splashy 
sports car …  and he said, 
oh, I‘m off to the beach.‖  
 
Post-mortem reflection on why 
the partnership ended  
 
 
―The whole thing just exploded 
…, from a partnership point of 
view, I think it was naiveté; 
[NP representative – a 
Physician] was totally naïve 
from a business point of view.‖ 
 
N
o
n
p
ro
fi
t 
Design and build a 
minimally invasive surgical 
system together 
 
―It was primarily a 
contractual thing rather than 
a cooperative design 
problem.‖ 
First cross-sector partnership 
attempt by FP 
 
 
―[Research Institute] wanted a 
surgical [device], something 
that they could themselves 
improve and essentially use it 
for whatever they wanted to 
use it.‖ 
Struggle with defining 
partners’ contributions 
 
 
―[FP] does not fund its own 
independent R&D … if 
you‘re going to develop 
new technology, and you 
want a company like [FP] to 
be involved, then you need 
to pay [them] to do the 
work.‖   
 
Failure to find third party 
financing 
 
 
―So the potential was there 
though for the two to go out 
and to get the funding…. 
The only problem was that 
it wasn‘t clear at that point 
how we would do this. How 
we would fund raise?‖ 
 
Multiple roles of NP (research 
& teaching) allows success 
even if original goal not met 
 
―I mean, and even if you don‘t 
solve the problem completely, 
you probably come up with 
something new that comes out 
of it and from a university‘s 
point of view, it‘s never a 
failure because you have ended 
up at least training somebody.‖ 
 
7
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 Role (re)calibrations are seen as drivers of success – specifically, partners regard 
the gradual engagement in relational processes as forward-looking investments in crafting 
social innovations.  
Also, [we were part of] the first revenue generating [project] that they [NP] put 
into. We worked on that whole project with them, brought in capital to help 
finance the deal and build a stream, a financing stream that was equivalent to their 
perceived ability … of how they would be able to generate revenue and income 
from that. So, that was pretty avant-garde stuff at the time. I mean, nobody really 
had a business model for how you would establish an imaging service. It was 
pretty cutting edge stuff. (FP, DI) 
 
When the partnership progressed successfully (or is seen as such by at least one 
partner), role calibrations were often projected forward along a collaboration continuum. 
The partnerships were described as flexible and dynamic; they involved ―active 
engagement ... and testing it to make sure you‘re both still gaining value add and good 
value for it‖ (NP, EC). 
We participate in their foundation events and they appreciate the fact that, you 
know, this is really disconnected from the business we do with them.... But 
nevertheless, as a partner, we feel that that‘s the right thing to do. Given that our 
own employees, unfortunately, have to use their facilities, as a local corporate 
partner we should do that. So we participate in those activities and that‘s seen by 
their leadership as us being good business partners…. And we adjust our 
philosophy and we spend a lot of time thinking and working with a specific [NP] 
to get an understanding of what is it that‘s important to them and what are the 
types of things we need to involve ourselves in so that we can understand what 
makes an impact. (FP, EC) 
 
Positive events stimulated role recalibrations; these role recalibrations provide 
new impetus for value renewal (Austin, 2000) by uncovering new sources of social 
innovation (Plowman et al., 2007): ―Well, we came back with more. We came back with 
a new offering‖ (FP, EC).4 
Proposition 1a. Role calibration accelerates momentum for success.  
Proposition 1b. Greater momentum for success escalates each partner’s 
motivation to engage in role recalibration.   
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FIGURE 3.2 
Relational Processes in the (Re)Forming of Strategic Cross-Sector Partnerships 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Partner-level constructs 
             Dyad-level constructs 
 
  Crossovers 
 
 
 When partners anticipated set-backs or detected signs of failure, they engaged in 
preventive role calibrations in an attempt to delay or reverse upsets. Only those dyads 
that persisted in their role (re)calibration efforts in spite of temporary disappointments or 
imbalance managed to consistently stay the course to their intended goal of social value 
creation. If one partner deliberately stalled role (re)calibration efforts, for example by 
stepping back commitment (Hardy et al, 2006), their counterpart could avoid premature 
failure by pressing for role recalibration. 
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So you weather those storms and I think that‘s a sign of a good partnership that 
unforeseen things happen but you respectfully and mutually work through them 
with a sense of urgency. You know, you don‘t take advantage of the relationship. 
You have a high level of respect and you have, and that level of respect comes in 
by, and then intimacy comes around understanding why that‘s important to me 
and why it‘s important to you and I give you insight into my company and how 
we‘re structured and how we need to be able to sustain ourselves in the market 
place. I can‘t compete with free and I can‘t compete with lower than cost but 
neither one of those things are sustainable and so they‘re no good for you in the 
end either. So, and as you understand how  important it is for you to ensure that 
your environment is up and protected and running, and we have that, we almost 
work as if it is our joint venture to succeed or fail. (FP, TC) 
 
Proposition 2a. Role calibration reverses momentum for failure.  
 
Proposition 2b. Greater momentum for failure reduces each partner’s 
motivation to engage in role recalibration. 
 
Role (re)calibrations can follow positive or negative events within each dyad (see 
Table 3.2). Our findings suggest an intriguing asymmetry: role calibrations come 
naturally as partners collaborate more intensively yet become increasingly challenging as 
the relationship derails: ―we‘re getting too late now…. I would say the indecision of 
whether to do it or not is really hurting now … I think we‘ve missed … a grand 
opportunity‖ (FP, MIS).   
Constraints 
Role recalibrations were constrained by partners‘ framing of social value and the 
perception of the risks incurred in co-creating the partnership. Each partner assessed the 
risk of the cross-sector partnership to themselves against the social value potential of the 
partnership as viewed through the lens of their own sectoral frame.
5
  
There‘s a significant amount of risk there.… I can pick out a business model that 
makes it very attractive for us to do that and I can take that risk, right. So, it‘s not 
like we just, we don‘t want to touch anything. We‘re willing to take risk … we‘re 
not afraid to take risk, but if you‘re going to take risk, you have to take it with the 
right people under the right circumstances. (FP, DI) 
 
80 
 
 
So what does that do for (my corporation)? If you believe that that‘s a good thing 
to do for Canadians, right across the country, and it is a large area in which health 
care, a large industry that needs sizeable transformation and you can help any 
individual hospital get over the financial hurdle by acquiring it [technology] and 
bringing it down to a cost point and a cost that is palatable on a hospital by 
hospital basis, then you need some hospitals that are willing to work with you to 
prove that it can work and be able to go out and talk to other hospitals and 
demonstrate to other hospitals.... I‘d like to believe that some of those are good, 
corporate purchases and good corporate thrusts for the betterment of Canadians. 
You know, we talked earlier about, you know, a lot of times to bring value to the 
community, bring value to Canada, those are a little harder at times to measure 
than they are in developing areas but if you can do it in this area, than I think that 
has tremendous benefit. (FP, TC) 
 
When either partner assessed risks independently of the potential for social value 
creation, that is, they decoupled social value from risk; the hurdle of co-creating social 
innovation seemed harder to overcome. For example, in the Telecommunication dyad, 
risk assessments by the FP hinged on the potential to generate social value – the more 
worthwhile the endeavour, the more reasonable the risk: 
Part of trust comes down to what level of risk that you‘re willing to take too and 
experiment with and either be rewarded for it or find new learnings as a result of 
it….  There‘s a lot of experience that you have to have to go in and say I think this 
is a worthwhile endeavour. This is good; there is a reasonable risk factor here. We 
are not overexposed and it has a good upside. This is good business. It‘s good, 
legitimate business for us both. (FP, TC) 
 
Momentum for success intensified when employees re-coupled their philanthropic 
investments and the risks involved in the partnership: 
Their employees said, ―Boy, we really enjoy this work. They‘re also doing this. 
Let‘s put some of our philanthropic time and our community time towards doing 
things for the hospital.‖ It‘s pretty huge what they‘ve done so you know it‘s, and 
they‘re having fun doing that. It‘s not like it‘s, ―oh yeah, we have to do this 
because we did that.‖ This is totally their own thing, totally their excitement, not 
ours. (NP, TC) 
 
It takes time to say, ―okay, well what do you mean by that and how does this 
work for the hospital?‖ Because you can‘t just say well, that‘s really nice, I really 
like that. Its how is this going to work? What are we going to do? How does that 
translate? Because at the end of the day, you still have to have some sort of a 
81 
 
 
contract and agreement. It‘s not just; oh thank you, that‘s really nice. So it was 
probably a year to 18 months before we actually signed something with them 
from the first time we met them. (NP, TC) 
 
Proposition 3. The momentum for success or failure is contingent on how 
each partner frames the dyadic interaction. When both partners couple 
risk and social value creation potential, the partnership maintains 
momentum for success as the partners progress along the collaboration 
continuum; when either partner decouples risk and social value creation 
potential, the momentum for success is hindered or stalled. 
 
Crossovers 
Because role recalibrations can lead to new, different, or stronger coupling 
between risk and social value creation, they can bring about turnarounds from success to 
failure or vice-versa. For example, following a 5-year window of musical chairs in the 
executive ranks of both partners, the DI dyad concluded a partnership agreement in 
March 2007. The for-profit partner noted that the potential for social value creation had 
peaked and the risks became more salient; the growing disconnect necessitated a 
recalibration of their roles in the partnership. 
We don‘t have the obligation, any more, you know, to continue to do that, so 
we‘re kind of waiting to see what the hospital wants to do going forward. But, I 
think we‘ve got some real notable wins out of that partnership. (FP, DI) 
 
I think we‘re back at square one … totally back at square one.… I don‘t think [the 
new CEO] knows us as a company. So, and nor do the new people in there…. 
But, you know, that‘s not the tip of the iceberg…. The change there is so 
complete…. Unless we did something really dumb or were really stupid, why 
would you not continue that relationship with [us]? But right now, it just doesn‘t 
seem to be on their radar and this type of thing doesn‘t seem to be really 
important to them. (FP, DI) 
 
In this case, the for-profit corporation bet on partnerships‘ ability to restore or renew 
social value, and turned around momentum from failure towards success: ―But I think, 
when it does, and they want to get back at it, it‘s really going to be starting from scratch 
again from an educational perspective of building up‖ (FP, DI). The flip-side effect was 
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also borne out by the data. When partners let social value erode, the risks loomed larger 
in comparison, shifting momentum from success towards failure: 
Well, they learned the hard way that, you know, in that particular case, because it 
was competitive bidding, they had to have the best price. So, I think having a 
good relationship but you‘re always testing each other that, you know, I never 
leave with my meeting with [FP] that I feel there‘s anything uncomfortable about 
it. But I could sense at a certain point if they weren‘t providing good service to us 
or, you know, we weren‘t feeling that we were … partners with them; they don‘t 
invite us to participate in their think tank sessions. You could see how the 
relationship could, you know, go sideways or after a period, by the time I have to 
test to do some sort of a third party analysis of the value of the relationship 
because, you know, at a certain point, you always have to test the market.… But I 
think what I‘ve learned in all these relationships is it‘s not just the price of a 
product, it‘s the price of these other value adds and that‘s probably the best part of 
your research is to understand it‘s never the price of just the product. It‘s the 
whole picture. It‘s the whole life cycle of the product. (NP, EC)   
 
Proposition 4. Increasing the social value creation potential and/or 
reducing relational risk enables crossovers from failure to success. 
 
Relational Attachment  
Our narratives also surfaced degrees and types of relational attachment. Prior 
studies suggest that relational attachment grows with good partners – through specific 
investments the exchange partners make in the relationship over time (Seabright, 
Levinthal, & Fichman, 1992). Our analyses differentiated two subthemes: ―being the 
right partner‖ versus ―staging the next move‖. Being the right partner was likened to 
marriage. Partners make patient investments in their relationship; their emphasis is on fit, 
compatibility, and constancy of purpose.  
You just don‘t decide … that we‘re going to have a partner … and who is that 
going to be? The best partnerships grow out of some shared experience, right? 
You learn how to be partners together. You learn how to work together and you 
build some confidence and trust in each other. Partnerships take a lot more time. 
They take a lot of time. [What is important is] history, our sense of their 
expectations, [and] time…. My comments [are] kind of accurate historically and 
said with, you know, some grains of hope for the future that it‘s going to continue 
to be that way…. You know, I do think the past is important. (FP, DI) 
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The trust has to be there.… The give and take … and the communication has to be 
there…. You can get peeved off at your partner for doing something silly but … 
you openly talk about it and say, you know, what you did is not right, and it‘s not 
helping this partnership.… There are bumps in the road.… Right from the outset, 
openly share what you‘re thinking of each other. One has to be very, very patient 
that you are realistic in terms of the time lines for achieving the … objectives that 
you set out. It takes, you know, we‘re not talking about months here. You talk 
about years … the compromise here is in terms of the time frame for achieving all 
of the objectives…. You have … to compromise those kinds of things. (NP, DI)  
 
Staging the next move emphasized the need to step up intensity and engagement 
in order to move the partnership to new ground. Partnerships emphasizing staging 
repeatedly morphed their relationship and made repeated references to the progression of 
the relationship in the past and in the future. These relationships start with scepticism but 
promote increasing degrees of closeness and transparency. Partners are less concerned 
about fit because their capabilities, needs and interests are evolving rapidly:  
Awhile ago we used to differentiate ourselves more on the services side, but you 
can‘t tell that service on services story unless you‘ve got the equipment footprint 
and you‘ve got the relationship and you‘ve got the quality of partner on the other 
side who is willing to let you in and consult, right?…  To be part of how [they] 
shape strategy, you know, to be part of [their] planning processes. Until you‘ve 
got that kind of closeness, our feeling is we can never really demonstrate what our 
true organizational capabilities are. (FP, DI) 
 
I guess it‘s just an evolution. I guess what it really comes down to is you move 
away from selling the product. But as most corporations realize, it‘s all about your 
long term relationships and your preferred client and also … picking each other‘s 
brains and you know getting the best from both parties..... So I‘d say in the first 
two years of the relationship or three years, there was a healthy scepticism of 
what I‘d call marketers promoting their technology as well as this performance 
contracting and we undertook to focus on that company because they were prime 
systems and also because they were the ones coming to us with an innovative way 
to get into it. (NP, EC) 
 
The two subthemes are not orthogonal; partners seek a balance between the 
stability offered by the right partner and the learning opportunities afforded by staging 
their next move. Combinations of these two subthemes allow partners to mitigate against 
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relational risks (through finding the right partner) and to push the envelope of value 
creation (by staging the next move).  
Partnerships do bring benefits if you pick the right one but there really needs to be 
trust there.... You really have to be comfortable; you have to know them really.… 
You have to say, well, okay, I‘m going to partner with [NP] … what is it I want 
from the partnership?… And you kind of write a little check list down. What is it 
they bring to the table? What are the gaps? Even if we don‘t have a perfect match 
in the first day, if we work on this, this and this, do you think we can get there? I 
don‘t think going into a partnership you know for absolute certainty it‘s 
absolutely going to work, but I think you make your best judgment. (FP, MIS) 
 
By choosing a specific type of relational attachment, partners can buffer relational 
risks (through the stability afforded by having the right partner) and push the envelope of 
social value creation (through the exploring closer, more complex, more challenging 
partnerships). In so doing, relational attachment supports more effective, timely, or 
frequent role recalibrations; this in turns sustains momentum towards success or 
facilitates crossovers from failure to success.  
Proposition 5. Relational attachment strengthens the positive effect of role 
(re)calibrations on momentum for success.  
 
Proposition 6. Relational attachment increases the likelihood of 
crossovers from failure to success. 
 
Partner Complacency 
Prior literature speaks about the importance of value renewal. Even successful 
collaborations may slide into complacency and stop searching for value opportunities. 
Austin observed that ―in the social purpose alliance marketplace, as in the commercial 
marketplace, the failure to innovate and create new value will likely lead to the 
displacement of laggards by innovators‖ (2000: 80). Our narratives showed evidence that 
complacency – taken-for-grantedness and/or lack of ongoing investment of time and 
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energy into renewing the social value of the partnership – eroded the relational 
attachment between the partners: 
But sometimes, you know, the relationship is too comfortable. So all of a sudden 
people know that‘s the business, I‘ve got it. So maybe they don‘t try so hard 
anymore and you know, and that‘s where you get that perimeter defined. You still 
both have to feel that both organizations are hungry and supporting the 
relationship. I can‘t get complacent about ignoring securing the supplies from 
them if they‘re the best provider and they can‘t get complacent about serving my 
needs and it can happen. They might just take it for granted. (NP, EC) 
 
Proposition 7. Partner complacency weakens the feedback loop between 
prior success and role recalibration. 
 
Partner Disillusionment 
Relational attachment is a double-edged sword. Engagement helps partners 
uncover novel capabilities and improves their odds of social value creation (Brickson, 
2007; Plowman et al., 2007). However, in intense relationships, even isolated incidents 
can have damaging consequences:  
The final straw for me was we‘re about to go into [NP representative‘s] house to 
do a lot like, heavy duty work on putting together a spec or something together 
and costing and [their surgeon] rolls up at the end of the driveway in his splashy 
sports car, somebody else in the car, and I said … he‘s coming to work with us 
and he said, oh, I‘m off to the beach. And so … I began to question then, is this 
really serious and so then it died out and I never really knew, and I feel bad for 
never having that closure. (FP, MIS) 
 
Proposition 8. Partner disillusionment weakens the positive effect of role 
calibration and momentum for success. 
 
Figure 3.2 summarizes our key propositions. Our framework emphasizes the 
duality of success and failure in cross-sector partnerships and articulates a central if 
subtle role of relational attachment in sustaining or constraining micro-processes of social 
innovation. Taken together, our propositions suggest that dyad success (or failure) hinges 
on partners‘ motivation to iteratively realign their roles. Partners sustain momentum 
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towards success by developing a stronger degree of relational attachment; this in turn 
mitigates relational risk and releases partners‘ capabilities to tap into unexpected 
synergies to co-create social innovation. 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The main insight from our grounded investigation is the importance of how 
partners relationally (re)engage each other. The process of co-creating social value is rife 
with differences and difficulties, yet mindful practicing helps partners recalibrate their 
roles as the relationship unfolds in order to sustain momentum towards success or reverse 
momentum from failure to success. Our analyses show that shared goals are resilient to 
partnership friction, but reaching these goals requires gradual progression through 
iterative role recalibrations. When partners take steps to deliberately recalibrate their 
roles, they tighten the coupling between social value creation and risk; this fast-tracks 
success or helps them overcome premature failure.  
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Our findings suggest that cross-sector partnerships often overlay rational 
decision-making with fine grained relational interactions (Fiol & O‘Connor, 2002). 
Emotionally-laden relational processes may influence partners‘ mindfulness, their ability 
to recognize and adjust to each other‘s cues as the partnership progresses towards shared 
goals (Hite, 2005). Future studies can examine how partners can use socio-emotional 
levers to stimulate learning and capability transfer among the partners (Fiol et al., 2009). 
Second, by intent and design, cross-sector partnerships typically bring together 
highly dissimilar partners. Because partners often espouse different expectations of what 
social value is and how best social value can be pursued and achieved, their actions often 
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reflect a priori values and beliefs (Hardy et al., 2006). Future research can explore how 
differential attention to social innovation processes shifts the creation and capture of 
social value within each dyad. Our questions and analyses caution researchers and 
practitioners that social value creation may be tightly coupled with the level of risk 
partners initially perceived; the higher the social value creation relative to the perceived 
risk, the better the odds of engaging in social innovation. Our analyses suggest that at 
times partners deliberately jack up their tolerance for relational risk or revise upward 
their social innovation target.
  
However, we encourage additional inquiry into when, why 
and how partners may rethink their risk frames (Stafford et al., 2000) and/or recraft or 
mutually adjust their social value propositions (Brickson, 2007; King, 2007). 
Finally, research on strategic alliances suggests that as partners make repeated 
investments in the relationship over time, they develop relational coordination 
mechanisms (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Hite, 2005; Seabright, Levinthal, & Fichman, 1992) 
and construct shared realities (Palmer, Benveniste, & Dunford, 2007). Our study suggests 
that sustained investments in such relational mechanisms are contingent on partners‘ 
ability to sustain momentum towards success. We put forth relational attachment as a 
buffering mechanism, which tempers the negative effects of complacency and 
disillusionment. However, we know very little about how partners may foster and sustain 
strong relational attachment in the face of difference, adversity and external pressure. The 
literature on cross-sector partnerships would benefit from a finer grained understanding 
of how, and to what effect, partners nurture positive affect. With a handful of exceptions 
(Fiol et al., 2009; Winn, MacDonald, & Zietsma, 2008) most research on partnership and 
alliances in the environmental and social domain has emphasized conflict and friction. 
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Moving forward we need a better understanding of how partners overcome friction. We 
would also welcome research into the antecedents of the role recalibration efforts fleshed 
out in our analyses and framework, and empirical tests of factors that may moderate the 
effects of role recalibration on partnership outcomes. 
CONCLUSION 
Our study contributes to the literature on social value creation by unpacking the 
strategic processes of sustaining and catalytic social innovation in cross-sector 
partnerships. We explain how partners can make ―things happen that never would have 
happened on their own or would have happened much later on their own‖ (FP, DI) by 
unpacking the relational processes that sustain momentum towards success or failure. Our 
analyses surface the inevitable duality of success and failure in cross-sector partnerships, 
specify the roles of relational attachment, partner complacency and partner 
disillusionment in fast-tracking success or hastening failure, and explain how relational 
processes combine to help partners manage ―crossovers‖ between successes and failures -
- ―there‘s times where a failed partnership in time turns around to become a valuable 
partnership in the end‖ (FP, TC).  
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NOTES 
 1 Consistent with Selsky and Parker (2005), we use the terms nonprofit organization and 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) interchangeably. Teegen et al. define NGOs as 
―private, not-for-profit organizations that aim to serve particular societal interests by 
focusing advocacy and/or operational efforts on social, political and economic goals, 
including equity, education, health, environmental protection and human rights‖ (2004: 
466).  
 
2 
Complete details on the study design and execution are available from the authors. 
 
3 
Neither of the MIS partners, FP or NP, would be considered to be industry incumbents 
but rather catalytic innovators in this scenario. The alternative explanation for our 
findings that the MIS partnership was unable to reverse the momentum for failure - that 
by its very nature, catalytic innovations are disruptive and thus more uncertain and at 
higher risk of failure – is not supported. The desired innovation would not be disruptive 
to either of the partners‘ routines and business models.   
 
4 
While we acknowledge success traps (a tendency to stay the same when successful), we 
observed process learning. That is, the partners learned that their success was related to 
the ongoing process of role recalibration. Thus the process of role recalibration was 
reinforced by success, which then lead to further role recalibration. 
 
5 
Social value potential and risk assessment is partner specific. The FP and the NP 
partners face different risks while engaging in cross-sector partnerships. For example, the 
NP faces a reputational risk that may challenge their position of representing the interests 
of beneficiaries which could negatively impact their funding. The FP partner, on the other 
hand, risks poor utilization of financial resources which could lead to market 
repercussions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
VALUE FRAME FUSION IN CROSS SECTOR INTERACTIONS
3
 
By intent and design, cross sector partnerships bring together for-profit and 
nonprofit organizations to generate social value (Alvord et al., 2004; Teegen et al., 2004) 
– whether by overcoming market failures (Austin et al., 2006) or pursuing social 
opportunities (Crane & Matten, 2007; Nicholls, 2006; Mair & Martí, 2006). The received 
wisdom is that cross sector partners are often held apart by sector-specific value creation 
frames (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990; Yaziji & Doh, 2009). Frames
1
 refer to individual 
interpretations which inform and guide their actions (Goffman, 1974; Kaplan, 2008; 
Snow et al., 1986); they articulate ―what is going on‖ or ―should be going on‖ (Benford 
and Snow, 2000: 614). Frames are collectively negotiated understandings that punctuate 
framing processes by providing shared interpretations of people, events, or settings. 
Frames are not only outcomes of framing processes, but also important inputs. Frames 
motivate agency (Benford, 1993). They pattern subsequent action (Gamson, 1995). And 
they provide adherents and opponents with compelling accounts that both motivate and 
justify their beliefs and actions. 
Cross sector partners enact contradictory value-creation logics (Bryson et al., 
2006; Hansmann, 1980), partly because the for-profit and the nonprofit sectors espouse 
divergent expectations of and approaches to value creation (King, 2007; Waddock, 1989), 
and partly due to distinct identities (Brickson, 2007). Clashes in expectations and/or 
identities often predispose cross sector partnerships to distrust, conflict and premature 
failure (Fiol & O‘Connor, 2002; Macdonald & Chrisp, 2005; Nowell, 2010). However, 
                                                 
3 A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication (Le Ber, M. J., & Branzei, O. Forthcoming. Value frame 
fusion in cross sector interactions. Journal of Business Ethics, Acceptance received on March 17, 2010.) with kind 
permission of Springer Science and Business Media. 
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most partners work hard to understand and overcome their dissimilarities (Seitanidi & 
Crane, 2009); some fitfully align their contributions so they can co-create (often 
unprecedented) social value (Croteau & Hicks, 2003; Le Ber & Branzei, 2010).  
We marry prior research on dynamic framing processes in multi-organizational 
fields (Benford, 1997; Evans, 1997; Klandermans, 1992; Rochon & Meyer, 1997) and 
across organizational boundaries (Croteau & Hicks, 2003; Kleidman & Rochon, 1997) 
with insights on social value creation in cross sector interactions (Le Ber & Branzei, 
2010; Seitanidi & Crane, 2009) to draw attention to the dynamic and distinctly relational 
processes of value (re)framing in cross sector partnerships. Our qualitative inquiry asks 
how for-profit and nonprofit partners come to understand, reconcile and productively 
combine their (often opposing and deeply embedded) sectoral frames. We use four 
longitudinal value creation narratives of how for-profit and non-profit organizations come 
to (or fail to) develop a relational process framework of value frame fusion in cross sector 
partnerships.  
Our intended contribution is three-fold. First, we map the effortful processes by 
which for-profit and nonprofit partners iteratively revise their own frames in relation to 
each other to reach common ground. This extends the literature on dynamic framing 
(Benford, 1993; 1997) and especially dynamic frame alignment (Snow et al., 1986) 
across organizations and/or sectors (Croteau & Hicks, 2003; Nowell, 2010). Several 
recent reviews call for open challenges to the ‗static tendencies‘ of prior theory on 
framing and explicitly call for the unravelling of the dynamic processes of ―social 
construction, negotiation, contestation, and transformation‖ (Benford, 1997: 415). This is 
particularly important in multi-organizational fields, where new frames need to ―link 
97 
 
 
previously existing organizational frames in some complementary fashion‖ (Croteau & 
Hicks, 2003: 253) – despite divergent and deeply embedded initial frames (Fiol and 
O‘Connor, 2002), intractable conflict (Fiol et al., 2009), and even ideological clashes 
(Bobo et al., 2001; Kleidman & Rochon, 1997). Our framework extends and 
interconnects the initial arguments on frame flexibility versus rigidity (Benford & Snow, 
2000) to explain how cross sector interactions stretch each partner‘s frames to craft areas 
of overlap, even synergies, for social value creation. We start with the working 
assumption that framing may succeed or fail (Noy, 2009). Cross sector partners may (or 
may not) reach common ground (Le Ber & Branzei, 2010). Our research question and 
findings are agnostic to the (un)anticipated consequences of framing processes. However, 
we hasten to acknowledge that any frame can have both functional and dysfunctional 
consequences for any actor as well as for the larger partnership (Trumpy, 2008) or 
coalition (Croteau & Hicks, 2003). 
Second, we introduce a new concept of frame fusion, which we define as the 
construction of a new and evolving prognostic frame that motivates and disciplines 
partners‘ cross sector interactions while preserving their distinct contribution to value 
creation. This construct complements prior research on frame alignment within 
organizations (Labianca et al., 2000; Balogun & Johnson, 2004) and across multiple 
players (Croteau & Hicks, 2003; Kaplan & Murray, 2008). Frame alignment describes 
how distinct actors may reach frame convergence (Noy, 2009), consonance (Fiol & 
O‘Connor, 2002) or at least balanced compromise (Croteau & Hicks, 2003; Nowell, 
2010). By fleshing out the generative properties of cross sector differences we explain 
how frame flexibility and rigidity may enable (constantly re-negotiated) overlaps without 
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necessarily locking into a common frame. Frame fusion is akin to symbiotic relationships 
that positively affect both parties without acquiescing to each others‘ frames (Trumpy, 
2008). However, it is different in that neither party ‗drives‘ the social change, but rather 
partners become voluntarily associated and seek to overcome their differences so they 
can actively and interactively address a common social problem (Waddock, 1988). 
Third, we begin to illustrate the multilevel relational coordination mechanisms 
that help partners re-negotiate shared understandings within the cross sector partnership, 
notwithstanding the important and persistent dissimilarities between partners‘ goals, 
approaches, and outcomes. Our findings corroborate the rich tradition in cross sector 
partnership research which has already discussed the individual, team, and 
organizational-level mechanisms that can help for-profit and nonprofit partners mutually 
adjust their goals and expectations (Andriof, 2000; Austin, 2000b; Googins & Rochlin, 
2000; Seitanidi & Crane, 2009). However, we also contribute by introducing a new set of 
cross sector relational coordination mechanisms by which representatives of each partner 
sample, espouse and enact subsets of each others‘ practices. We discuss how these 
relational coordination mechanisms can enrich prior arguments on the role of 
conversations (Lawrence et al., 1999; Hardy et al., 2005) and identity (Brickson, 2007; 
Fiol et al., 2009) in cross sector interactions. We further suggest that these cross sector 
coordination mechanisms may offer new insights on whether, when, and how multi-
player partnerships enable or constrain social value creation, especially in novel value 
domains (Kaplan & Murray, 2008).  
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SOCIAL VALUE CREATION IN CROSS SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS 
Cross sector partnerships have been described as ―social problem-solving 
mechanisms among organizations‘‘ (Waddock, 1989: 79). Because social value creation 
is, according to many, the raison d‘être of  cross sector partnerships, the question of how 
for-profit and nonprofit organizations come together – despite their differences – to 
generate social value has received substantial theoretical and practical attention (Hess et 
al., 2002; Selsky & Parker, 2005). Although a full review and problematization of social 
value falls beyond the goals of the current study (for reviews, please see Mair & Martí, 
2006), research on cross sector partnerships largely agrees on the centrality of social 
value creation as well as on notable discrepancies in how social value is defined, created 
and captured by for-profit versus nonprofit partners (Adler et al., 2007: 133). 
Value Creation Logics 
By mission and design cross sector partnerships ―address issues that extend 
beyond organizational boundaries and traditional goals and lie within the traditional 
realm of public policy – that is, in the social arena‖ (Waddock, 1988: 18). Cross sector 
partners often come together to solve a specific social problem, for example, 
homelessness (Croteau & Hicks, 2003) or domestic violence (Nowell, 2010). Cross sector 
partners strive for a common goal (i.e. social value creation, Waddock, 1988). However, 
their underlying logics of social value creation often stand in stark contrast, in part 
because for-profit and non-profit partners are often deeply embedded in distinct value 
logics (Dees & Andersen, 2003; Di Domenico et al., 2009; Yaziji & Doh, 2009). By 
value logics we mean interpretations of value which comprise the organizing principles 
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of what is valued and valuable in the institutional setup of a field (David, 2003; Kaplan & 
Murray, 2008; Friedland & Alford, 1991).  
The for-profit partner pursues mainly, although not necessarily exclusively, 
economic value creation, typically by serving profitable markets for products or services 
(McLaughlin, 2006). Economic value creation refers to the generation of financial gains 
through economic transactions, irrespective of who accrues these gains (e.g. the 
organization may capture some of the economic value as profits; employees may 
appropriate it as higher wages, or consumers may benefit through a relatively lower price 
for the same quality product, Peteraf & Barney, 2003). The nonprofit partner is largely 
driven by its social mission (Teegen et al., 2004) – trying to address market failures and 
provide socially necessary goods and services despite institutional roadblocks (Sud et al., 
2009) (e.g.  promoting community development, advocating for more inclusive or fair 
policies, advancing education or worker‘s rights, and dealing with social problems like 
domestic violence or homelessness, Croteau & Hicks, 2003; McLaughlin, 2006; Nowell, 
2010).  
Social value creation encompasses ―the pursuit of societal betterment through the 
removal of barriers that hinder social inclusion, the assistance of those temporarily 
weakened or lacking a voice, and the mitigation of undesirable side effects of economic 
activity‖ (Austin et al., 2006: 264). The literature on cross sector partnerships has long 
grappled with the trade-offs (Hardy et al., 2006) and the synergies (Austin, 2000a) 
between social and economic value creation, but has so far lacked a solid foundation for 
explaining for whom, for what, and to what effect value is created (for recent exceptions, 
see Le Ber & Branzei, forthcoming). We contribute by explaining how partners may 
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deliberately fuse their economic and social value frames when they come together to 
address a specific social problem.  
Dynamic Processes of Value Creation 
Our focus on how partners dynamically (re)frame social value creation in cross 
sector partnerships heeds recent calls for studying value frames at and across 
organizational and sectoral boundaries (Kaplan & Murray, 2008; Nowell, 2010). These 
studies draw attention to parallel, analogous, but often clashing logics: ―frames are not 
finished, static products. Instead, they are the contingent products of dynamic processes 
fraught with ongoing challenges and disputes‖ (Croteau & Hicks, 2003: 270). Yet we 
know more about the differences between for-profit and non-profit partners, then about 
whether, when, or how for-profit and nonprofit organizations may deliberately recognize 
and/or reconcile these differences (Austin, 2000a; Rondinelli & London, 2003). The 
handful of studies which tackle this question head on can be grouped into two distinct 
camps. The first and earlier group of studies provides practical advice (Googins & 
Rochlin, 2000; Rondinelli & London, 2003) and at times predicts which actions may help 
bridge the divide (Andriof, 2000; Christensen et al., 2006). The second and more recent 
stream (e.g. Fiol et al., 2009; Seitanidi & Crane, 2009) suggests that cross sector partners 
learn how to co-create social value by carefully designing, implementing, and adjusting 
their contributions, and gradually advancing along a collaboration continuum, that is, 
from philanthropic to transactional and then integrative partnerships (Austin, 2000b; 
Seitanidi & Ryan, 2007). Our qualitative inquiry leverages and extends these arguments 
by taking a closer look at how partners (re)frame social value creation as their 
relationship unfolds.  
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Relational Processes of Social Value Creation 
We adopt a relational view of cross sector partnerships, whereby the alignment of 
partners‘ expectations and contribution is non-linear (Seitanidi, 2008; Seitanidi & Ryan, 
2007), fitful (Le Ber & Branzei, 2010) and contingent on both partners‘ relational 
capabilities – that is, their willingness to sensemake (Sonenshein, 2007), craft shared 
realities (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Palmer et al., 2007), and pursue common goals (Plowman 
et al., 2007). While ―active rather than passive involvement from all parties‖ (Waddock, 
1988: 18) has long been implicit in much of the cross sector literature (e.g. Austin, 2000a; 
Selsky & Parker, 2005; Westley & Vredenburg, 1997; Wilson & Charlton, 1993), a 
relational view has only recently been explicitly used to model how for-profit and non-
profit partners overcome conflict (Fiol & O‘Connor, 2002), engage in meaningful 
conversations (Hardy et al., 2005), reconstruct identities (Brickson, 2007), and manage 
their fitful collaboration path through successes and failures (Croteau & Hicks, 2003; Le 
Ber & Branzei, 2010).  
Because frames evolve within and through specific relationships (Croteau & 
Hicks, 2003) our research question -- how for-profit and nonprofit partners come to 
effectively combine their different and distinctly sectoral frames for social value creation 
– calls for an explicitly relational view. Relational processes play a critical role in 
(re)framing – especially in emergent, unstructured, and ambiguous situations (Garud & 
Rappa, 1994; Kaplan, 2008). Relationships are particularly important when organizations 
seek to ―transform current means into co-created goals with others who commit to 
building a possible future‖ (Dew et al., 2008: 983), because they necessarily engage inter-
subjective and non-predictive processes. In these settings, partners learn by stitching 
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together networks of relationships and iterating through complex feedback loops to 
understand how their different capabilities, viewpoints and expectations come to bear on 
newly (re)constructed frames. While the relational underpinning of frames has a long 
tradition (Bourdieu, 1977; Gioia, 1986; Zerubavel, 1997), several recent studies explain 
when and how relationships provide structures of opportunity and constraint for value 
creation in cross sector partnerships (Nowell, 2010; Plowman et al., 2007).  
SOCIAL VALUE CREATION FRAMES 
Our working premise is that partners can overcome the inherent fragilities and 
incompatibilities of cross sector interactions (Berger et al., 2004) by first anticipating 
their differences and then deliberately adjusting their value creation frames – in relation 
to each other. There are several precedents for this two-fold premise in the framing 
literature more generally and in cross sector interactions specifically. First, organizational 
actors are motivated and able to accurately perceive others‘ frames in strategic decisions 
(Kaplan, 2008), organizational change processes (Balogun & Johnson, 2004), and multi-
player interactions (Croteau & Hicks, 2003; Kaplan & Murray, 2008). In cross sector 
partnerships, partners are motivated to continuously monitor and interpret each other‘s 
frames (Le Ber & Branzei, 2010). Second, partners purposefully align their social value 
frames. Several recent studies have theorized that the for-profit and nonprofit partners 
engage in deliberate conversations about their value frames (King, 2007; Stafford et al., 
2000). These conversations help connect partners to a common issue and draw them 
closer together through particularized ties (Hardy et al., 1998). Sometimes, these 
conversations help partners to develop a collective identity (Hardy et al., 2005).  
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Social Value Framing 
The social movement literature describes framing as a dynamic and interactive 
process of meaning construction, which both challenges and changes prior interpretations 
(Snow & Benford, 1988). This literature further defines frame alignment as a relationship 
of congruence and/or complementarity between an individual‘s interests, values and 
beliefs on one hand and a social movement organization‘s activities, goals and ideology 
on the other (Snow et al., 1986). Framing is ubiquitous but demanding. Effortful frame 
alignment represents a necessary condition for movement participation; when successful, 
frame alignment enables more individuals to join a specific social movement 
organization. The social movements literature describes four distinct types of frame 
alignment processes.
2
 Here we elaborate on the initial conceptualization of frame 
transformation. Snow et al. (1986) suggests two distinct paths to frame transformation for 
social movement organizations: transformation of domain-specific frames (i.e. within a 
particular domain of life) and/or transformation of global frames (i.e. changing an 
individual‘s broader view of the world, often referred to as their master frames).  
Although the original conceptualization focused on how ideologies conflict and 
combine at the individual level, frame transformation processes are applicable at other 
levels of analysis (i.e. cross-individual, cross-organizational). For example, later 
applications of framing processes to organization studies offer several qualitatively 
different ways of domain-specific frame transformation, whereby new schema may come 
to replace old schema (Balogun & Johnson, 2004). Frame transformation is especially 
pertinent in cross sector interactions where common ground is not readily available 
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(Dahan, Doh, & Teegen, 2010; Lucea, 2010), partly because partners have to cross-
referentially reconstitute what is going on (Goffman, 1974).  
The growing literature on framing has remained relatively silent on frame 
transformation processes at and across two distinct domains with only a handful of recent 
exceptions. Croteau and Hicks (2003) describe the framing processes in coalitions that 
pursue social change. They explain how partners develop consonant framing through 
analogous but distinct framing processes. Nowell (2010) similarly studies community 
collaborations among for-profit, non-profit and public agencies and finds a greater degree 
of frame alignment when partners converge on their understanding of the problem. Even 
these recent exceptions address self-referential frame transformation, whereby future 
frames are compared against a common set of expectations (see also Lawrence et al., 
1999).  
We seek to fill this research gap by qualitatively exploring how social value 
creation is deliberately (re)framed in cross sector interactions. Cross sector partners can 
reach common ground, often by concomitant frame transformations which tend to occur 
incrementally and at times even accidentally (Plowman et al., 2007). However, cross 
sector interactions often start with distinct frames and the recognition that partners‘ initial 
differences are often hard to reconcile in the first place (Hardy et al., 2005; Fiol & 
O‘Connor, 2002).  
In addition to the literature on framing and frame alignment reviewed above, our 
qualitative inquiry was prefaced by prior research on the flexibility versus rigidity of 
frames (Benford & Snow, 2000), core framing processes (i.e. diagnostic versus 
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prognostic framing, Snow et al., 1986), and relational coordination mechanisms (for a 
review see Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). 
Flexibility versus Rigidity 
 Variation in collective frames has long been a central topic of research on framing 
(for a review see Benford & Snow, 2000), especially in research on social change agents 
(Capek, 1993; McCaffrey & Keys, 2000). Most attention has been focused on variance 
compressing mechanisms, such as alignment (Snow et al., 1986), consonance within and 
across levels (Croteau & Hicks, 2003) and convergence within and across organizations 
(Nowell, 2010). This direction has been motivated mostly by a commonly understood 
need to reach agreement, whether between social movement organizations and 
individuals in the case of micromobilization (Snow et al., 1986) or between individuals 
within organizations in the case of organizational change (Balogun & Johnson, 2004). 
However, research on multi-organizational coalitions has also shown that agreement is at 
best fleeting (Croteau & Hicks, 2003) and often rife with ongoing controversies and 
compromises (Nowell, 2010), prompting renewed research interest in how (relational) 
processes may influence the social (re)construction of frames (Benford, 1997).  
To sum up a rich and growing stream of case studies dealing with variation in 
framing processes, we know that: 1) shared framing is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
effect social change but tends to be more effective when backed by material resources 
(Noy, 2009); 2) partners interact both substantively and symbolically, but frames are 
most effective when backed by action (Trumpy, 2008); and 3) variation co-occurs at and 
across levels resulting in complex and hard to anticipate shifts in frames (Croteau & 
Hicks, 2003). Research on cross sector interactions further suggests that partners‘ 
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motivation to converse about their different logics (Hardy et al., 2006) and to 
accommodate incremental and radical changes (Plowman et al., 2007) are important for 
social innovation – even when partners may not espouse a common frame. But many 
partnerships do not converse, in part because they lock into adversarial positions 
(Frooman, 1999; Hendry, 2005, 2006) and/or lack the resources (Noy, 2009) or forego 
the actions (Trumpy, 2008) required for social change. Guided by earlier arguments that 
―collective action frames may vary in the degree to which they are relatively exclusive, 
rigid, inelastic, and restricted or relatively inclusive, open, elastic, and elaborated in terms 
of the number of themes or ideas they incorporate and articulate‖ (Benford & Snow, 
2000: 618), we looked for evidence of flexibility versus rigidity in partners‘ frames as 
their partnership unfolded. 
Diagnostic versus Prognostic Framing 
Frames can encode ―a variety of previous experiences—including individual 
career histories, project experience, functional membership, position in the hierarchy—
and contexts—including the firm, the industry and the prevailing technological 
paradigm‖ (Kaplan, 2008: 738; e.g., functional affiliation, Dearborn & Simon, 1958; 
demographic measures, Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). These 
prior experiences can be used diagnostically (Benford & Snow, 2000; Campbell, 2005) to 
understand a specific problem, such as the competitive structure (Porac et al., 1989; 
Sutcliffe and Huber, 1998) or the degree of threat or opportunity (Gilbert & Bower, 2002; 
Jackson & Dutton, 1988). Or they can be used prognostically, to make forward-looking 
decisions (Garud & Rappa, 1994; Kaplan, 2008; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000).  
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Diagnostic frames tend to grow increasingly specific and detailed over time and 
thus can become rigid. Their rigidity is functional, in so far as it narrows attention to 
specific environmental stimuli (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) and/or predictably patterns 
resource allocation decisions (Glynn, 2000). In contrast, prognostic frames tend to be 
more malleable through social interactions. Kaplan (2008) shows the deliberate 
(re)construction of frames through daily encounters among politically motivated actors. 
The research on frame alignment and frame transformation provides at best mixed 
evidence about the interaction between diagnostic and prognostic frames. Aligned 
diagnostic frames can (Croteau & Hicks, 2003), but do not always (Noy, 2009), enable 
alignment in prognostic frames. For example, alignment in diagnostic frames is unlikely 
to translate into convergent prognostic frames when actors have heterogeneous 
experiences (Nowell, 2010) or inadequate or at least differential resources (Noy, 2009). 
Convergence in either becomes more challenging when problems or solutions are novel 
or ambiguous.
3
  Given these prior insights, we approached our inquiry forewarned that 
flexibility and rigidity may differentially impact diagnostic versus prognostic framing. 
We not only examined whether or when partners fuse their interpretations but also looked 
for (un)successful transitions between diagnostic and prognostic frames for the partners 
and for the partnership. 
Functions and Dysfunctions of Frame Conflict 
Frames often clash in cross sector interactions because the partners hold distinct 
interpretations of social problems and solutions (Fiol and O‘Connor, 2002) – even when 
partners try to work together (Trumpy, 2008). Because partners typically approach social 
problems and solutions from distinct (and often opposing) sector-specific frames (Yaziji 
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& Doh, 2009), our working assumption is that frame conflict is pervasive and likely 
unavoidable in cross sector partnerships. Many for-profit partners strategically motivate 
their commitments of time and resources to cross sector alliances as investments with 
economic returns (King, 2007); social returns are valued, but often remain subdued and 
are largely circumscribed by their mandate of economic efficiency (Brickson, 2007). 
Nonprofit partners focus primarily on doing good; economic costs and benefits are 
typically of secondary concern.  
Prior literature on cross sector partnerships has documented clashes in diagnostic 
frames. For-profit and nonprofit partners differ clearly (and often transparently) in how 
they define the purpose of the partnership and the desirable outcomes (Bryson et al., 
2006). These differences have often been discussed as a cause of friction (Berger et al., 
2004), yielding the working assumption that success in cross sector interactions hinges on 
partners‘ efforts to deliberately reconcile their divergent interpretations of value creation 
(Googins & Rochlin, 2000). Prognostic frames are also discrepant because partners start 
with different expectations (Hardy et al., 2006) and/or interpret issues and goals from 
different angles (Lucea, 2010) – this even when they have a shared vision of the end goal 
and are motivated to work collaboratively to reach it (Le Ber & Branzei, 2010).  
Clashing frames can have generative or dysfunctional consequences (Carlile, 
2002; Dougherty, 1992). When conflicts are approached systematically, they can yield 
new insights (Bechky, 2003). Deliberately engaging divergent assumptions can thus be 
generative. For example, framing contests enable partners to change or expand their 
frames (Foster & Kaplan 2001, Schön & Rein, 1994). It can also release the hold of 
domain-specific frames, especially when these are ill-fitting to the social problems or 
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solutions (Trumpy, 2008). In cross sector partnerships, clashing frames can help surface 
(un)anticipated social value creation (Fiol & O‘Connor, 2002; Le Ber & Branzei, 2010). 
In other organizational settings, there is evidence that conflicting frames can promote 
new searches and creative solutions (Balogun & Johnson, 2004). Furthermore, ―managers 
do not have to be victims of institutionalized frames. Adaptation can be the result of 
purposeful action on the part of actors to shape the frames of others. These efforts can 
lead new frames to predominate in new sets of strategic choices‖ (Kaplan, 2008: 747).  
Partners‘ search for common ground often surfaces conflict and requires ongoing 
assessment and compromise (Nowell, 2010). Conflict may simmer permanently (Nowell, 
2010), burst out (Croteau & Hicks, 2003) or become intractable (Fiol et al., 2009) and 
thereby stall progress towards a common goal. Even consonant frames are not immune to 
conflict. Conflict per se is neither good nor bad. Prior research suggests that it is not 
necessarily the presence or absence of conflict that matters, but rather how partners 
approach and proceed to resolve it (Kaplan, 2008). Noy (2009) shows that even when 
conflict is absent or swiftly resolved, partners do not necessarily meet their goal. Rather, 
the greater the attention to the incidence and resolution of conflict at and across different 
levels, the better the odds that clashing frames have functional consequences and achieve 
their social change goals (Croteau & Hicks, 2003). 
Relational Coordination 
Last, because prior studies of cross sector partnerships speak to the importance of 
relational alignment in managing success and failure (Le Ber & Branzei, 2010), we 
reviewed research on coordination mechanisms at and across levels of analysis 
(Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Relational coordination contributes to the creation of a 
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common understanding within and across organizations. We adopted Faraj and Xiao‘s 
definition of coordination as the ―temporally unfolding and contextualized process of 
input regulation and interaction articulation to realize a collective performance‖ (2006: 
1157), and heeded Okhuysen and Bechky‘s recommendation to focus on ―coordination as 
it happens assuming that people must coordinate the work regardless of the 
organizational design‖ (2009: 469). 
Okhuysen and Bechky (2009) further describe several coordination mechanisms 
that may create a common perspective even in the absence of formal structure or routines. 
These mechanisms include: roles which enable a finer-grained understanding of how the 
work itself is performed (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009: 489); representations like schedules 
and maps that help team members develop a shared mental model of the task or goal 
(Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009: 475); and plans and rules that enable parties to become 
familiar with the task and figure out how their tasks fit together (Okhuysen & Bechky, 
2009: 488). We were particularly interested in both planned and spontaneous relational 
coordination practices, such as responses to unexpected events or crises (Majchrzak et al., 
2007: 147). We paid attention to multi-level processes at the individual, team, and 
organizational levels (Croteau & Hicks, 2003) and to interactions across multiple 
stakeholders within and across sectors (Nowell, 2010) which have been discussed in prior 
research on framing. We also expected to identify new relational coordination practices 
that could help bridge across the for-profit and non-profit sectors. 
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METHOD 
Context 
We focused on cross sector partnerships in health care because this setting offers 
a rich context for social innovation and has a longstanding commitment to social value 
creation (Christensen et al., 2006; Hwang & Christensen, 2008; Christensen et al., 2009). 
We sampled four dyads -- all among the very first cross sector partnerships that involved 
Canadian health centres in co-creating social value with private firms. All four were 
formed in late 1990s-early 2000s and had received substantial public and media attention 
since their formation. 
Table 4.1 describes the partners, the initial goals and the purpose of each sampled 
dyad. To protect the anonymity of the participants, our study identifies the four dyads by 
their initial objective: energy conservation (EC), Telecommunication (TC), Diagnostic 
Imaging (DI) and Minimally Invasive Surgery (MIS). All four dyads engaged a for-profit 
(FP) and a nonprofit organization (NP). The NP organizations were affiliated with a 
major Canadian Health Centre. Canadian hospitals pursue the fulfillment of social needs 
by engaging in non-competitive activities oriented towards community service (Baum & 
Oliver, 1996; DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990; Hansmann, 1980). All four NP partners were 
registered as nonprofit organizations (Statistics Canada, 2006).
4
 The dyads engaged four 
distinct FP organizations, all large companies (ranging from 3000 to 122,000 employees, 
and respectively $1.05B CAD to $34.6B USD).
5
 For confidentiality, we refer to the four 
FP organizations by acronyms (Energy Solutions, Telecom Solutions, Imaging Solutions 
and Tech Solutions), and where necessary we also disguise their specific 
products/services and/or otherwise identifiable respondents.  
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To contextualize our findings, Table 4.1 presents the goals and outcomes of each 
partnership in the respondents‘ own words. There was notable agreement among the 
partners of the EC, TC and DI dyads. For the MIS partnership, the FP and NP 
organizations differed in their assessment of success or failure, but they both fulfilled 
their contractual obligations and agreed to the completion of the partnership agreement. 
Data 
Our unit of analysis for understanding social value (re)framing processes within 
cross sector partnerships was the cross sector dyad. Each cross sector dyad was followed 
over time, using a combination of primary data collection (interviews, follow-ups, 
conversations and feedback) and archival data (internal and publicly available records 
spanning the full length of the relationship between each FP and NP partner, specifically 
3 years for the MIS dyad (the complete span of a 3 year partnership), 6 years for the TC 
dyad (3 years of cross sector partnership, out of a 5 year partnership agreement, preceded 
by a 3 year supplier relationship), 8 years for the EC dyad (5 years of cross sector 
partnership, preceded by a 3 year supplier relationship), and 25 years for the DI dyad (the 
FP partner was a supplier for the first 20 years, followed by a 5 year completed cross 
sector partnership). Three of the four dyads (EC, TC, DI) had a five-year partnership 
agreement in place; MIS had a three-year partnership agreement. Our initial interviews 
were conducted during the active period of each partnership. Our last follow-up debriefed 
the completion of the partnership for the MIS, EC and DI dyad. The EC partnership is 
still ongoing but offered sufficient evidence of social value (re)framing, including frame 
fusion.  
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TABLE 4.1 
Description of Strategic Cross-Sector Partnerships 
Dyad 
Partnership Partners 
Data 
Goal Outcome Characteristics Purpose 
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―We‘re renewing our 
hospital […] through a 
very fiscally and 
environmentally 
responsible type of 
program. We‘re not using 
patient care dollars. We‘re 
not using [government] 
dollars to upgrade our 
facilities yet. Instead, we 
are using dollars that will 
come from energy savings 
and those energy savings 
are guaranteed.‖ (FP)  
Energy Solutions (FP) 
Est. 1885, $34.6B 
USD, publicly traded, 
122,000 employees.  
―Upgrading [Health 
Centre‘s] facilities 
through what I call a 
fiscally and 
environmentally 
responsible program.‖ 
(FP) 
Interviews (2007) 
Vice President, Energy 
Solutions (FP) 
Strategic Planning and 
Marketing Leader (FP) 
Sales Director (FP) 
VP, Planning (NP) 
Archival Materials  
(2006-2008) 
Unpublished case study; 
Annual reports (FP, 
NP); Sustainability 
reports (FP); Media 
releases 
Health Centre, 
Planning (NP) 
Est. 1875, $770M 
CAD, 10,515 
employees & students. 
―We began with small 
energy and building 
retrofit projects to save 
energy costs.‖ (NP) 
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s ―So you weather those 
storms and I think that‘s a 
sign of a good partnership 
that unforeseen things 
happen but you 
respectfully and mutually 
work through them with a 
sense of urgency. You 
know, you don‘t take 
advantage of the 
relationship.‖ (FP) 
Telecom Solutions 
(FP) 
Est. 1880, $17.9B 
CAD, publicly traded, 
44,292 employees. 
―We are bringing 
[telecom] solutions to 
the hospital to consider.‖ 
(FP) 
Interviews (2007) 
Regional Vice President 
(FP) 
Vice President, 
Information 
Management (NP) 
 
Archival Materials  
(2006-2008) 
Annual reports (FP, NP) 
Sustainability reports 
(FP) 
Media releases 
Health Centre, 
Information 
Technology (NP) 
Est. 1875, $770M 
CAD, 10,515 
employees & students. 
―They bring people in to 
work side by side with 
our folks.‖ (NP) 
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―[Imaging Solutions] 
offered the technology 
side, [health Centre] 
offered the fact that, you 
know, we‘re a major 
player in the system and 
our culture was one, I 
believed, was one that was 
compatible to their culture 
and that is if we wanted to 
stay in the front when it 
came to acquiring some 
new technologies.‖ (NP) 
Imaging Solutions 
(FP) 
Est. 1892, $15B USD, 
publicly traded, 10,000 
employees. 
―[Health Centre] had the 
lion‘s share of diagnostic 
imaging [and thus 
offered] a wonderful 
proving ground for the 
whole concept that we 
have around early 
health.‖ (FP) 
Interviews (2007) 
National General 
Manager (FP) 
CEO  & President, 
Health Centre (NP) 
 
Archival Materials  
(2006-2009) 
Annual reports (FP, NP) 
Sustainability reports 
(FP) 
Media releases 
Published case study 
Health Centre, 
Radiology and 
Ultrasound (NP) 
Est. 1875, $770M 
CAD, 10,515 
employees & students. 
―We started out by 
talking about what could 
they offer and what 
could we offer, work 
processes [like six 
sigma] associated with 
that part of the 
hospital.‖ (NP) 
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(F
P
) 
―And despite all of our 
experience, they 
unwittingly suckered us 
into, they didn‘t know 
they were doing it, but 
they suckered us into 
something that wasn’t 
uninterpretable.‖ (FP) 
 
―It worked out fine in the 
end because we did 
manage to achieve all the 
objectives of the contract.‖ 
(NP) 
Tech Solutions (FP) 
Est. 1969, $1.05B 
CAD, publicly traded, 
3000 employees. 
―ultimate objective … to 
have a prototype that is 
sellable to a GE kind of 
company‖ (FP) 
Interviews (2007-2009) 
National Director, 
Medical Systems (FP) 
Director, Research 
Institute (NP) 
 
Archival Materials  
(2006-2008) 
Annual reports (FP, NP) 
Media releases & 
clippings 
MOU 
 
Research Institute 
(NP) 
Est. 1983, $50M CAD, 
850 employees. 
 
“If you own, if you 
design your system, you 
have everything that you 
need. You can always 
extend the range of 
applications.‖ (NP) 
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We sampled dyads based on their objective. Specifically, we were interested in 
cross sector partnerships that attempted new types of social value creation (Christensen et 
al., 2006; Hwang & Christensen, 2008; Christensen et al., 2009). Our initial selection was 
based on expert commentaries and first author‘s familiarity with the healthcare sector. 
We sampled locally to maximize access and connection. The data collection confirmed 
that all four partnerships, and their social value creation goals, were ―cutting-edge‖: ―in 
the front‖ and ―a wonderful proving ground [for a new concept]‖ (FP, DI); a 
demonstration site for a new business model of energy conservation, able to ―convert 
others‖ (FP, EC); a sampler of ―new solutions [for] the hospital to consider‖ based on 
[FP‘s] experience in other industries and engagement with the government (NP, TC); and  
a first-time medical application of world-first technology (FP, MIS).  
We deliberately sampled for variation to maximize opportunities for comparison 
and contrast (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The four dyads differed in their goals and 
outcomes, in their resource commitments (Noy, 2009), their actions (Trumpy, 2008), and 
partners‘ frames – that is, their approach towards the social problem and/or solution 
(Croteau & Hicks, 2003). In addition to these planned contrasts, the sampled dyads 
afforded several opportunities for unplanned contrasts. For example, we were able to 
contrast social value (re)framing depending on whether the partnership was championed 
by the NP or the FP partner, on whether the journey was smooth or fitful, or whether the 
results were favourable or not. We also used several control codes, including strategic 
leaders‘ experience (sector- or organization-specific frames) and the pre-partnership 
involvement of the FP and NP organizations in three of the sampled dyads. 
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We used archival data to construct longitudinal narratives of each partnership. 
Archival data sources included published and unpublished case studies; annual reports of 
the partners, sustainability reports, media releases, media clippings, Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOU), company power point presentations, and various promotional 
company materials (Table 4.1).  
We triangulated these narratives with the views of strategic leaders (including the 
NP and the FP representatives, and other members of their organizations directly 
involved in the formation and/or implementation of the partnership, Table 4.1). In cases 
of leadership change, we contacted multiple leaders and members tasked with their duties 
during the transition. We focused on strategic leaders (Ireland & Hitt, 1999; Rowe, 2001) 
because they actively wrangle with paradox and conflict (Lewis, 2000; Smith & 
Tushman, 2005). Further, these strategic leaders functioned as the primary boundary 
spanners for their respective organizations and thus set the frame for their organization. 
The primary data collection started in 2006. The main field work lasted from 
April 2007 to January 2008 and was supplemented by additional onsite visits in February 
and March 2009. The initial interviews, conducted after signed informed consent, lasted 
from 1 to 2.5 hours. Their accounts included real-time challenges as well as retrospective 
accounts covering their own involvement and experience both before and during the cross 
sector interaction. Several rounds of shorter follow-up (by email, phone and in person) 
with respondents helped clarify, validate, and expand our insights on each partnership as 
the study unfolded.  
As with most qualitative work, our study has important limitations. Our ‗view 
from the top‘ does not paint the full picture of the cross sector collaboration (Croteau & 
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Hicks, 2003). However, it offers a high-fidelity context for our research question, because 
the leaders of the FP and NP partners reflected openly and often on their similarities and 
differences (Noy, 2009). They were also mindful of potential biases, and made explicit 
efforts to be transparent with their employees. For example, the CEO of the NP 
organization in the DI dyad explained: 
People like [VP, Diagnostic Services] were really, really ticked off because I was 
pushing the envelope and he thought I was pushing too much but as I tried to say 
to [him], … ‗you know, we‘ve got to, we‘ve got an obligation here to get the best 
founding for this organization‘ and he felt that we had received all the value and I 
kept on pushing and people like [him] would say, ‗well, what the hell‘s the use of 
me being involved because you‘re going, you‘re going to sort of drill them 
anyway so why should I be involved?‘ And my answer to that was ‗… you have 
to be involved, but for goodness sakes, keep in mind that if I see an opportunity 
for this organization, I‘m going to push hard.‘ So, I mean, he accepted it and he 
understood it but he wanted to be the deal maker and the fact of the matter is that 
the [CEOs] of the world don‘t necessarily make the best deal with people at [the 
VP] … level. They always want to shoot up to the top, but I had Board members 
involved in that deal too by the way. (DI, NP) 
 
Although archival data and retrospective reports enabled us to reconstruct a rich 
narrative for each dyad, we only have real-time interview data with their leaders for a 
portion of the duration of each partnership. These limitations notwithstanding, prolonged 
engagement in the field (Miles & Huberman, 1994), the combination of primary and 
archival data collection mechanisms (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Scott & Alwin, 1998) and 
especially our repeated efforts to triangulate, elaborate and validate the accounts of the 
strategic leaders increase our confidence that the framing processes and the frames are 
presented accurately (if perhaps not exhaustively). 
Analyses 
Both authors analyzed the data. The first author collected all the data and had 
deep experience in the healthcare sector. As an ―outsider,‖ the second author kept a 
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distance and identified questions and patterns that the first author (i.e., the insider) would 
either support or refute by using her rich understanding of the data (Gioia et al., 1994: 
368).  
We used two analytical strategies to ground our interpretations and insights 
(Langley, 1999). First, we co-developed rich longitudinal narratives for each dyad, going 
back over specific events and asking how partners framed them, and how these frames 
influenced the next steps (Trumpy, 2008). Each narrative included quotes juxtaposing the 
interpretations of the FP and NP organization against others‘ interpretation and/or other 
internal or public records. 
Second, we developed a data structure consisting of first-order codes by iterating 
between prior theoretical and case-based insights on frame flexibility versus rigidity, 
diagnostic versus prognostic framing, and (a) relational coordination and the in-vivo 
interpretations provided by the strategic leaders of the NP and FP arm of each dyad. 
Analyzing each longitudinal narrative, we then developed second-order themes by 
repeatedly inquiring: 1) how did each partner understand social value as the relationship 
progressed (Croteau & Hicks, 2003)? 2) what interpretation of social value creation did 
the partners articulate and enact in each dyad (Trumpy, 2008)? and 3) when and why did 
partners‘ social value frames become more or less alike as the partnership unfolded (Noy, 
2009)? We tracked these subjective understandings at multiple levels and stages of 
partners‘ interactions (Corley & Gioia, 2004; Weick, 2007) and relied on constant 
comparison techniques (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Golden-Biddle & Locke, 2007; Yin, 
2003) to discern common patterns across the four dyads (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
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In all four cases respondents showed a sound understanding of each others‘ 
motivations and commented openly on differences in their goals, capabilities and 
approaches. Our findings further corroborate prior insights that actors can compare their 
frames at arms length, even when their interpretations stand in stark contrast (Kaplan, 
2008; Fiol & O‘Connor, 2002; Trumpy, 2008). Furthermore, our respondents were 
mindful to changes in their own, as well as in their partner‘s interpretations (Noy, 2009). 
The FP partner of the TC dyad commented on how deliberate attention to understanding 
each other enabled the two organizations to establish a joint responsibility for the 
common success or failure of the partnership: ―As you understand what it takes for me to 
stay in business, and as I understand what importance it is for you to ensure that your 
environment is up and protected and running, and we have that, we almost work as if it is 
our joint venture to succeed or fail‖ (FP, TC). 
FINDINGS 
Our first order codes provide several preliminary insights about partners‘ frames 
and their co-evolution as their cross sector interactions unfolded. In three of the four 
dyads (EC, TC, and DI), our respondents explained how they had already reached a full 
understanding and appreciation of each other‘s contributions and complementarities, 
despite their notable differences. For example, the FP partner in the DI dyad commented 
vividly on how the improved understanding of their partner has enabled them to see more 
clearly their own unique contribution: 
You cannot tell that service on services story unless you‘ve got the equipment 
footprint and you‘ve got the relationship and you‘ve got the quality of partner on 
the other side who is willing to let you in and consult, right. To be part of how 
you shape strategy, you know, to be part of your planning processes. Until you‘ve 
got that kind of closeness, our feeling is we can never really demonstrate what our 
true organizational capabilities are. (DI, FP) 
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This co-evolution was linear for EC, where both partners worked steadily to 
realize their initial goal, but non-linear for TC and DI, both of which involved multiple 
‗firsts‘. For the MIS dyad, the partners commented at length about each other, but 
showed little appreciation for their unique contributions. For example, the FP partner 
explained that the NP partner ―unwittingly suckered us into this‖, while the NP partner 
commented that they were ―kind of zigzagging along instead of going in a straight line‖ 
and that the FP partner ―worked on it because it was a contractual obligation‖ (FP, MIS). 
 Table 4.2 presents an overview of how the partners‘ frames evolved in the four 
dyads. We focus on three ‗moments‘ in each partnership, as seen retrospectively by each 
partners‘ leaders and in some cases validated with real-time media releases and internal 
documents. First, we capture first partners‘ initial frames regarding their relative 
contributions to social value creation. Each partner explained how the other provides a 
complementary contribution, for example, ―fiscal and environmental responsibility‖ (FP, 
EC), ―access to the latest and greatest‖ (NP, TC), ―a reputation in being at the cutting 
edge‖ (NP, DI), and an innovative medical application of cutting edge technology (FP 
and NP, MIS). Second, we explore the direction and nature of frame dynamics in each of 
the four dyads. This evolution was described as an expansion to ―a fuller ecological 
stewardship approach‖ in the EC dyad, as creating additional value by ―working together, 
solving problems together‖ in the TC dyad, as a sequence of firsts and an opportunity to 
demonstrate success in the DI dyad, and as a stall-and-go, respectively zigzagging, 
journey in the MIS dyad.
  
 
TABLE 4.2 
Value Frame Overview in Four Cross-Sector Partnerships  
Dyad Initial Value Frames Value Frame Dynamics Value Frame Fusion 
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Energy Solutions (FP) 
―…to help them address their needs in terms of 
upgrading their facilities through what I call a 
fiscally and environmentally responsible program.‖   
―Then what do they see in us today? First of all, they 
see a partner […] that has brought to them an 
innovative solution to help them address their needs 
in terms of upgrading their facilities through what I 
call a fiscally and environmentally responsible 
program.‖ (FP) 
―And, we adjust our philosophy and we spend a lot of 
time thinking and working with a specific business to 
get an understanding of what is it that’s important to 
them. And, what are the types of things that we need 
to involve ourselves in so that we can understand 
what makes an impact.‖ (FP) 
Health Centre (NP) 
―We’re renewing our hospital. We‘re doing it through 
a very fiscally and environmentally responsible type 
of program.‖ 
―We […] have now expanded to a fuller ecological 
stewardship approach that recognizes how our 
product purchases, waste management and disposal, 
travel, landscaping and staff awareness can reduce 
our impact on the environment and improve our 
health.‖ (NP) 
―The more work I have with you the more, the bigger 
stick I have to make sure that you have an interest in 
getting that done … helping me for what I want.‖  
(FP, paraphrasing NP).  
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s 
(T
C
) 
Telecom Solutions (FP) 
―How do you optimize the business and how you 
transform the business, so business transformation, 
process transformation.‖ 
―Bringing additional value to the table and from not 
only what our insights and our involvement in other 
health care institutions, but our work at the level of 
government and our understanding of the industry 
and we are bringing solutions to the hospital to 
consider.‖ (FP) 
―You have a high level of respect and you have, and 
that level of respect comes in by, and then intimacy 
comes around understanding why that’s important to 
me and why it’s important to you.‖ (FP) 
Health Centre (NP) 
―We‘re not staffed to do a whole pile of research and 
things on our own. We never will be and that‘s fine, 
but then you have to find a way to make sure that you 
have access to the latest and the greatest and you 
know how to get to certain things in certain places.‖ 
―We can‘t afford not to have some partnership 
relationships. It‘s just too expensive to stay in that 
vendor world…. When you get over to the strategic 
partner level, you‘re actually working together, 
solving problems together.‖ (NP) 
“Trying to put those kinds of sessions in place on a 
regular basis so that there is some ongoing 
evaluation: Is this working? Can we do something 
different? Should we do something different?” (NP) 
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TABLE 4.2 (continued) 
 
Dyad Initial Value Frames Value Frame Dynamics Value Frame Fusion 
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Imaging Solutions (FP) 
―We looked at [Health Centre] as a place for real 
imagination and innovation, […] a customer who was 
really uniquely positioned to be able to do that with 
us.‖  
―As the relationship kind of evolved over time, we did 
a number of things with [Imaging Solutions] that we 
did for the first time in [City]. They bought the first 
cardiovascular designed MR system that we had and 
were part of the clinical development program […]. 
We entered into a very fruitful CT research 
relationship with them […]. We did the first co-
operative cost management program.‖ (FP) 
―You cannot tell that service on services story unless 
you‘ve got the equipment footprint and you‘ve got 
the relationship and you‘ve got the quality of partner 
on the other side who is willing to let you in and 
consult, right. To be part of how you shape strategy, 
you know, to be part of your planning processes. 
Until you’ve got that kind of closeness, our feeling is 
we can never really demonstrate what our true 
organizational capabilities are.‖ (FP) 
Health Centre (NP) 
―We wanted to look at a partner who had a 
reputation in being at the cutting edge ‖  
―We decided to go for a partnership so that we could 
use the very best of what they had to offer and we 
would be a model site for them so they could bring 
their future partners or future customers into our 
organization to see what we had done.‖(NP) 
―It was agreed that anything that was working for 
them as a corporation that we would be able to tag 
along and get the benefit of whatever it was that 
brought benefits to them.‖ (NP) 
M
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Tech Solutions (FP) 
―The original motivation was [to leverage intellectual 
property for commercial applications]. We‘ve just 
been bought by [Acquirer] and they kept saying well, 
you built 10 [devices] in 30 years [but] there‘s a 
million [still untapped potential medical 
applications] out there, what’s wrong with this 
picture.‖ (FP) 
"We build the [surgical device], we try to get 
approval from the FDA […] at the end of the day, 
you still have this problem of potential litigation.... 
can an organization that is essentially a nonprofit 
organization deal with this? And that‘s going to be a 
problem for anybody who comes up with newer 
[surgical devices].‖ (FP) 
―Basically we figured it out that nobody really cared 
about the … [surgical device].‖ (FP) 
Research Institute (NP) 
―[Research Institute] wanted a surgical [device], 
something that they could themselves improve and 
essentially use it for whatever they wanted to.‖ (NP) 
―For [Tech Solutions], the original problem was 
finding that they worked on it because that was a 
contractual obligation. But because they were 
interested in something else, at every point they 
would sort of stop and say, how do we do this now? 
So, it‘s kind of, you know, you’re kind of zigzagging 
along instead of going in a straight line and that’s 
okay.‖ (NP)  
―It worked out fine in the end because we did manage 
to achieve all the objectives of the contract.‖ (NP) 
 
1
2
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  Third, we explore how value frame fusion occurred in three of the four 
partnerships but failed to materialize in the fourth. Both EC partners commented on their 
commitment to understand each other – but noted the subtle differences in how they 
interpreted this commitment. The FP partner saw joint commitment as a way to maximize 
(social) impact; the NP partner as a ―bigger stick‖ so they could better align the FP 
partner‘s interest with their own. Both TC partners praised intimacy because it enabled 
them to pursue new things, which were important to both partners. Both DI partners 
commented on closeness as a surprising way to rediscover what they wanted, and what 
they were good at. The MIS partners‘ interpretations of value creation were at odds. The 
FP partner felt that not much was achieved, that ―nobody really cared‖, and that big egos 
got in the way of creating social value; the NP partner felt that the contractual obligations 
were met, and the transfer of technology and the related training was beneficial. As we 
will explain in a subsequent argument, whether or not partners achieved frame fusion 
depends on their willingness to both challenge their own sector-specific frames and (at 
least partially) embrace their partners‘ sector-specific frame. 
Frame Fusion 
Our second-order themes address our initial research question by modeling the 
relational processes by which partners assess and ‗fuse‘ their value creation frames. The 
concept of frame fusion differs from the prior static constructs of frame alignment (Snow 
et al., 1986) and the later more dynamic discussion of convergence (Noy, 2009), 
consonance (Fiol & O‘Connor, 2002) or at least balanced compromise (Croteau & Hicks, 
2003; Nowell, 2010). Frame fusion partners reach common ground by coming to 
appreciate their (complementary) differences rather than espousing and/or enacting a 
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similar frame. Frame fusion leads to symbiotic relationships because it can positively 
affect both parties without requiring one to acquiesce to the other‘s frame (Trumpy, 
2008). Partners voluntarily and relationally seek frame fusion. Neither partner ‗pushes or 
pulls‘ – the dynamic process of frame fusion relies on partners‘ (re)engagement in the 
relationship and their gradual recognition that (at least in some domain of thought and 
action) the partnership‘s view of value creation comes to overwrite with their own, often 
deeply institutionally-embedded, views about what value is and how it can be achieved 
(Kaplan & Murray, 2008).  
Frame fusion also differs from earlier conceptualizations of frame transformation 
(Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Kaplan, 2008) because the frame renewal process is double-
barrelled. Partners not only update their frame in relation to each other but they also do so 
in reference to, and in conversation with, each other. Furthermore, the frame fusion 
concept differs from self-referential frame change processes because the reference point 
is not only outside each partner‘s direct control (Croteau & Hicks, 2003), but it is also 
constantly changing according to two (often contradictory) sets of institutional logics. 
The process of frame fusion, which we will illustrate next, thus requires an effortful 
cross-reference of value creation frames both within and across sectors.  
Our second-order analyses describe a dually punctuated journey of frame fusion. 
Table 4.3 interlaces the value frame narratives for the FP and NP partners in the DI dyad 
to uncover four distinct relational processes: frame negotiation (which iterates between 
frame contrast and frame rift), frame elasticity, frame plasticity and frame fusion. 
  
 
TABLE 4.3 
Interlacing Value Frame Narratives for the Diagnostic Imaging Dyad  
 Frame Contrast Frame Rift Frame Negotiation Frame Elasticity Frame Plasticity Frame Fusion 
Im
a
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g
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s 
(F
P
) 
―When you look at your 
fleet of diagnostic imaging 
assets and you have one CT 
scanner but six radiographic 
rooms, you‘ve got a 
different kind of tolerance, a 
different requirement for 
service based on those two 
units because there is 
differences in co locality 
and there‘s differences in 
through put and so if that 
one rad room goes down, 
not such a big deal. That one 
CT scanner goes down, 
well, guess what. Your 
trauma capability is shot. 
You‘re no longer in 
business, right?‖ (FP) 
―The first 
proposal that we 
got to review was 
[…] research on a 
competitor‘s 
product but […] 
you know, you 
can‘t be that 
restrictive in 
terms of how 
you‘re going to let 
a partner allocate 
those funds. So, I 
mean, that was 
kind of one of the 
early tests.‖ (FP) 
―And then as the relationship kind of 
evolved over time, we did a number of 
things with them that we did for the 
first time in [City]. They bought the 
first cardiovascular designed MR 
system that we had and were part of the 
clinical development program […] We 
entered into a very fruitful CT research 
relationship with them […] in the early 
‗90s. […]. We did the first co-operative 
cost management program for service.‖ 
(FP) 
―The program was 
very, very meaningful 
because it brought 
[researcher] into kind 
of [our] product family 
and [the researcher] 
developed the CT 
profusion package 
through that agreement 
and that has been one 
of the most successful 
research ventures, the 
sort of public/private 
kind of research 
ventures if you will 
that [we have] had, 
right. Almost like 
phenomenal 
successful.‖ (FP) 
―So, it was a means of 
adjusting service 
delivery, reflecting cost 
and working with the 
hospital to manage 
demand, because if you 
want to manage cost, 
you‘ve got to manage 
the demand side of it too 
[…]. In a way for us to 
do that in a sustainable 
matter […], there had to 
be some drag on 
demand. And we were 
able to work out a great 
agreement with them 
that‘s progressively 
saved them service 
money year over year 
over year.‖ (FP) 
―They‘re just, they are a 
model for the not-for-profit 
segment and if you ask the 
chairman of … [Health 
Centre] how they got there, he 
will tell you it was through 
this relationship with … 
[Imaging Solutions] and 
effecting that culture 
transformation of bringing six 
sigma, lean, you know, work 
out culture into their 
organization.‖ (FP) 
H
ea
lt
h
 C
en
tr
e 
(N
P
) 
―We were looking at what 
does … [Imaging Solutions] 
have that we don‘t have but 
we could use […]. They’ve 
got a lot to offer, a lot to 
learn from and we were 
looking at [Imaging 
Solutions] to provide us 
with some of that‖. (NP) 
―We wanted to 
provide the very, 
very best of 
imaging enabled 
technology to 
serve our patients. 
[…].  
How can we 
provide the latest 
state of the art 
technologies to 
help with the 
diagnosis and the 
treatment of the 
patients that relied 
on [Health 
Centre].‖ (NP) 
―You can get peeved off at your partner 
for doing something silly but unless you 
openly talk about it and say, you know, 
what you did is not right, and it‘s not 
helping this partnership. So, you know, 
there are bumps in the road including 
[Imaging Solutions] where we 
questioned how they arrived at some of 
the savings and they came back and 
said, ‗yeah, you‘re right, this was not 
the way that it should have been 
calculated‘ and the savings cheque 
became something bigger than it 
originally was. So, you‘ve got to, right 
from the outset, openly share what 
you‘re thinking of each other and the 
trust and integrity has to be there.‖ (NP) 
―Tied into all of this, 
… was the fact that we 
were about to design 
new x-ray rooms … 
and we wanted them to 
help us with the design 
of the rooms because, 
again, we had some 
ideas but they could 
offer other ideas as 
well […]. And so, they 
had to share some 
confidential stuff with 
us and it was done in 
that manner.‖ (NP) 
―You compromise, you 
know yourself that 
Tuesday is not the best 
day; bring him on 
Thursday and again, you 
compromise on those 
kinds of things. You 
don’t compromise on the 
monetary side. If you‘ve 
agreed that savings are 
going to be this or you 
agreed that the purchase 
price is going to be that, 
that‘s what it is. You 
don‘t compromise on 
those kinds of things.‖ 
(NP) 
―It was just something that 
was not going to happen on 
its own for a long, long time, 
right. And we were able to go 
in there, I think, and, you see, 
it‘s not just the equipment. I 
think it was also the black 
belts who knew how to 
collect data in a bullet proof 
manner, who knew how to 
modify the working 
processes, work with them 
and modify their work flow 
so that they could really 
extract the value out of the 
investment. That was the 
key.‖ (NP) 
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Frame Negotiation 
Frame negotiation processes enable partners to diagnose discrepancies in their 
value creation logics (Kaplan, 2008). We emphasize the interactive nature of this process: 
partners negotiate their interpretation of what value is and how value can best be 
achieved by engaging in constant questioning of how they compute value. The NP 
partner in the DI dyad captured this back-and-forth eloquently:  
You can get peeved off at your partner for doing something silly but unless you 
openly talk about it and say, you know, what you did is not right, and it‘s not 
helping this partnership. So, you know, there are bumps in the road including 
[Imaging Solutions] where we questioned how they arrived at some of the savings 
and they came back and said, ‗yeah, you‘re right, this was not the way that it 
should have been calculated‘ and the savings check became something bigger 
than it originally was. So, you‘ve got to, right from the outset, openly share what 
you‘re thinking of each other and the trust and integrity has to be there. (DI, NP) 
 
 However important (Hardy et al., 2005), conversation is not sufficient for frame 
negotiation. Our analyses surfaced a dialectic process between frame contrast (deliberate 
juxtaposition and comparison of each partner‘s frame against the other, Kaplan, 2008) 
and frame rift (the joint recognition that some changes are taking the partnership in a 
different direction, at a different pace, or produce a different magnitude of social change 
than either – and often both – partners desire). Table 4.3 illustrates one example of frame 
contrast in the DI dyad. The FP partner recognized how the value of a CT scanner 
changes depending on partners‘ unique circumstances – if they have many, and one goes 
down, ―not such a big deal;‖ but if they only have one and it ―goes down, guess what. 
Your trauma capability is shot. You‘re no longer in business, right?‖ (FP, DI). 
Simultaneously, the NP partner recognized the value of better understanding the 
technology itself and looked to the FP partner ―to provide us with some of that.‖  
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Table 4.3 further shows the complementarity between frame contrast and frame 
rift. Specifically frame rift is necessary for diagnosing boundary conditions to value 
creation, that is, specifying what value each partner can create, and when these 
contributions are unsatisfactory for one or both partners. The notion of rift encompasses 
the often quoted mis-es in cross sector partnerships – misunderstandings, misallocations 
of costs and benefits, mismatches of power, mismatched partners, misfortunes of time 
and mistrust (Berger et al., 2004). However, it also overlays an (often intuitive) 
appreciation of these mis-es: partners can diagnose that something is not how they wish it 
were. The notion of frame rift also embodies a sense of missed opportunity, even when 
the results work out nonetheless. For example, the MIS FP partner explained that 
―business has to think about money, money, money and management, whereas a hospital 
is funded by its taxpayers, by the government‖ (Table 4.4). This ―huge rift‖ caused a lot 
of missed opportunities.  
Frame rift does not, however, herald failure. In the ‗phenomenally successful‘ DI 
dyad, we also observed frame rift. For example, the FP partner agreed to fund a research 
project using a competitor‘s product, even though this was not aligned with their 
expectations of what their partnership could accomplish. But they recognized this frame 
rift as ―one of the early tests‖ and they admitted that ―you can‘t be too restrictive in terms 
of how you‘re going to let a partner allocate those funds‖ (Table 4.3). Similarly, the NP 
partner wanted ―the very, very best of imaging enabled technology,‖ ―the latest state of 
the art,‖ ―pretty avant-garde stuff at the time‖ (Table 4.3) but agreed to interim proposals 
because ―nobody really had a business model for how you would establish an imaging 
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service.‖ The DI FP partner clarified that frame rift was necessary, and closely monitored 
to keep forward momentum and ultimately reach the partnership‘s goals: 
It was pretty cutting edge stuff.  [...] great from a business development 
perspective, research perspective and infrastructure development perspective.  [...] 
But we did not just, you know, when we formed this partnership, it was 
monitoring. It was also, you know, on the diagnostic imaging side it was CT, MR 
and x-ray. It was not ultrasound and it was not nuclear medicine at the time, okay. 
And it has become nuclear medicine over time but ultrasound has never been part 
of it. The first proposal that we got to review was an ultrasound proposal, 
interestingly enough, which we approved, right, which I thought was the right 
thing for us to do.  It was research on a competitor‘s product but it was out of the 
department that we had elected to support and you just, you know, you can‘t be 
that restrictive in terms of how you‘re going to let a partner allocate those funds.  
So, I mean, that was kind of one of the early tests which goes to support that. 
(DI, FP) 
 
 Contrasting the incidence and resolution of frame rift in the MIS and the DI 
dyads, surfaces one counterintuitive insight about the functionality, even desirability, of 
frame rift. When recognized and closely monitored, frame rift provides an opportunity for 
practicing together, within the mandate of the partnership. This is particularly useful 
when tasks are novel, or approaches are yet uncharted because it offers a trial-and-error 
course by which partners can gradually uncover each other‘s preferences. Frame rift 
fulfils a function akin to frame elasticity, a concept we introduce next and which builds 
on the earlier discussion of frame rigidity and flexibility (Snow et al., 1986). But the two 
constructs are conceptually distinct. In the case of frame rift, partners‘ frames drift apart 
(from each other and/or from the agreed common ground), but the frames of each of the 
partners (i.e. their definitions of social value, their assessments, and/or their own and 
joint ambitions) neither ‗give‘, nor ‗bend‘. 
 
 
  
 
TABLE 4.4 
Value Frame Narratives for Tech Solutions (FP), Minimally Invasive Surgery Dyad  
 Frame Contrast Frame Rift Frame Negotiation Frame Elasticity Frame Plasticity Frame Fusion 
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―In the commercial process, 
the reason why you have to 
have margins as high as that 
is you have to take most of 
that money and use it to 
regenerate the next product so 
no government is going to 
come along and say, well, you 
did a good job on the first 
one, here‘s $100 million to do 
the next one. You’re on your 
own. You can only succeed on 
your own so that is a 
fundamental difference.‖ 
―There‘s a huge rift […] I 
mean a different approach, 
there‘s a whole different 
approach between a hospital 
and say a business. […] The 
business has to think about 
money, money, money and 
management, whereas a 
hospital is funded by its 
taxpayers, by the 
government. It doesn‘t have 
money to pass out to a 
project [like surgical 
devices].‖ 
―I say the most 
important things in 
business are money, 
money, money and 
that‘s not a greed thing. 
That really comes from 
the fact that you have to 
have investors and 
partners.‖ 
   
R
el
at
io
n
al
 P
ro
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es
 ―You have to understand what 
is a fair price, what is a price 
the market can bear. You 
have to understand what gross 
margins you must have to 
enable you to generate the 
next product.‖ 
―I‘ve learned over the last 
four years in the American 
model of business hospitals, 
if you can’t do it for less 
than $1 million you’re 
wasting your time.‖ 
―When we developed 
[space technologies], it 
was thrilling and 
exciting, but we only 
succeeded because we 
managed the money. 
We wouldn‘t have 
lasted a year if we 
hadn‘t had done it 
properly.‖ 
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 TABLE 4.4 (continued) 
 
  Frame Contrast Frame Rift Frame Negotiation Frame Elasticity Frame Plasticity Frame Fusion 
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s ―So, I suppose the lesson 
we‘ve learned from it all is 
the number one issue again is 
money and in this case, if you 
want to get some transaction 
like this off the ground, 
creating the money is the 
number one issue.‖ 
―Well, the real [issue] is 
whoever gets the money 
[…]. We can’t actually do 
the design and development 
until somebody brings 
money to the table.‖ 
―Even though we had a 
one common goal to 
develop [a medical 
device] the every day 
interests are very 
different so I‘ve always 
tried to be as open as I 
can with everyone I 
ever deal with and I 
would always try and 
help situations.‖   
―We invested, not cash, but one 
of the things that’s important in 
industry […]. We‘ve done $2 
billion worth of robotics over 
the years so we‘ve established a 
tremendous back log of what 
we call background intellectual 
property […].‖ 
―When we do something 
additive to what we‘ve always 
done, we make sure we 
document it […] So, the 
business negotiation has to be 
based on what you own in 
terms of intellectual property 
[…]. That is a very important 
thing in […] the type of 
business we’re in.‖ 
―Basically we figured it out 
that nobody really cared 
about the … [surgical 
device], they wanted this, 
they wanted that, they wanted 
simplicity, they wanted 
something a way less than $1 
million and so on and so 
forth.‖ 
R
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 “[Some] go into the 
partnership […] not expecting 
to kind of solve their financial 
problems. [Some] enter into 
partnerships thinking well, 
this one project‘s going to do 
it for us. It’s not. That’s not 
going to work.‖ (NP) 
―…they‘re going to say, 
‗well, don‘t do it then,‘ 
simply because we don‘t 
have a $1 million off of our 
bottom line to contribute.‖  
―But at the end of the 
day, if I go back to my 
company saying, ‗well, 
[Research Institute] 
wants me to do this for 
$5 million but they‘ve 
only got $4 million‘ 
[…].‖ 
―We spent very deliberately 2 
years [working together]. We 
lived with surgeons, we 
listened, […] we spent weeks in 
operating rooms, we listened, 
we asked, we made a nuisance 
of ourselves.‖ 
―So, we set out to produce a 
system that we felt the 
majority of surgeons said they 
wanted. We‘ve gone ahead 
and done it and by the end of 
next year, we‘ll be in a 
position to start selling it and 
[this] is why the intellectual 
property thing is so 
important.‖ 
―We build the [surgical 
device], we try to get 
approval from the FDA […] 
at the end of the day, you still 
have this problem of potential 
litigation.... can an 
organization that is 
essentially a nonprofit 
organization deal with this?‖ 
 
1
3
0
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Frame Elasticity 
Frame elasticity helps partners experiment with different prognostic frames – 
interpretations of possible solutions (Benford & Snow, 2000). They see whether or how 
their own interpretations of value creation may include, or at least tolerate, partners‘ 
different goals or approaches. This stretch in interpretation was deliberate but short-lived, 
as in many cases the experiment did not take. However, the process of experimentation 
itself was an important meeting ground where partners could try on each other‘s 
understandings and better assess fit in their social value creation goals and approaches. 
Frame elasticity can be immediately rewarding, as in the case of the DI dyad, where 
sharing helped partners quickly recognize their complementarities. In this case, both 
partners assessed the program as ―very, very meaningful‖ (Table 4.3).  
But frame elasticity can be uncomfortable (Kaplan, 2008) as it requires ongoing 
compromise and attention to multiple dualities (Croteau and Hicks, 2003). The 
zigzagging journey of the MIS partnership (Table 4.2), with the FP partner‘s 
representatives making ―a nuisance of themselves‖ (Table 4.4) and trying to do what ―the 
majority of the surgeons wanted‖ when they felt the surgeons did not care about the 
technology (or their needs as engineers), suggests that frame elasticity can be strenuous 
and stretch across long periods of time (almost 2 years in the case of the MIS dyad, Table 
4.4). Frame elasticity was necessary but not sufficient to reach a shared appreciation of 
each other‘s complementarities. We observed that partners often took a step back after 
gaining a new level of understanding. They attempted to reconcile the newly acquired 
understanding with their prior take, often reverting (at least some way) towards their prior 
frames. Sector-specific frames were often invoked. Although some compromises were 
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made, each partner identified at least a handful of issues which they wouldn‘t (or 
couldn‘t) compromise on. We labelled this construct frame plasticity. 
Frame Plasticity 
 Frame plasticity refers to partners‘ deliberate efforts to retain some of the newly 
acquired understanding while discarding others. These processes are akin to frame 
updating or retyping (Weber & Crocker, 1983), in that each partner deliberately ‗edits‘ 
their understanding as the result of the interaction (Balogun & Johnson, 2004). It is also 
similar to Bartunek‘s (1984) frame conflict because new meanings emerge through the 
dialectic between old and new understandings. However, the important difference 
between frame plasticity and these earlier constructs is that frame plasticity requires a 
greater level of deliberation and iteration through multiple levels of understanding – 
sector, partnership and partner. Indeed, it is neither the editing nor the dialectic that 
drives the emergence of new meaning. Rather it is the effortful cycling back and forth 
between sector-specific, partnership-specific and organization specific frames that allows 
the newly acquired understanding to fall into place for each of the partners.  
 Our construct of frame plasticity is also different because partners tend to plastify 
different portions of meanings. Put differently, frame plasticity does not strive for frame 
alignment within the partnership but rather facilitates inner alignment across each 
partner‘s sector-, partnership- and organization- specific understanding of what social 
value is and how it can best be co-created. Table 4.4 illustrates frame plasticity for the 
partners in the DI dyad. The FP partner felt that they were able to reach a great agreement 
that progressively saved money for the NP partner, despite the NP‘s partners (non-
negotiable) constraints – that is, they ―[didn‘t] compromise on the monetary side.‖ 
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FRAME TRANSITIONS 
 Our second-order analyses also shed some insights on how partners transition 
from diagnostic processes (frame negotiation) to prognostic framing processes (frame 
elasticity, plasticity and fusion). By contrasting the successful progression reported by the 
DI dyad partners shown in Table 4.3 with the ‗zigzagging‘ journey experienced by the 
MIS dyad partners illustrated in Table 4.4, we can shed some additional light on two 
likely causes of mismanaged transitions from diagnostic to prognostic framing (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1997). First, reluctance to stretch away from sector-specific frames results in 
an (unconditional) unwillingness to engage frame elasticity processes. Second, lack of 
appreciation for the partner‘s self-defining and thus hard to change characteristics hinders 
frame plasticity processes. 
 Perhaps the most important factor that held back frame elasticity for the FP 
partner in the MIS dyad was their deeply ingrained allegiance to two sector-specific 
frames: ―money, money, money‖ – because ―you are on your own. You only succeed on 
your own‖ and their ―tremendous backlog of what [they] call background intellectual 
property‖ (Table 4.4). These two sector-specific frames were co-dependent. The FP 
partner ‗invested‘ their intellectual property, in order to create and eventually monetize 
‗additive‘ intellectual property. For example, they ―only succeeded [in developing 
complex technologies] because [they] managed the money. [They] could not have lasted 
a year [let alone thirty] if [they] hadn‘t had done it properly‖ (Table 4.4). The FP partner 
was interested in social value creation, that is, ―what the surgeons said they wanted‖ to 
get ―in a position to start selling in‖ (Table 4.4). They ―listened, [they] asked, [they] 
made a nuisance of [themselves].‖ Note the emphasis the FP partner placed on listening: 
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There‘s all kinds of qualitative considerations and knowledge and that‘s an 
important aspect of what I call market assessment and knowing the customer, 
knowing the user.  It‘s not about knowing their technical capabilities, while you 
have to know that, it‘s about knowing what their limitations are, knowing how 
they operate, knowing that constraints they have on them which can vary from 
year to year.  Have they just had a bad year?  Did they have a good year?  You 
know, and sometimes ... it‘s kind of ... knowledge that you have to assemble.  
You have to, you know, and you just, there‘s all kinds of ways of gathering 
information and then you can read annual reports, you can just get to know people 
and you actually build up a knowledge base of what makes them tick and what 
they don‘t like, what they do like, you know, or what their CEO will let them do.  
If you really listen, I think the skill is in listening.  If you really listen, you‘ll hear 
them talk about stuff and you can gather from that what their constraints are. 
(MIS, FP) 
 
The MIS partners painstakingly engaged the frame negotiation process (especially frame 
contrast). However, their frames were rigid (Snow et al., 1986). This prevented the FP 
organization from trying on partners‘ different interpretations, a fact openly recognized 
by both partners as constantly and mutually frustrating.  
 The disparities between social value (re)framing in the DI dyad (Table 4.3) versus 
the MIS dyad (Table 4.4) also surfaced an important benefit of frame elasticity – even 
when the tried-on interpretations neither fit, nor last. The willingness and ability to see 
each other‘s point of view builds forward-momentum simply by creating a sense of 
connection. For example, the FP partner in the DI dyad qualifies a program as ―very, very 
meaningful because it brought [the researcher] into kind of [their] product family‖ (Table 
4.3); similarly, the NP partner commented that ―we had some ideas but they could offer 
other ideas as well […] and share some confidential stuff‖ (Table 4.4). This sense of 
connection was conspicuously lacking in the MIS dyad, where the FP partner felt that 
―nobody cared about the [surgical device]‖ while the NP partner felt that the FP partner 
was simply fulfilling contractual obligations. Both valued the technology, but their 
interpretation of what value this technology represented or how that value would be 
135 
 
 
realized did not (and would not) overlap. Put differently, the MIS partners recognized 
differences in their diagnostic frames (Kaplan, 2008), but could not work together to craft 
compatible, let alone complementary, prognostic frames. Despite the early success in 
developing a radically innovative medical device and despite significant commitment of 
time and resources, the MIS partners never aligned their frames. 
 Lack of appreciation for each other‘s self-defining features created a second layer 
of hold-back in the MIS dyad. Intellectual property was self-defining for the FP partner: 
―When we do something additive to what we‘ve always done, we make sure we 
document it so when you negotiate with a customer, it‘s very important to get 
[intellectual property] on the table and get it recognized.‖ (Table 4.4) But note their 
admitted lack of appreciation for one of the NP partner‘s self-defining features, the 
professional egos of the surgeons who would help design and who would use the surgical 
device:  
Yeah, we definitely learned.  We learned a bit about the medical profession. We 
learned a lot about egos, how to manage an ego. […] We found all doctors are 
like that, they don‘t want to be bothered with the specifics. They‘ll critique it 
when you get it wrong but they don‘t want to put the time in at the beginning. 
(MIS, FP) 
 
 This lack of appreciation was not due to poor understanding of such self-defining 
features. The FP partner had (and has since) worked with other hospitals and understood 
how they went about value creation. Although the MIS cross sector partnership was the 
FP‘s first partnership agreement while all prior collaborations had taken the form of 
contract engineering, these prior relationships provided the FP partner with sufficient 
knowledge of hospitals‘ self-defining features. Nor was the FP‘s appreciation for the 
NP‘s contribution restored as the FP partner ―learned over the last four years in the 
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American model of business hospitals‖ (Table 4.4). In hindsight, the NP partner reflected 
on FP‘s partner lack of appreciation for the users of the technology: 
I think the company … probably didn‘t get as much out of it as they should 
have….  In my mind, that was probably because of a lack of foresight on their 
part.  When you enter into a project like this which is really a high technology 
project, you need to have in mind that you would be able to use it, that you are 
open to receiving high technology into your company.  If you‘re going to be very 
conservative about it and say, well, no this is, we‘re really not comfortable, we 
can‘t do this, then you should not do this kind of work. And that, I think, shows 
that there is a lack of understanding perhaps at the senior level in some of these 
companies about the need to absorb new technology. (MIS, NP) 
 
Symmetrically, the FP partner felt that the NP partner did not care about the technology 
and the intellectual property and thus could neither appreciate their contribution, nor help 
them deliver on the full promise of the technology itself: 
Because for you, in an engineering business, nailing the requirements, even 
though it might only be two pieces of paper, is the most important step in every 
project because that‘s, if somebody tells you on day one I want this instead of 
that, it costs nothing.  If they tell you that just before you‘re going to make it, it 
costs a thousand times more than that. So, it‘s absolutely critical that you 
understand what your customer wants. (MIS, FP). 
 
 In contrast, the DI partners were eager to work together, not just in spite of but 
rather because of their clear differences. As the FP partners recalled: ―We were very 
eager to be at the cutting edge of technology, because as you know, in [our one campus], 
we had some of the x-ray equipment that should have been thrown out 15 years ago […]. 
So, we wanted to look at a partner who had a reputation in being at the cutting edge.‖  
 Appreciation facilitated the transition from frame elasticity to frame plasticity by 
helping partners agree and disagree on specific compromises. For example, the NP 
partner in the DI dyad didn‘t compromise on the monetary side – they couldn‘t due to 
their requirement of competitive bidding. FP partner‘s appreciation for this constraint 
enabled both parties to shift attention to other types of benefits, for example, ―working 
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with the hospital to manage demand [as an alternative way to manage costs and achieve 
sustainable cost savings].‖ 
DISCUSSION 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the parallel (if often asymmetrical) processes of frame 
negotiation (i.e. iteration between frame contrast and frame rift), frame elasticity, frame 
plasticity and frame fusion; these processes unfold simultaneously and relationally for the 
NP and FP arms of the cross sector partnership. Our findings speak to these distinct and 
often iterative frame processes, as well as to when and how partners effectively transition 
(or not) from relational diagnostic framing processes (i.e. frame negotiation) to relational 
prognostic framing processes (i.e. frame elasticity, plasticity and in some cases fusion). 
Our grounded framework draws these insights together to explain the unique and effortful 
nature of social value (re)framing in cross sector partnership.  
Frame transformation processes can be both self- and other-referential (Snow et 
al., 1986). Unlike single organizations, cross-sector partners depend on each other. They 
move forward together, but rarely in lock-step. Often, partners take turns trying on each 
others‘ interpretation, retaining those understandings which best fit their sector- and 
organization-specific frames, and discarding those less comfortable. Each process of 
frame elasticity, plasticity and fusion is dynamic; in addition there may be movement 
back to an earlier process. But once frame fusion is achieved, this frame is used to 
address new conflicts and problems as they arise.   
These frame transformation processes are relational; they require connection and 
appreciation. Connection encourages frame elasticity. Appreciation motivates frame 
plasticity. We also found that relational framing processes do not necessarily lead to 
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frame fusion; however, frame fusion requires relational framing processes. It especially 
necessitates attention to the relationship to counterbalance sector-specific frames: the 
more specific or ingrained sector-specific frames become the more emphatic and/or 
elaborate the requisite relational processes. Relational work alone is not sufficient for 
frame fusion (e.g. the MIS partners worked hard to listen but did not come to understand 
or appreciate their differences). Rather, a willingness by both partners to invest in each 
other‘s understanding so the partnership can grow stronger is required. The FP partner in 
the DI dyad expressed this vividly: 
The best partnerships grow out of some shared experience, right?  You learn how 
to be partners together.  You learn how to work together and you build some 
confidence and trust in each other. (DI, FP) 
 
 Relational coordination mechanisms scaffold relational processes and sustain 
forward momentum, a point we illustrate further below. This finding extends prior 
interest in the multilevel processes of relational coordination that enable frame fusion and 
thus complements prior insights into the mechanisms associated with frame consonance 
(Croteau & Hicks, 2003). 
Multilevel Coordination 
 Several relational coordination mechanisms were operational in each of the four 
studied dyads (with the caveat that coordination was both less pervasive and less 
effective within the MIS dyad, where frame fusion was never achieved). Relationships 
stitched across multiple fault-lines, bringing key individuals together, aligning 
departments, uncovering organizational synergies, and (towards the end of successful 
partnerships) overstepping sector lines to extend value creation beyond the current scope 
of each partnership. 
  
 
FIGURE 4.1 
 
A Dynamic Model of Value Frame Fusion in Cross-Sector Interactions 
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 The usual suspects, cross-individual, cross-team and cross-organizational 
coordination mechanisms (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009) surfaced – albeit with some 
interesting peculiarities. We found that a single point of contact was particularly helpful 
in frame negotiation. This single point of contact provided an anchor for frame contrast 
and a partnership-level reference point. The single point of contact had positive effects, 
such as bringing ideas and helping ―value build both ways‖ (EC, Table 4.5). TC used an 
inner circle -- appointments to technical advisory groups. MIS struggled with ―single 
point failures where the loss of one person can really hurt you‖ (Table 4.5) but also 
recognized that one well-positioned connector could open doors. DI had a ‗quarterback:‘ 
You‘ve got to have a quarterback.  You‘ve got to have a quarterback who makes 
it her business, his business, to make sure that they understand the kind of 
partnership that they want for their particular organization and make sure that the 
vision that that organization has is shared with the potential partners out there.  If 
that vision isn‘t shared right from the outset and if that culture doesn‘t match up, 
you‘re fighting uphill and you have to question whether there‘s value with that 
kind of partnership agreement. (DI, NP) 
 
 Cross-team coordination was particularly helpful when the team members knew 
what they wanted and acted in concert, as the DI FP partner explains: ―they extracted 
value from us and they knew exactly how to do it and it worked. It absolutely worked‖ 
(Table 4.5). Cross-organizational mechanisms, such as retreats (DI), ―senior people 
working together‖ (TC), opportunities to reconcile expectations (MIS), helped 
organizations ―understand each other‘s unique circumstances‖ (EC). Cross-team and 
cross-organizational coordination enabled, sustained, and/or renewed frame elasticity in 
each of the four dyads, albeit the effort was only temporarily and partially effective in the 
MIS dyad. 
 
  
 
TABLE 4.5 
Multilevel Coordination for Value Frame Fusion 
 Energy Conservation (EC) Telecommunications (TC) Diagnostic Imaging (DI) Minimally Invasive Surgery (MIS) 
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―You actually do get to go and talk to the 
CEO….So, we were able to get right to [CEO, 
VP, the Board ]. We tend to get very engaged 
with the executive team. And, today we see 
executives talking about all of the benefits.‖ 
(FP) 
 
―When [Operational Leader, Health Centre] 
needs help or he wants some information or 
he‘d like to do, we‘re right there to help him. 
And, he‘s good about it because he‘ll actually 
bring it to us and say listen, like, you know, 
‗I‘ve got an idea guys. I want to do this […]. It 
helps to value build both ways.‖ (FP – also 
paraphrasing NP) 
―They bring people in to work side by side 
with our folks. Our folks are gaining huge 
and again, it‘s personal development… 
their own skill… just a huge jump for some 
of them because they have now access to 
experts in the field where they didn‘t have 
that access before.... Some of our folks 
have been invited to be on those technical 
advisory groups, and now you‘re in the sort 
of the inner circle with their key people. 
It‘s huge, absolutely huge.‖ (NP) 
―You can have […] honest organizational 
commitment and it can be undermined by one 
person just not doing their bit. […] We went and 
hired, actually, a six sigma black belt so this is 
someone pretty deep in … [our] process skills.… 
So, this individual went down there as the strategic 
alliance manager to really participate, you know, 
from the research side and setting up those 
mechanisms, on the professional development side 
setting up those mechanisms and working in the 
department to enhance departmental efficiency[…]. 
We also put in place a single point of contact, what 
we call a technical account manager to help … [NP 
partner] manage their service resources and their 
fleet of assets more effectively.‖ (FP) 
―You should never be in a position of 
having what we call single point failures 
where the loss of one person can really hurt 
you -- even an all-star. An all-star leaves, 
somehow or other and it‘s difficult, there 
should be someone who within six months 
can assume the [responsibilities]‖ (FP) 
 
―I have to say, the [surgeon] was the one 
who could open the political doors because 
of his fame. People knew [Tech Solutions] 
as a company and what we‘ve done, but 
they knew him personally because he got a 
lot of recognition out of that [world‘s first 
surgery].‖ (FP) 
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―Not only have we been able to provide them 
with services, we’ve actually used them to 
help us shape our offerings.  So, [our] users‘ 
group was really designed to be a forum where 
executives and users would come together to 
discuss some of the challenges they face and 
to listen to what [we] may be developing in 
terms of solutions, but it was also to listen to 
them so we could develop those solutions.‖ 
(FP)   
―So, you know, you‘ve got to do the due 
diligence to make sure you‘ve got all of 
that kind of infrastructure in place and […] 
your people have to know who to work with 
and how to work with them and so on.‖ 
(FP) 
―The people in the departments knew what they 
wanted from the partnership. They wanted a 
partnership and they knew how to milk it and I 
don‘t mean that in a derogatory way. I mean it in a 
very positive way. They knew how to extract value 
from a partner. They extracted value from us and 
they knew exactly how to do it and it worked. It 
absolutely worked.‖ (FP) 
―In other words, the [Research Institute] 
engineers would have acted as a sort of a 
go-between between the medical and the 
contractor. So we would have been there 
most likely just over viewing what they 
were doing and giving an engineering 
perspective on how things were going and 
maybe even suggesting some changes just 
to translate what the medical and the 
surgeons wanted to [know] what [Tech 
Solutions] were able to do.‖ (NP) 
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―So at the end of the day, we could, in 
confidence, understand that did we accomplish 
what the objective was and we worked 
together on that. And in fact, in cases where it 
didn‘t deliver [Energy Solutions] came back 
and, you know, made it right. And so there 
was accountability. I would call it a mutual 
accountability and relationship. You also get 
to another step because a true partnership says, 
‗do you understand each other’s unique 
circumstances?‘ (NP) 
―In the partnerships that we‘ve put 
together, what we‘ve said is that there will 
be sort of semi-annual meetings and the 
expectation is that it’s senior people from 
both organizations working together and 
doing things together so that you‘re having 
some evaluations, putting some business 
case around it. And I think that ties in both 
organizations to what you‘re trying to 
do....There‘s a commitment in the 
organization to spend time together and 
that really, I think, is really essential.‖ (NP) 
―So we had a number of retreats, actually, with … 
[Health Centre CEO] just to talk about partnership 
opportunities and how we develop closer 
relationships.‖ (FP) 
―I thought it was successful because my 
expectations or the expectations of my 
group from that interaction were to work 
with industry, to work […] on something 
that was state of the art technology 
development.‖ (NP) 
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TABLE 4.5 (continued) 
  
Energy Conservation (EC) Telecommunications (TC) Diagnostic Imaging (DI) 
Minimally Invasive 
Surgery (MIS) 
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 ―We participate in [Health Centre‘s] 
foundation events and they appreciate the 
fact that, you know, this is really 
disconnected from the business we do 
with them. […] But nevertheless, as a 
partner, we feel that that‘s the right thing 
to do given that our own employees, 
unfortunately, have to use their facilities 
that we, as a local corporate partner, we 
should do that. So, we participate in those 
activities and that‘s seen by their 
leadership as us being good business 
partners. We‘ve had employees 
volunteering on committees.‖ (FP) 
 ―And in the case of [Telecom Solutions], […] the people 
here, have looked at [Health Centre] as their hospital. And 
their employees have embraced that and … [Telecom 
Solution] pride themselves on their community 
involvement and they‘ve chosen the hospital as one of the 
places where they‘ll do a ton of community involvement 
so they work tirelessly with their folks raising money for 
the foundations, doing different things….Their employees 
said, ‗boy, we really enjoy this work. They‘re also doing 
this. Let‘s put some of our philanthropic time and our 
community time towards doing things for the hospital.‘ 
It‘s pretty huge what they‘ve done so you know it‘s, and 
they‘re having fun doing that. It‘s not like it‘s, ‘Oh yeah, 
we have to do this because we did that.‘ This is totally 
their own thing, totally their excitement, not ours.‖ (NP) 
 ―Prior to the [request for proposals], [Imaging 
Solutions] wanted to come in and say, you know, 
we want to be your partner and we‘ll give you 
best prices, best service and all that kind of stuff, 
but we couldn‘t do it that way, because of it being 
a public organization. You‘ve got to give people 
out there an opportunity because, I can tell you, if 
you don‘t, [their competitor] will be banging on 
the Minister‘s door […]. I think they understood 
that we had to do it as a public organization.‖ 
(NP) 
For-profit – Nonprofit 
 ―In the end […] we did 
manage to achieve all the 
objectives of the contract 
[…] I mean, and even if you 
don‘t solve the problem 
completely, you probably 
come up with something 
new that comes out of it and 
from a university‘s point of 
view, it‘s never a failure 
because you have ended up 
at least training somebody. 
So that‘s not a failure.‖ (NP) 
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―I was invited for the first time to go and 
speak in Phoenix on what we were doing 
at their North American function user 
group for instance.  That was an eye 
awakening for me … I went to speak and 
I came back, wow, understanding a whole 
new side of [Energy Solutions]‖ (NP) 
―Insomuch as our senior executives meet often with 
government officials too to give them our view of where 
the government should be involved and shouldn‘t be 
involved in business and in communications, whether 
that‘s at the regulatory side or whether that’s in support of 
providing funds to various sectors to do various kinds of 
work […]. And so we do that and then indirectly that 
influences government to begin to release funds to do 
those kinds of things.‖ (FP) 
―And the other thing about partnerships, that is 
really, really important is that the policy makers, 
meaning governments, have to buy in on the 
concept of partnerships. […] If you introduce 
partnerships to a novice governance group, you 
have to spend a lot of time explaining to them 
what they‘re getting into. Yeah, like before we 
signed off on [Imaging Solutions], we went to the 
Board and we told them that we were looking at 
establishing a partnership and told them about the 
risks and told them about the benefits and they 
were really very supportive of that.‖ (NP) 
―The catalyst this time has 
been specifically [third party 
well known internationally]. 
Not that he asked to come 
here, but we see somebody 
in the middle of all this who 
really thinks like a Canadian; 
who really wants to do this 
as Canada. He] has been 
down here recently talking to 
[Chair/Chief of Surgery] and 
[Medical Director].‖ (FP) 
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―[Energy Solution has] become an active 
player and much more visible in the 
organization […] they are one of the first 
ones if we‘re going to have these open 
houses, they provide handouts to people, 
you know, the light bulbs […]. They 
don‘t have to do those things but they do 
it….You know, it‘s all business. I mean, 
they‘re hoping to do well by it but they do 
it with a great willingness. There‘s never 
hesitation; it‘s just, oh yeah, we‘re here 
for you and provide materials and 
resources and we had a big open house 
and they helped facilitate that.‖ (NP) 
―But then we began to bring additional value to the table 
and from not only what our insights and our involvement 
in other health care institutions, but our work at the level 
of government and in our understanding of the industry 
and so we were bringing solutions to the hospital to 
consider.‖ (FP) 
―What I want him to do is put on what is called 
the health products services sessions whereby 
[Imaging Solutions] will assemble a dozen 
opinion leaders and then present some of their 
products from the point of view of how to market 
them and products can be things like the latest 
technology, but they can also be things like early 
health initiatives and they‘ve got a 
pharmaceutical company now [working on] 
genetic screening […] they‘re ready to roll that 
out and I‘m trying to say to them, think of [Health 
Centre] as a possibility.‖ (NP) 
―Have graduate students 
working on it, students for 
which the ultimate goal for 
us in fact in academia is to 
be able to train people so 
that was an important goal 
that we were able to achieve. 
We trained quite a few 
graduate students out of 
that. And there was the 
technology that came into 
the university.‖ (NP) 
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 The most interesting insights spoke to cross sector coordination. We observed at 
least three distinct types of mechanisms that contributed to frame plasticity and frame 
fusion. First, we found mechanisms that helped NP partners understand for-profit sector 
logic and vice-versa (where partners became ‗excited‘ about what the other was doing 
beyond the partnership, and consequently emulated some practices or volunteered to 
implement some of those practices). As the TC NP partner remarked: ―This is totally 
their own thing, totally their excitement, not ours‖ (Table 4.5). The DI FP partner further 
recalled how their NP partner emulated one of their work practices to enhance social 
value creation, both within but also beyond the partnership. 
work[ed] out culture into their organization. [...] They had actually taken our 
corporate calendar, they‘d figured out that some pieces of this just don‘t apply to 
what we do here, right.  There are pieces that really do apply and for those pieces 
that don‘t apply, we have other stuff that does apply. So, they had actually taken 
the whole concept of the race track, modified it for their purposes and undertaken 
it with all the operating rigour that we pursue it with. It‘s like really cool stuff.  
They‘ve taken our lessons; they‘ve figured out what‘s applicable to their 
operations; they‘ve discarded what isn‘t and have made themselves far more 
successful….They have learned to fish, no doubt. (DI, FP) 
 
 Second, we noted mechanisms that helped partners expect or extract greater value 
from each other. These included catalysts, awakening experiences, and deliberate 
engagement with influential third parties. These third parties helped the partners to 
understand ―a whole new side of [the solution]‖ (EC), ―release funds to do those kinds of 
things‖ (TC), create broader ―buy-in‖ for cross sector partnerships (DI) and move things 
along for the greater good (MIS). 
 Third, and perhaps most noteworthy, we observed that value frame fusion was 
associated with spontaneous efforts to deliver value to new communities, often partners‘ 
stakeholders for which the organization had no contractual obligation and in some cases 
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no expectations of quid pro quo. Mechanisms included open houses and handouts (EC), 
spanning multiple industries and interest groups (TC), workshops for opinion leaders 
(DI), and training future trainers (MIS). 
Implications 
 Taken together, our framework for value fusion in cross sector partnerships and 
the multilevel coordination mechanisms (especially the cross sector mechanisms) 
underpinning value fusion extend the literature on framing in three important ways. First, 
they provide preliminary evidence of dynamic fit, whereby different frames can come 
together without becoming one. Our concept of frame fusion opens new research avenues 
by drawing attention to the importance of orchestrated complementarities that stimulate 
rather than inhibit partners. Second, our findings extend the literature on framing by 
showing how organizations can use multiple referents to socially-construct new frames. 
Third, we begin to explain how organizations accomplish this challenging but important 
task by mapping out new sets of coordination mechanisms, both planned and 
spontaneous, that helps partners dynamically and relationally create social value.  
 We also contribute to research and practice on cross sector partnerships. We comb 
together a heterogeneous set of studies on framing that bring to the fore the importance of 
difference in co-creating social value —despite substantial contingencies and challenges 
that organizations face when they engage in cross sector interactions. Our synthesis 
positions cross sector interactions as a unique and rich context for understanding framing 
and as a (largely under-explored) locus of social value creation. Theoretically, cross 
sector partnerships are essential in understanding dynamic frame alignment processes. 
Practically, cross sector partnerships have risen in prominence and social impact, and 
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there is a rapidly growing appetite for fully leveraging their potential to co-create social 
value (Yaziji & Doh, 2009).  
 Our findings also offer two immediately actionable insights. First, our framework 
of value frame fusion helps cross sector partners troubleshoot ‗zigzagging‘ interactions, 
by walking them through the benefits and downsides of frame negotiation, elasticity, 
plasticity and fusion, and by explaining how they can engage transitions from one stage 
to the next. Second, we identify several leverage points by providing examples of 
coordination mechanisms that help partners not only overcome sector differences but at 
times even immerse themselves, totally and excitedly (TC NP, Table 4.5) in a different 
sector to experience a new understanding of value. 
 Our research question and findings speak directly to value frame fusion in cross-
sector partnerships. However, the qualitative framework derived in this study may 
generalize to instances when two organizations starting with discrepant or conflicting 
value logics voluntarily work together to explore and leverage complementarities for 
additional or atypical value creation. To begin with, such differences can be observed 
within the for-profit sector as well as within the non-profit sector. Traditional for-profit 
and nonprofit models are increasingly confronted by hybrid models, which straddle 
common-good mission-driven values and market-oriented profitability and 
competitiveness (Boyd et al., 2009).  
Future research can explore to what extent the value fusion processes described 
here for cross-sector partnerships may also apply to partnerships between traditional 
versus hybrid nonprofits (Pallotta, 2008), or between traditional versus hybrid for-profits 
(Hoffman, 2010). In both cases, we expect lesser discrepancies in value creation logics – 
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yet more stubborn commitment to these differences. For example, expectations may be 
less flexible because each partner ‗sees‘ just another non-profit (respectively just another 
for-profit). Within either sector, future research can also tackle larger discrepancies in 
value logics, that is, when organizations differ in their sector-specific frames, value chain 
position, organizational orientation or norms, or even national culture. Where, how and 
how effectively partners reconcile distinct value logics across overlapping or multiple 
divides certainly merits additional research. 
CONCLUSION 
This study models the dynamic, relational processes of value-creation in cross 
sector partnerships to explain how for-profit and nonprofit partners come to effectively 
combine their different and distinctly sectoral frames for social value creation. We start 
with the working assumption that partners can leverage their mis-es (Berger et al., 2004) 
by deliberately engaging, and gradually reconciling, their differences. We find that 
although diagnostic frames (partners‘ divergent understanding of the problem, Snow et 
al., 1986) may be hard to bridge, their prognostic frames (partners‘ distinct understanding 
of possible solutions, Snow et al., 1986) offer particularly generative grounds for crafting 
new understanding of what value is and how it can best be achieved, sustained or 
enhanced. Our four-stage model of prognostic frame negotiation, elasticity, plasticity and 
fusion begins to reconcile two contrary stances in the literature on cross sector 
partnerships. On one hand, cross sector partnerships face harsh hurdles and they rarely 
and at best ineffectively cross their divide to generate social good (Fiol & O‘Connor, 
2002). On the other, some succeed in creating unprecedented social value, in spite of 
great divides (Austin, 2000a). Our qualitative framework explains how four cross sector 
147 
 
 
dyads (re)frame their social value creation, and illustrates several multi-level relational 
coordination mechanisms that enable value frame fusion.   
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NOTES 
1
 The social movement literature explains that ―collective action frames are constructed in 
part as movement adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic 
condition of situation which they define as in need of change, make attribution about who 
or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in 
concert to effect change‖ (Benford and Snow, 2000: 615). 
 
2
 According to Snow et al. (1986), frame bridging adjoins ideologies that bear on the 
same issue/solution; frame amplification clarifies and invigorates interpretations which 
were buried under ambiguity or lethargy; frame extension recruits related individual 
values and motives by portraying them as congruent with the core ideology; frame 
transformation requires a systematic alteration: ―new values may have to be planted and 
nurtured, old meanings of understanding jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or 
‗misframings‘ reframed‖ (Snow et al., 1986: 474). 
 
3
 Kim and Mauborgne (1997) show, for example, that novel prognostic frames fare better 
when they completely leave out prior diagnostics.  
 
4
 The NP partners in the EC, TC and DI dyads were distinct divisions within the 
Canadian Health Centre, with separate leaders, objectives and reporting processes. The 
NP partner in the MIS dyad was a Research Institute affiliated with the same Canadian 
Health Centre but managed by its own Board, again with separate leaders, objectives and 
reporting processes.   
5
Canadian dollars (CAD) and US dollars (USD) were roughly equivalent at the time of 
the market capitalization estimates. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
The need for social innovation is evident in the urgent yet longstanding social and 
environmental challenges facing our global society, such as ensuring human rights, 
combating environmental degradation, alleviating poverty, minimizing disease and 
providing education (Westley, Zimmerman & Patton, 2006). Both nonprofit and for-
profit organizations are expected by society to take an active role in the social 
transformation that is needed to address these challenges (Cone, 2010; King, 2007). And 
increasingly, these organizations are working together. Each of the three studies included 
in this dissertation addressed the underlying challenge of social innovation at the 
interface between the two sectors; in so doing, it lays the groundwork for understanding 
how cross-sector partnerships are key arenas of social innovation. 
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Several theoretical contributions and implications are advanced by each of these 
studies as well as by the set of studies together.  
Critical Theory of Value Creation 
In the first paper, the most significant contribution is the beneficiary-focused 
theorizing as a conceptual bridge between the tenets of economic and social value 
creation. There is little argument that collaborative solutions that transcend the 
ideological and practical boundaries of organizations within defined sectors benefit 
society. However, despite success stories, there are few accounts about how such 
collaborations may create social innovation. Within the broader premise that creating 
social value sustainably (through repeated value cycles over time) often requires trade-
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offs, we proposed a critical account of how beneficiary-focused theorizing can help 
overcome the stalemate in both economic- and social-based theories.  
We showed how social forces can deeply enrich RBV theorizing by cross-
pollinating the core findings concerning the origins and dynamics of economic value 
creation with the social premise of critical management theories, to more explicitly look 
into the foundational principles, relations, and relational processes constraining value 
creation. Our theorizing introduced different types of beneficiary voice to invoke, 
harness, and bridge three distinct critical theory perspectives – Marxism and related 
feminism and environmentalism; pragmatism, and Frankfurt School. Our core argument 
is straightforward: appreciation for each type of beneficiary voice increases the potential 
for value creation in cross-sector partnerships. 
The inclusion of beneficiary voice has several theoretical implications for 
management research more generally and strategy research in particular. First, giving 
voice to the beneficiary in theorizing value creation builds on and extends more recent 
trends in stakeholder theory. While the voices of stakeholders are often included in 
stakeholder research, the focal actor continues to be the corporation. There are only a few 
notable exceptions conducted from the perspective of the stakeholder (i.e. Frooman, 
1999; Hendry, 2005, 2006; Zietsma & Winn, 2008). These theoretical and empirical 
studies examine the influence tactics and strategies of stakeholders who are activists in 
adversarial relationships with corporations. While these ―secondary‖ stakeholders drive 
issues onto the political or corporate agendas (Zietsma & Winn, 2008), the role of the 
beneficiary (still) remains under-studied. This study advocates for recasting theories of 
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social creation from the point of view of the beneficiary, and suggests a more inclusive 
analysis of cross-sector partnerships as three-party ventures.  
Second, the beneficiary voice is nuanced and these nuances matter:  voice 
receiving, voice making and voice taking may differentially transform social interactions 
and political structures. In offering a new narrative of capitalism, Freeman, Martin and 
Parmar advocate ―stakeholders as essential to value creation and trade‖ (2007: 304). Yet 
their principles for stakeholder capitalism, which focuses on individuals voluntarily 
working together to create sustainable relationships, are silent on how to achieve this 
state particularly for those segments of society who are disadvantaged, marginalized or 
disenfranchised. This study explains the critical theory underpinnings and the theoretical 
implications of voice receiving, voice making and voice taking.  
Third, explicating the role of the beneficiary in value creation calls for a 
rethinking of the role of actors outside the firm (who may not have an existing 
relationship with the firm) in our major management theories. The firm centric view can 
be limiting theoretically because it excludes outside influences on value creation (and 
destruction). For example, RBV has so far considered only resources that the firm can 
appropriate to further the goals of the firm but RBV could gain new theoretical grounds 
from understanding how beneficiaries transform these resources. Other firm-centric 
theories stand to benefit equally from explicating when and how beneficiaries matter. 
King, for example, challenged the transaction cost perspective in an effort to specify 
―when and how firms act as sources of positive social change‖ (2007: 889); we feel that 
re-thinking the role of the beneficiary can help in this endeavour.  
 
160 
 
 
Relational Processes of Social Innovation 
The second study contributes to the growing recognition in the cross-sector 
partnership literature that relational processes are important (Seitanidi, 2008), deepening 
our understanding of how advancing and/or repairing relationships through the iterative 
processes of recalibrating roles enables social innovation in cross-sector partnerships. It 
bridges practice-based insights on the staged evolution of cross-sector partnerships 
(philanthropic, transactional, and integrative) with relational perspectives on the 
processes of social value creation in adversarial and collaborative cross-sector 
relationships to offer a grounded elaboration of the framing literature in the specific 
context of cross-sector partnerships. Social value framing and risk framing shape the 
genesis of the cross-sector partnership and the (re)calibration of the roles each partner 
offers.   
Attention to the relational processes within the cross-sector partnership has 
several theoretical implications for management research. First, the act of formation of 
the cross-sector partnership is not a one time event; it is socially elaborated and depends 
on both partners. It is nonlinear and the stages are progressive, often without a clear 
demarcation. The process is punctuated by changes in partner‘s positions and roles that 
are shifting which affords multiple opportunities to make the relationship work or fail. 
And each partner can easily unilaterally stall the partnership. Thus an explicitly relational 
perspective offers a more accurate description than a contractually based account. This 
relational perspective both distinguishes the cross-sector partnership from interfirm 
alliances and opens new directions for relational theorizing within the broader domain of 
interfirm alliances.  
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Second, the learning literature has recently examined how organizations learn not 
only from successes and failures but also from the ambiguous ―grey zone‖ between 
success and failure where it is unclear whether an approach was successful or not (Rerup, 
2006). Our findings offer cross-sector partnerships as fruitful contexts for theorizing and 
analyzing this grey zone. We argue and show that neither failure nor success is lasting or 
unconditional; both hinge on partners‘ relational flexibility and adaptability. We see great 
promise in studying different contexts (including cross-sector partnerships) as important 
contingencies to the grey zone argument.   
Last, social processes within an organization are well recognized as hindering or 
facilitating innovation (Garud & Nayyar, 1994; Bartel & Garud, 2009). A new study 
(Garud, Gehman, & Kumaraswamy, forthcoming) tackles the social processes of 
innovation in a single organization. They ―theorize that combinations of relational and 
temporal practices represent interwoven complexity arrangements. These interwoven 
complexity arrangements afford organizational actors multiple agentic orientations as 
innovation journeys unfold‖ (Garud et al., forthcoming: 3-4.). Our study supports this 
understanding of the process of innovation and points to the extension of learning for 
both partners as well as the cross-sector partnership itself.   
Value Frame Fusion 
In the third study, we offer a theoretical elaboration of the framing literature 
(specifically micro-frame alignment) which originally explored interactions between 
individuals and social movement organizations and recently tackled  frame 
transformation processes within single organizations, by applying core framing 
propositions to frame transformation processes across two distinct domains (economic 
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and social value) and two distinct logics of operations and governance (for profit and 
nonprofit organizations). Our analysis brought forth an interesting and counterintuitive 
insight – the more the partners worried about their mis-es, the more likely they were to 
invest in reframing their approach to social value creation. Their commitment to revising 
their prognostic frames was an essential and necessary step which both preceded and 
informed their novel basis for co-creating social value in the partnership. Theoretically, 
bringing the processes of cross-sectoral frame transformations to the fore of social 
innovation research shows that deliberate efforts to align their value frames offers 
partners an alternative path to co-creating social value, even in cases when they do not 
intend or are not successful at forging a collective identity. Because the process of 
framing itself is transforming, it provides a necessary but still missing link in extant 
theorizing about social innovation in cross-sector partnerships.  
Second, the framing process should be of great interest to institutional theorists, 
particularly those developing new institutional theory. If cross-sector partnerships fuse 
together key elements of different logic, this process may hold a new key to 
understanding the development of other hybrid arrangements that cross sectoral (or 
institutional) boundaries. Tracey, Phillips and Jarvis, who have recently studied hybrid 
organizations, advocate for the development of a new hybrid logic by ―bridging two 
conflicting logics – the logic of for-profit retail and the logic of nonprofit homelessness 
support‖ (2010: 1-2). We strongly second their advice. 
Third, we found that the framing processes represent an important if so far 
neglected, source of value creation, which can enrich theorizing on value creation 
(Lepak, Smith & Taylor, 2007). Perhaps more importantly, our focus on social innovation 
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draws attention to the under-theorized role of social value creation in mainstream 
theorizing.  
Overall 
Although each paper makes unique theoretical contributions as highlighted above, 
the greatest contribution however, lies in their combination. Their collective contribution 
is a more openly social theorizing about the phenomenon of social innovation —going 
beyond the confines of mainstream strategy theories to explore processes and 
contingencies unique to the domain of cross-sector partnerships. The set of studies offers 
a fresh, rich and distinctly relational perspective on social innovation in cross-sector 
partnerships by recasting processes of relating as one important but so far neglected 
source of value creation in general (Study 1) and social innovation more specifically 
(Study 2 and 3).  
Moving forward, cross sector partnership theorizing would benefit from 
incorporating four working premises. 1) Beneficiaries are absent without voice in most of 
the cross-sector partnership literature. Theorizing with the exclusion of beneficiaries 
severely limits our understanding. Future studies should bring to the fore three rather than 
two actors (beneficiary, nonprofit organization and for-profit organization). 2) 
Understanding the relational processes between and among these three actors (bilateral 
and tripartite) is of utmost importance as social innovation is enacted through, and 
depends on these relational processes. 3) Shifting perspective to view the same 
phenomenon from the perspective of the different actors can uncover virgin theoretical 
ground. Although cross-sector partnerships are relationally onerous, it is precisely the 
(different perspectives) on these effortful processes of alignment that can bring social 
innovation about. 4) A relational perspective can also inform the evolving definition of 
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social innovation. While the very thinking of what social innovation means is still being 
developed, we have shown the merit of rethinking social innovation as an important by-
product of cross-sectoral relationships. 
An important next step in theorizing social innovation requires a deeper 
understanding of the tensions and synergies between economic and social value creation 
and the role of relational processes in leveraging the two. While our research questions 
did not specifically address the coevolution of social value creation and economic value 
creation, ―exchanges‖ between the actors helped us see the need to explore this co-
evolution and even the conversion of one to the other and the mechanisms that enable it. 
We are particularly interested in whether, when and how relational processes may enable 
or hinder the social-economic value conversion, but other mechanisms may also be 
important. Complexity theory may further stretch our collective understanding by 
identifying the simple rules and principles that attract and shape social-economic value 
conversions. 
Finally, the context of cross-sector partnerships can offer a window into the future 
of institutional arrangements by understanding how competing institutional logics may 
come together. Relational and framing processes may also contribute a fresh lens from 
which to understand the emergence and diffusion of alternative hybrid forms of 
organizing – cross-sector theorists ought not ignore these alternatives: some  may even 
internalize or ‗cannibalize‘ the social innovation function of cross-sector partnerships.  
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The practical implication of the collective findings is a greater understanding of 
why some cross-sector partnerships are more successful than others. Engaging the 
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beneficiaries as active participants and contributors to social innovation and not just as 
recipients of the goodwill of the cross-sector partnership tackles the very essence of the 
power structure within society and is essential for the desired social transformation. The 
very act of inclusivity begins the journey of transformation. This is counterintuitive as it 
is assumed that the powerful successful organizations have the knowledge to enact 
change.  
The main insight from our grounded investigation is the importance of how 
partners relationally (re)engage each other. The process of co-creating social value is rife 
with differences and difficulties, yet mindful practicing helps partners recalibrate their 
roles as the relationship unfolds in order to sustain momentum towards success or reverse 
momentum from failure to success. Our analyses show that shared goals are resilient to 
partnership friction, but reaching these goals requires gradual progression through 
iterative role recalibrations. When partners take steps to deliberately recalibrate their 
roles, they tighten the coupling between social value creation and risk; this fast-tracks 
success or helps them overcome premature failure.  
Last but perhaps the most actionable insight comes from the enabling effects of 
relational improvisation on value frame fusion. Our framework helps cross-sector 
partners troubleshoot ‗zigzagging‘ interactions, by walking them through the benefits and 
downsides of frame negotiation, elasticity, plasticity and fusion, and by explaining how 
they can engage transitions from one stage to the next. Second, we identify several 
leverage points by providing examples of coordination mechanisms that help partners not 
only overcome sector differences but at times even immerse themselves, totally and 
excitedly in a different sector to experience a new understanding of value. Although we 
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do not set up to compare the relative effectiveness of alternative mechanisms, and our 
findings are subject to the usual limitations of qualitative research, we offer one 
motivating insight for researchers and practitioners grappling with cross sector 
interaction. Simply put, we show that effective value creation across sector boundaries 
require effective ongoing interactions; these interactions are at least a necessary 
complement to strategic efforts, and at best an effective means to effectuate catalytic 
social change.  
REFLEXIVITY STATEMENT 
During the five years prior to entering the doctoral program at the Richard Ivey 
School of Business, I was a senior executive at a Health Research Institute. One of my 
responsibilities was to develop relationships with industry – predominantly with medical 
device companies. To leverage government grant monies, the Institute needed to have 
industry partners. We were able to engage some companies but others not at all. Some 
partnerships were deemed successful and met both parties‘ expectations. Other 
partnerships never got off the ground or started off well but disintegrated prior to initial 
expectations being met. These differences puzzled me and thus formed the basis of my 
dissertation work. These experiences might have biased me to a ―view from the top‖ 
similar to the participants in the two empirical studies. We thus address this potential 
limitation in studies 2 and 3. 
Given my previous work, I was either known by reputation to the participants in 
this study or was introduced and endorsed by a highly regarded and well known national 
health care leader. This may have influenced a ―social desirability‖ bias in the responses 
from participants even though complete confidentiality and anonymity was assured. We 
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addressed this potential limitation to the two empirical studies through triangulation of 
interviews and archival materials, and comparison within a dyadic partnership. But more 
convincing is the frankness displayed by the participants in describing some of the 
dynamics internal to the organization as well as within the partnership. Their, at times, 
negative comments discount the social desirability bias claim.  
Finally, my first career was in psychiatric and community health nursing. I had 
first hand observations of the struggles of individuals with mental health issues and of 
single parent women and their children living in a subsidized housing development. More 
recently I have had volunteer experiences with helping refugees navigate their way 
through our social systems. Thus the critical management studies literature resonates with 
me and the standpoint of the beneficiary in value creation is of personal interest to me.    
LIMITATIONS 
The two qualitative studies share three important limitations with case-based 
inductive theory building studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003a, 2003b). First, the cases 
were selected to afford causal inferences (Tsoukas, 1989) – and while we are comfortable 
that these causal inferences generalize to other cross-sector partnerships, we acknowledge 
the possibility (indeed the desirability) of further scrutinizing our findings in other 
contexts (Eisenhardt, 1989: 547). This applies particularly to our non-profit partners, 
which were part of or associated with the same divisional organization (albeit 
independent of each other) - a multi-site health centre and its research institute. We 
followed a comparative case design because multiple-case studies often provide a 
stronger base for inductive theory building (Yin, 2003b). Since the usual process of data 
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analysis and data collection in qualitative research is iterative (Corbin & Strauss, 2008), 
adding additional cases and data would enrich our understanding across contexts.  
The same limitation of restriction of range applies more broadly to the type of for-
profit and non-profits partners selected, which by intent and design represented cases of 
positive deviance – that is, they engaged in social innovation before and better than their 
sectoral peers. We captured significant portions of the evolution with our original 
longitudinal design, but it would be really interesting to understand how the same 
partners ‗shorten‘ or lengthen the cycle of their processes in subsequent partnerships and 
how later adopters of cross-sector partnerships may move slower or faster. This 
replication would allow us to study what changes in the causal mechanisms depending on 
the type of cross-sector partnership. 
And although archival data and retrospective reports enabled us to reconstruct a 
rich narrative for each dyad, we only have real-time interview data with their leaders for a 
portion of the duration of each partnership. This limitation notwithstanding, prolonged 
engagement in the field, the combination of primary and archival data collection 
mechanisms and especially our repeated efforts to triangulate, elaborate and validate the 
accounts of the strategic leaders increase our confidence that the relational and framing 
processes and the frames themselves are presented accurately, albeit at only one layer of 
relational interactions. There is enough evidence to suggest research at and across other 
levels (Seitanidi, 2008) would be pertinent and enlightening because it would get us 
closer to multiple voices first hand.  
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FUTURE RESEARCH 
Research Extensions 
A restricted range of the phenomenon was purposefully chosen in this dissertation 
as it allowed meaningful cross-dyad comparison (across issues and times) while each of 
the dyads themselves were first in class – and selected as such. This we felt was 
beneficial given the theory-building stance in the two qualitative studies, and the need to 
get closer to the causal relationships, pinning down contingencies and contexts (Tsoukas, 
1989). We have done so, but are mindful of the need to replicate the findings (validate or 
invalidate) depending on the characteristics of the non-profit organizations involved, e.g. 
community focus, research focus, and visibility.  
The extension underway includes a double replication - both a nonprofit centred 
extension as well as a for-profit design extension. The nonprofit sample will add two 
different hospital/health research institute sites, following the same dimensions for 
sampling across types of innovation and activity focus: four (independently-run) cross-
sector partnerships for each. We will continue to deliberately sample for variation within 
the nonprofit organization‘s partners as done in the two previous studies (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994) to maximize opportunities for comparison and contrast (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007). The eight additional partnerships will focus on different social goals, 
differ in the resource commitments required and their anticipated life course, may have 
been championed by different parties, and may have met with different degrees of 
success. Where possible, we will include partnerships involving some of the same for-
profit partners (e.g. Energy Conservation) or similar for-profit partners (e.g. 
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Telecommunications) so that we can examine the possibility of learning within partner 
and across subsequent partnerships. 
The for profit centred design extension uses a snowball sampling strategy
1
 (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994: 28), where each of the for-profit partners, identified by the nonprofit 
organizations in the larger study, are asked to identify at least one distinct nonprofit 
partner (from the nonprofit organizations included in the initial study and the two 
nonprofit organizations studied in the extension) with whom they implemented a similar 
innovation, most likely after the partnerships analyzed in this dissertation. This will add 
another 4 – 12 dyads (depending on the overlap of for-profit partners between the 
nonprofit organizations) to help us get at the issue of sequentiality and time-varying 
processes. The total extension is a minimum of 12 dyads in addition to the 4 dyads 
studied in this dissertation giving us an expanded context from which we can theorize. 
The double replication study also affords us an opportunity to explore further 
contingencies to the findings already identified (Tsoukas, 1989) and also more 
importantly, to advance our understanding of cross-sector partnerships from relational 
processes to the generative mechanisms of value creation at the interface between 
economic and social value creation. Our research speaks to one and only one layer of 
relational interactions – but there is enough evidence to suggest research at and across 
other levels would be pertinent and enlightening (Klein, Tosi, & Cannella, 1999). The 
questions of how economic and social value co evolves and what the practices of value 
conversion are, require additional cross-level layers of understanding and perspectives. 
The initial inclusion criteria for each partnership selected were business and nonprofit 
(hospital) executives who have the knowledge and authority to discuss cross-sector 
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partnerships involving their organization. Going forward, efforts will be made to include 
as many voices as possible both within each dyad and across organizational levels (for 
anyone participating directly or indirectly in the cross-sector partnership) including 
beneficiaries.  
This extension will support a research program that will explore applications and 
extensions of complexity theory to cross-sector partnerships, specifically the patterns of 
self organizing (simple rules or principles of value conversion) (Stacey, 2001) of cross-
sector partnerships. The focus will be on intentional social transformations – in the 
broader context of ―life as it is: unpredictable, emergent, evolving and adaptable‖ 
(Westley et al., 2006: 7). 
Research Directions 
This research opens up a number of unanswered questions for future research both 
theoretically and empirically. Some particularly interesting avenues of research include 
the processes of value conversion (economic to social and vice versa) and various forms 
of hybrid organizing that advance social innovation. Complexity theory holds much 
promise for theorizing about social innovation.    
The social enterprise literatures describe the juxtaposition of social and economic 
value – using typologies, blends, frameworks, and/or configurations (Short, Moss & 
Lumpkin, 2009) but offer few guidelines on how managers may deliberately (re)align 
them. The concept of value conversion is anecdotal at best in this literature. And it is 
silent on the mechanisms of value conversion. The context of cross-sector partnerships 
would be well suited to such investigation. 
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New organizational forms are emerging as agents of social innovation. Hybrid 
organizations defined as both market-oriented and common-good mission-centered 
entities (Boyd et al., 2009)
2
 blur the distinctions and boundaries between nonprofit and 
for-profit forms and (re)couple economic and social value creation within the 
organizational boundaries. Given our interest in the framing processes of cross-sector 
partnerships, which brings the different logics of two organizational forms together, the 
internalization of these two logics raises some intriguing questions about the role of 
institutional logics in the creation of organizational forms. Greenwood et al. highlights 
that ―organizational forms - are manifestations of, and legitimated by, institutional 
logics‖ (2009: 2). Recent work by Tracey et al. (2010) looks at processes of bridging 
institutional entrepreneurship that create new hybrid logics. With the paucity of studies of 
hybrid organizations, much work is yet to be done in understanding the processes that 
these hybrids use for social transformation (or perhaps hybrid organizations are the 
transformation).  
There is still much we do not know about the processes of social innovation. The 
approach from a complexity theoretical lens would be to study the self-organizing 
processes as they occur. As the understanding of these processes becomes deeper, the 
simple rules and principles that pattern social innovation emerge.   
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Social innovation by its very definition challenges existing social systems and 
institutions in order to address today‘s most pressing local and global social issues. 
Collaborative cross-sector partnerships hold promise as a vehicle of social innovation. 
The three studies included in this dissertation jointly suggest and find that relational 
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processes (beneficiary voice, relational contingencies, and relational framing) are 
important contributors to social innovation and explain how each process recasts and 
enriches mainstream theories and how each advances the collective project of cross-
sector partnership research.  
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NOTES 
1 A snowball or chain sampling strategy ―identifies cases of interest from people who 
know people who know what cases are information-rich‖ (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 28). 
 
2
 These hybrid organizations are also known as Fourth Sector, Blended Value, For-
Benefit or B-Corporations as well as social enterprise. The introduction of new laws to 
regulate these new entities such as an L3C Statute (Low Profit Limited Liability 
Company) in several states in the United States or the CIC Regulations (Community 
Interest Corporations) in the United Kingdom legitimizes and propels the hybrid 
momentum. 
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